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APPlmxx 
A. Booster System Engineer (BSE) 
B. R e t r o f i r e  O f f i c e r  (Re-) 
C. might Dynamics O f f i c e r  (mDO) 
D. Guidance O f f i c e r  (0) 
E. CSM Electrical and Ehvironmntal O f f i c e r  (EECOM) 
F. CSM Guidance and N a v i g a t i o n  O f f i c e r  (GNC) 
G. LM Electrical, Environn-ental, and EMJ O f f i c e r  (TELW) 
H. LM C o n t r o l  O f f i c e r  (Control) 
I. I n s m t a t i o n  and commicatim O f f i c e r  (IN031 
J. Procedwes O f f i c e r  (Procedures) 
K. Flight A c t i v i t i e s  O f f i c e r  (FM) 
L. k m n ~ d i c a l  O f f i c e r  (Surgeor,) 
M. Recovery Operations 
N. N e t w r k  Operations 
This mission operations report contains the scory of 13-e Ap011.o 13 
flight operation as seen in r ea l t b .  An attanpt has been made t o  
describe the situations, the various alternatives available, the deckions 
mde, and -the reasons for those decisians. No data is used except that 
available in &time even in those cases where post-mission data shws 
the ~ a l - t i r e  data t o  be ir. m r .  
The basic mission narrative is contained in Section 111 (FligLt 
Director's Report) and identifies the team by color. The corresponding 
flight directors ar?e: 
White - Eugene F. Kranz 
Black - G14m S. Lunney 
Gold - Gerald D. Griffin 
Marwn - Milton L. W i n d l e r  
There are several aspects of the mission which deserve special note 
although these do mt appear in the narrative. First of all, the procedures 
used in  recovering from the mmaly were, i n  a pat m y  instances, 
fair ly w e l l  thou&t out p m i s s i m .  For e q l e :  The Ul jettison 
sequence and tim, the 1l.1 operatian at minimum  coo^, the midcourse 
a l i g p m t  technique, and the procedm t o  separate the LM and the Satum 
S-IVB stage o o d c a t i o n  frequency t o  nam a few. When new procedures 
w a e  required o r  &en existing procediis had to be reviewed, the core 
of the p d s s i o n  planning team was used. This resulted in well coordinated, 
quickly defined procedures. 
Another important aspect is that prwnission work with LM system and 
CSM system in minimum power configurations mntributed greatly t o  the 
ability t o  provide suitable systerns CQnfiguMtians for the Pgollo 13 case. 
This tmrk also provided an additional mility that w a s  available through 
-duty cycles. Forhmately 6 was not required, but the point 
should be mde that there was a level of operations availabe that muld 
have resulted in  LE.: water and battery power usage rates well below the 
f ina l  stabilized mtes obtained. 
Also, a conscientious effort was mde to l e t  the crew set  the rest/ 
wrk cycles. This resulted in  the Mission Control Center holding m y  
mn-critical procedural i t em until  W m m c t  crew member w a s  available. 
The total f l ight  control team for this mission had been built around 
a four shif t  operatim. This waked out very w e l l  in that the teani which 
had prepared for -the entry phase (simulations, checklist review, etc. 1 
could be taken out of the normal rotation and devote full tirrre for -two 
days to  the I-= t i rel ine and p m e d m s  for entry. These sank? people 
then executed this W y  critical phase. 
Finally it &%uld ke obvious that the sinailation prsamel in both 
the Flight Cantrol Division and the Flight C k w  Support Division played 
a very important role in preparing both the c r e w  and the p u n d  team for 
abnormal o p e ~ t i o n a l  mGes. 
The Pgollo 13 flight w a s  essentially follotv-ing the ncmiral n i g h t  
plan prior t o  55 hours 53 minutes elapsed tinre. The c a t e r  engine on 
the S-I1 stage of the S a m -  launch vehicle shut down about 2 minutes 
early, but t h i s  ha6 no effect' on imertion into E& Orbit o r  on Trans- 
lunar Injection. ?he Saturn S-IVB stage.had been successfully t a r p t e d  
toward the planned lunar inpact area near lk Apollo 1 2  seismmeter. The 
launch vehicle debriefing with the c r e w  h3d been mnpleted, and entry 
into the Lunar m u l e  had been mde about 3 hm?s early t o  inspect the 
supercritical helium pressq= in the descent propulsion system. This 
pressure was  satisfactory, and no further action was conterrplaLed. 
A t  55+53 GET, a C o m d  Wdule computer rest= was observed, fol- 
lowed by a repor€ fm the crew tha t  a main bus B u n d m l t a g e  had c c ? c m d  
about the sane t h  as a "loud bang.'' There was a short pernd  during 
which the Control Center and the c r e w  sorted out the false in:licatiois 
f r o m  the t rue anomalies, but it quickly becam apparent tha t  one of 'the 
two cryogenic oxygen tanks and lxm of the three fuel cells had been 
lost.  The Com~nd Module systems were amfigured to protect the entry 
capabjlity, Efforts were concentrated on attempting t o  save the &- 
ing oxygen tank. These efforts  proved t o  be fu t i l e  and at 57+35 GET, 
the CDR and LMP were entering the Lunar  Wdule (LM) t o  establish corn 
munication and l i f e  support functirns. The UC guidance system w a s  
powered up and aligned to preserve a rrraneuver capability and at 58+40, 
the CSM was mq1ete ly  powered down. About 20 anp hours had been used 
from the t o t a l  of 120  amp hours available in the CM entry batteries. 
Once the s y s t w  situatim had stabilized, the Control Center's 
attention turned t o  the -trajectory plan. The current status was that 
the spacecraft was on a n o n m  return trajectory which muld require 
a significant maneuver t o  change t o  sa t i s fadmy entry canditi~ns. A 
direct return t o  ear43 with landing time of 118 hours GFT was possible 
only by using the Service Module p p u l s i o n  system and j e t t i s n i n g  the 
LM. This option was - a v a i l a b l e  for obvious reasons and x~duced the 
ansiderations t o  either: (a) Execute a h d i a t e  40 fps midcourse 
correction t o  a free return trajectory (landing a t  152 hours GET in the 
Indian Ocean). There would then be an opportuniiy t o  reduce the trans- 
earth coast t h  by rraking a mneuver about 2 hours after flying by the 
m n .  
o r  (b) waiting to make the first nmeuvm unti l  about 2 how3 after 
flying past the m n .  
The plan adopted (and which was essentially unchanged) w a s  t o  exe- 
cute an h d i a t e  midcourse correction t o  a h e  return trajectory, 
evaluate the aonsumables with the intention of keeping the L&! guidance 
system powered up thru the m j o r  meuvers  i f  a t  a l l  possible, and execut- 
ing a m j o r  iM descent engine burn about 2 hours af ter  passing the m n  
(79+30 GET). 
The primary effort  for the d d e r  of the mission was  directed 
towards establishing th various procedures required for the m y  non- 
standard operations, i.e., CM battery charging fram LN batteries, CM 
LiOII cannister use on LM e n v h r m n t a l  control system, no-optics align- 
mt for  maneuvers, w a t e r  transfer from CM and portable life support 
system tanks t o  LM tanks, Service Mule jettisan, and many others. 
The 03nsumable situation continued to improve and stabilize t o  the 
point where it was feasible t o  leave the LM guidance system powered up 
unt i l  the descent engine mneuver with every expectation that the systems 
a u l d  easily be managed t o  stay within the answnable quantities available. 
This proved to be the case and af ter  the m j o r  maneuver at 79+30 GET, the 
usage rates had dropped t o  be clearly compatible w i t h  the landing tim. 
Sufficient workaround procedures had also been established t o  provide 
margins should t k r e  be subsequent loss of batteries, w a t e r  tanks, o r  
oxygen tanks ir; the W. 
There were several options available fo r  the nmeuver a t  79+30 GFT 
( 2  hours af te r  l u r a  flyby). These included jettisoning the Service 
bdule  b e f o ~  the bum and burning the descent engine t o  near depletion. 
Tie comsumbles status did not justify gokg t o  either of these ex-trwnes, 
and the maneuver w a s  targeted t o  reduce the landing t h  frr>m 152 hours 
GET t o  142 hours GET and change the landing area f r o m  the Indian Ocean 
t o  the Pacific Ocean. This allowed a comfortable propellant margin fo r  
f u t m  midcourse corslections. 
The transearth coast portion was  dewted t o  getting the ground 
developed p r o e d u e s  up t o  the crew at the proper tines and in  executing 
two small m i d a m e  adjus-brwts t o  the -trajectory. The consumable status 
had continued as predicted, and the LJ4 w a s  pawered up early t o  help warm 
up the crew and allow them a better chance t o  rest. This early power up 
also allowed a LM Primary G'uidance and Navigation System alignmnt which 
w a s  l a t e r  -transferred t o  the a4 Guidance $stem saving semral  minutes in 
the critical preentry phase. 
The SM was jettisoned abcut 4-1 ,'2 hours prior t o  entry interface (EI) 
and the CM power up procedm started a t  EI - 2 hours 30 minutes. The 
CM Guidance System w a s  fine aligned and the LM was jettisoned at E I  - 
1 hour. A l l  CM Systems furictioned properly during entry and the landing 
could be seen f r o m  TV on board the recovery ship. The crew w e  mcovezled 
in 45 minutes and were in good cori;lition. 
MISSION OFERATIWS mKT 
SECTIrn I11 
FLIGHT DIRECTORS REPORT 
FOR APOLU) 13 
Miltcn L. Windler - Maroon 
Pl?elaunch: 
The majar premunt activity started &en the Black Team came on duty 
at 2:00 a.m. CST w i t h  the clock holding at T-9 hours, and the network 
1 
c a n t  t o  l i f tof f  at T-11: 20 and counting. The anly netwark problem w a s  
-the Honeysuckle MSFN Station carmand caxputer which was occasianally 
faulting. There w a s  no estimate on the problem, lxlt we were still GO 
without a cmmd &tcr at Honeysuckle. (This p b l e m  continued t o  
exist  unt i l  56+47 GET when a temporary f i x  w a s  made t o  chassis and 
the problem never retumed. Balloon and landing point prediction proc- 
essing was normal thrcughout the mt with m land landings even fcr the 
negative Ebergency Detection System limits. At  T-7 : 32, the weather 
r e p 3  included an area in the Atlantic w i t h  28 knot winds and 8-10 Coot 
seas. This represented abort times fKm 6 minutes 30 secands t o  8 &tes 
10  seco~lds Gxund Elapsed Time (m) and was cansidered acceptable. A t  
T-5:34, the Vanguard MSFN Statian cen-tral data pmcssa r  was r e w e d  
"zed-cannot support." This affected the law and high speed Mdar tracking, 
hcwever, the Berrmda MSEN Station caverage was adequate t o  prowed. A 
t e m p o m  fix was attempted, ht the p m . ~ ? s s o ~  -never was usable. 
There was a problem w i t h  m t i n g  the use of the long- fm 
patching the Cape Kennedy t e s t  c h a i i l  214 t o  the MCC. This s h l d  be 
addressed again prim t o  the mxt mission t o  assure that all parties kna~ 
and agree t o  the plan. 
About this time (T-2 : 001, a weather repart of about 16 foot swells 
on both sides of the previously defined marginal weather was received. 
'All times am hDIIIg ard minutes unless o t h e d s e  noted. 
After oonsidering t h i c  for  a time, and the pcssibi l iw of a 2' (20 minute) 
launch azimuth s l ip ,  anothw weather report was received with a mxrement 
of the marginal weather significantly t o  the south. After sane discussion, 
it was clear that there was nothing t o  be gained by slipping the &th, 
and the w o r s t  weather area was now d m  t o  an abort GET of 7 t o  8 minutes 
with the sam 8-10 foot seas and 28 h o t  wirds. There were other mparts 
f m n  the area not as bad as this, and we elected t o  c a n t h e .  
The Maroan Team came on shift xi T-2: 00, and the only other anamdly 
prelaunch was a procedural error ir, failing t o  console select the BSE far 
camanding ?he launch abort check sequene a t  T-1:55. 
Launch, Translunar Injectian, and LM Ex-traction: 
Liftoff occurred at 1913:OO as scheduled. A l l  functions were 
m n h a l  unt i l  the S a m  s-11 center engine shut dam at 5 minutes, 31 
nemnds (abcut 2 m i n  1 2  sec early). This presented no f l ight  control 
pmblems and the rest of the stage perfarmed romindlly. There was m 
doubt abmt being GO for  Translunar Injection (TLI), and the f l ight  was 
normal through TLI &though sane instrumentation was inopemtive on the 
Saturn SIVS. 
Transposition, docking, and IM extraction r e =  normal witJ~ satisfactmy 
TV cwemge. The Entry Fbnitorixg System AV bias masurem~ats w e r e  kkCm 
and the results incorporated i n  the midcourse maneuver pad. The 
Midcourse Correction at 30+40 GEZ was expected t o  be ncminal; and, as 
planned, the MCC-1 (a t  11+41) was not executed. 
SIVB Lunar Impact: 
The SIVB lunar impact maneuvers were executed successfully as planned. 
There was a ques t i~n  whether the SNB Attitude Pru,pulsian System (APS) 
MCC-1 a t  6+00 GET should be based an the Bemda tracking vectar instead 
of the p d m m  vectm w;th a rrminal TLI mile applied. m v e r ,  these 
ttm vectors wre similar; and s k u  the imackiq after the r l l 3  MCC-1 
indicated that the SIVB uaild land within the target a, it was decided 
mt to a t t q t  further midccxlrse -. The SIR3 telemtry ard 
attitude mtml was last at 19+24, but tkre was no difficulty in 
tmkhg the S-Band b e a m .  An apparent AV impulse was abselved about 
t h e t i m e o f ~ ' t r y a n d c o n ~ l o s s , b u t t h i s ~ t o ~ t h e  
landing point closer to the target. The landing point varied slightly 
as the -tMcking data uas abtakd. Ibever by 36+00 the point stabilized. 
Translunar mast: 
The Gold Tean cane cn duty at 6+00 a d  all flight plan items =re 
acrmrplis,?ed nowrdlly until it was time to establish Passive T h e 4  
Control (FTC) at appmximtely 7+33. T k  f b t  attempt to es tab l i sh  PIT 
resulted in a very wide  and dive&ng caning angle, and the Pl'C had to be 
reestablished, Several problems w x e  detected in the first attempt-the 
major ones beirg tha t  in mder to gdt a final mil rate of .3O/sec, -the 
Digital &to Pilot (UP) nust be loaded w i t h  a M t e  of . 3 7 ~ ~ / s e c ,  anl all 
thrusters mst be enabled in roll. Althagh GNC stated that this was the 
.sane as Apollo 12, the checklist rrn the flight plan d l e c t e d  the 
UP load; and the cllew was rot -tly ware Wt "okerl-' the 
was re~uired. The thruster enabling was a late pen and ink change to the 
checllist. After the crew was advised uf the p p e r  PTC procedures, FTC 
was stab! w i t h  very gcad results. A t  9+10, GNC reported that the 
Service M e  Propulsion System (SPS) audxzw . . tank pressure was s l d y  
deaeasing but that it was expected and was attributed to helium absorptiool. 
A t  9+24, GU'$IXI reported that tire CHP had entered a V37 into the Carmand 
ibchle C b p t t . ~  at an h p q e r  ti- &-!ng -the P 2 3  navigation 
sightings and that certain bi t s  had not been set properly in the computer. 
A a m c t i v e  pmedure was read t o  the crew with a caution on h t o  avoid 
any shilw ocamences in the fu-. 
The Wte Tear came an duw at 13+51with PTC in progress an3 the 
crew asleep. 
RDO pointed out that ME-2 was presently scheduled for  30+41 GET 
and would be appmxhately 23 fps. QIC pointed out that the gyro drift was 
running about 1.5 n'aru and would eventually require updating. EECOEi 
reported no d e s  and a l l  cxMsumables were plus. He d s o  pointed 
out that fuel cell sharing with the sp l i t  bus configuration was running 
a b a t  as expected- 
A t  15+38, two questions - received fraa the Mission Director 
relative t o  the SII  early engine cutoff durirg the launch phase. These 
questims were passed m t o  the CAPCDM t o  be uplinked at the nrninal tim! 
in the flight plan for the booster perfonnance debiefing with -the crew. 
A t  18+31, EEC(321 ~ p t e d  that fuel cell 3 andenser exhaust t aq~re twe  
was fluctuating 1 .59  & a r t  every 70 semnds ; h-ver, this sort of thing 
had been seen on p ~ v i o u s  missions ard was ru t  q c t e d  t o  creat a pmblem. 
This trend o a n t h e d  un t i l  after the ME-2 .3& which time the fluctuation 
increased t o  6 OF abcut every 31 seconds. 
A t  20+01, REO3VERY reported a -pi=: stom' in -2 c- k t h  Pacific, 
and then wor3ced w i t h  REI'RO t o  make the ; k- .i;sary a d j u s m t s  t o  the 
25 and 35 hwr abort landing areas. 
Tfe Black Team care on duty at 22+01; w i t h  -&& c r ~ ;  asleep. The flight 
plan activity for this shift was  %ighIighted by the foil-. 
1. The Saturn Launch Vehicle debriefing questions. 
2. MCC-2 (which was  a transfer frrm the free return t o  a hybrid 
trajedory. 1 
3. P23 navigation sightings. 
4. Caoaet I3e.nnet.t photos. 
The P/T transducer on quad D was opemting m c t l y  at this t h  
but w a s  determined t o  give inaccurate d g s  at high SMRCS usage rates. 
Available SMRCS propellants *re slightly above the f l ight  plan projections. 
On the EEalM side, cryos wzre above the redlines; a suit pressure transducer 
was biased lw; glycol f l w  mate was 10#/hour lrxlFer than expected from 
previous missions; .two offline meetins were schemed t o  plan :or the 
LM supermitical helium (SHE> readout pmc&mes and t o  review final 
changes t.c. lunar orbit gi\oto plan. 
At 22+46, the potable H20 -cer mped t o  79% for a short t k  
and n3urned t o  100%. This was d u d e d  t o  be a tmnsducer problem of 
thz sane kind as seen on previaus missions. The crew called in at 23+11 
and started battery B charge. They had stated their dosimeters on the suits, 
and the ClP dosimeter would be available later. The StlEEXN understood 
and accepted that situation, ]ahowing the other readouts wuld be available 
when the cr?ew suited up tit the m=xxn. 
A t  24+41, -the W01 AF' confirmed a close-to-xmLnal decay rate in 
the LM. A t  25+ll, the Saturn debriefing was conducted and all questions 
were m d .  (Fbrther disawsians cm the LM .SHe were leading t o  the 
mnclusicn of an early entry into -the Ill, about GFT 55+00 h a m ,  W e  
the pressure readings for  various courses of action were still being 
finmi up.) A t  28+45, preparations began for -the ME-2 hun w i t h  
spacecraft televisicm on. The 23.2 fps MCC-2 was perfomd at 30+40+49 
and all burn pameters  were normal. 
The Marocm Team c a ~  an duty shmtly affcr the E - 2 ,  and at 32+00 
an e + k z t  was male t o  photcgqh carnet knnett. Hcwever, this was not 
t 
possible due t o  the sun shafting on the (;N optics. This shafting was 
expected, but the attempt was made since the canet wculd be cansidemble 
dimner on the transearth leg when no optics problems were  expected. 
Pn: was initialized at 32+25, ht had t o  be stopped and reini t i i l ized 
at 33+20. Apparently the W cammded a jet t o  f i r e  t o  slow d m  the roll 
mte causing divergene. 11.p- secon3 PTC was initialized successfully. 
A CSM Master Cautian and Warning (MEW) alarm cam on a f te r  the c r e w  
went t o  sleep due t o  I-$ tank #1 dropping k lcw MCEW limit before the heaters 
cycled on. lhis did n ~ t  happen again although the pressure came within 
1 pan cc~lnt of trippirlg the alarm on several other cycles. 
The Gold Team came on duty at 40+00 with the m w  aslsep. A t  43+00, 
the landing point fo r  the 60+00 ahr t  pint was moved t o  153% in order 
t o  avoid tropical s tom Helen. A t  wake-up (47+00) the UEW was requested 
t o  cycle the cryo fans per the namal pmcedure. Wen the a?ew cycled 
t k  fans in O2 tank #2, the gauging systen in +hat tank failed off scale 
high. A &out of the o n b a d  gauge confirmed an off scdle high read- 
ing. Loss of this gauge was of no great concern a t  this tinrr: since the 
tank status could be followed by manitoring pressure, T e m p e r a t u e ,  and 
the status of O2 tank #l. GNC noted a slight j i t t e r  in the optics 
Coupling Data Unit shaft readout and the crew was advised of the ananaly. 
A similar j i t t e r  was noted on Apollo 1 2  and was of no concern. The mew 
was advised t o  turn off the optics paer except when the optics were in use. 
Anamaly Period t o  Midccxlrse Correction ( to  Free Return) : 
The shift handwer t o  the White Team was canpleted at 49+00 GET. 
There were no major open items; the Flight Plan contained the original LM 
activation, SHe pressure verification, a TV pass, and establishment of 
VTC. The ME-3 nraneuver scheduled. at 55+25 was deleted since the ME-4 
was only 4 fps. The major f l ight  cmtml activity was  directed taward 
establishnent of a plan t o  avoid a a y o  H2 tank #2 lcw pressure C&W 
during the subsequent sleep period. 
The heaters in % tank #2 had been turned off at 47+00 in an attempt 
t o  see if the H2 tank #l heaters uolld m~ml the p m s m  at a higher 
level. By 49+40 the H2 heater cycles on tank #1 had s h a n  this t o  be 
-true. (The heater cane on at 233 psi,  and the CEW limit was 224.5). 
The plan then was t o  unbalance the 3 so that tank #1 w a s  about 3% higher 
than tank #2 for the sleep period. Tank #1 heater m l d  be left in auto 
fo r  the sleep period and tank #2 heater would be left off in order t o  
avoid MC&Wt s during the sleep period. 
A t  50+30, the CEW was briefed on -the changes t o  the Activatian 
Checklist in order t o  allm them t o  read out the Sle pressure. 
A t  51+00 the crew was requested t o  stir bcth cryots in order t o  mn- 
i t o r  the H2 b a l m  prior to d t m e n t  t o  our sleep plan ani i n  mder t o  
maintain a better M on the O2 since we had los t  the tank #2 sensor. 
A t  52+15, a new tmjectary update was made that indicated ME-4 vmld 
be less than 3.6 fps; all systens were n d ,  and the b t t q  B -e 
was initiated. The ME-2 Service Module Propulsicm System data was reviewed 
and it was noted that the thrust chmber pressure seemed about 4% below 
the preflight prediction. At  53+27, the ~ E U  was cleared t o  ingress the 
LM about 1 1/2 hwrs early, and LM press began at 53+34. A review of the 
analog playback of the O2 tank #2 gauging pmblan with ECUM shcued that 
the qyantity went thmugh 4 cycles, avenaging about :2% abcut 80% quantity, 
then went t o  100% quantity, and subsequently reJMined there. It w s  
assumed that the tmnsducer failed. A hardcopy of the amlog data was requested. 
The detailed SHe procedures were reviewed w i t h  SPAN, including .the 
pmcedues fo r  the IPS "Burp11 i f  it becam necessary. The m e w  canpleted 
the SHe verification at 54+40 w i t h  the pressure 710-720 psi,and no further 
action required. A t  54+59, the LM p e r  was  terminated and the TV was 
initiated a t  55+00. The Y2igh4aj.n Antenna (HGA) would mt work properly 
i n  AVrO o r  REACQ. (The crew t r ied  both the primary and secordary electrwlics 
and l&p w a s  finally obtained & manual. A maneuver t o  the PTC attitude 
was prescribed, and as the maneuver w a s  initiated, the H(;A locked up in 
R E A Q  and narrw b e d d t h ,  and worked m c t l y .  Wever ,  it was not 
understood haw this nwneuver caused the HGA t o  operate correctly in REACQ. 
Limited troubleshooting was attempted. 
The TV was  very good, and was terminated at 55+46. The battery B 
charge was tersninated at 55+50, and the battery was essentially topped 
off with 40 AH. Farther i so la t im of the E A  armnaly began by verifying 
cockpit switches and HGA pitch and yaw readouts. These proved t o  be 
normal and no further investigatim was  mde due to  the O2 anonaly. The 
crew was advised t o  stir the cry0 H2 and O2 for  the last the  prim t o  
the sleep period. A status check was run t o  verify proper canfiguration 
on LM closeout and start of the PTC ard rest period. Everything was 
normal ; the hatch was hing closed, and the LM heater a m e n t  was 
c y d h ~  properly. 
NOTE: The following pages discuss the anamly and are derived 
primarily f m  -the air-t0-m and f l ight  d h c t o r  loop 
voice tapes. Times are anly appmimate. 
A t  55+55, the Guidance Officer indicated that he had observed a 
Ccmnand Module Omputer hardware restmt. In rapid succession, the crew 
identified , "0 .K. , Houston, we have a pmblem. Main B undervolt." 
"Right m, Houston, the voltage is looking good; w e  ha3 a large bang 
associated w i t h  the CEW, and I recall Main B w a s  the one that had a 1 amp 
spike on it." The telemetry indicated many discrepancies, and EECOM 
identified we may have had a maim ins-tatian problem. ZNCO identified 
that we had a switch fmn narrow t o  widebeam. 
NOTE: A t  this time, I felt we had had a major short circuit  
that hocked rmch of the instrumentation offline, and 
that it might be related t o  the HGA aMmaly that occurred 
earlier. 
The sew gave a quick sumnary of the i r  CEW indications, and several 
of the Reaction Control System (RCS) flags associated with the helium 
and propellant i soh t ion  valves indicated closed. EECDM, at 55+58, 
indicated the c r e w  was  appanmtly attempting t o  reconfigure the fuel cells. 
A t  55+59, E E W  had enough confidence in the TI4 t o  give a Gck status: 
"We got Main A volts, no Main B volts. Attempt t o  connect fuel  cell #1 
t o  Main A, fue l  cell #3 t o  Main B. '' This was attempted by the crew with 
no success and they reported that the fuel  cell (FC) #1 and #3 talkbacks 
were grey (normal), but .there w e e  no reactant flows. 
Prim t o  the anmnaly, Main bus B was  configured t o  drive inverter 2 
and per AC bus 2. '&en the main bus B was  lost ,  the AC bus 2 was lost. 
The GNC had d t a r e d  a decay in SHRCS quad D manifold pressures, and 
believed that the quad heliwn isolation valve was closed. The w a s  
requested t o  reopen the D He i so la t im valve. 
I N 0  came back shortly a f t e r  GNC and identified that  tlae HGA switched 
beam width at 55+55+04, and I believed that the HGA could have been the 
cause; due t o  mncern on switching into a shorted system and my a m e r n  on 
the i n s m t a t i o n  rdiabi l i ty ,  I became quite cautious on further 
amfiguration changes. 
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The main bus A seemed t o  be holding up although the voltage was 
below the undervolt warning light. The EECQM recomnended attempting t o  
configure FC # l / d  bus B, FC #3/& bus A, d c h  wadd bring a different 
se t  of overload and reverse current sensors and motor switcks into action. 
Hawever, I decided not t o  take that calrse unt i l  I had a better feel  for  
the pmblem. 
The crew then provided us several madcuts at our request: 
FC #1 N3=0 psi 
FC #2 02=13 ps i  
The telemetry on main h s  A current indicated 52 amps which was  a b u t  
mmd, but the max that the FC can sustain. We were discussing putting a 
battery on main kus A at about the same time the c r e w  brought battery A 
anto main bus A. 
'lhagtmt a l l  of the above, the spacecraft was  d a t i v e l y  stable in 
attitude due to  the crew ex&hg ccmective attitude corrtrol, but 
~aow it was starting t o  d r i f t  anl we startec.? cmmi switching. Fortunately, 
we  w e r e  ablc t o  obtain good High B i t  Rate data fKm the 210-foot MSEN 
s i t e  at Goldstone. The Guidance Officer mted that the s p a c e d t  was  
mving in attitude and this was canfirmed by GNC when he confinred usage 
of about 25# cf SMRCS fuel. I then became mcemed that we had an SMRCS 
problem that may have precipitated the e l e m i d  problem . TheC was 
requested t o  ame up w i t h  a minimMl RCS fuel usage canfiguration. 
NOTE: W e r e  along here, I requested Glynn Lunney t o  advise 
center management that we had a majca, systems problem. 
The TELMU advised that LM heater a m e n t  had be-. static; I was 
not amcaned on this i t e m  ard advised him t o  ccnne back l a te r  an. 
GNC shortly thereafter advised me that the crew had turn& all  RCS 
thrusters aff.  By th is  time, the crew had given us tha requested FC N2 
and O2 readcuts; and after disarssim w i t h  EW, he recmmnded that 
fuel  cell #1 W d  be open-c-ted. This recarmendation was taken 
by the crew a t  about 56+08--about 13 minutes after the initial problem. 
The crew &vised that the cry0 O2 tank 82 quantity read zero. This 
was the quantity tmnsducer that  had been los t  previously, and was of no 
particular makn since it could also be related t o  the AC 2 loss. (AC 2 
powers the instnmntation. 1 
A t  56+14, the crew reported that they had looked out of' the hatch 
window and they were venting sanething. A l l  positions were requested t o  
check their systems fcrr, any venting. 
I then requested EEOOM t o  call in the i r  badcup people, and identified 
the p o s s i b i l i ~  of going t o  the LM as a lifeboat. 
NOTE: This is the first time that I considered that wi? were 
probably in a survival situation, and I started moving 
in the h c t i o n  of rafing the CSM while wing t o  m a i w  
ta in  enough main bus A pcx~er t o  a l l o w  a contmlled CS l  
perdown. 
A t  56+15, the GNC had an RCS configuratim t o  move quad C t o  main A, 
and place B3 and B4 on main A also. A t  the same the, we were drifting 
close t o  gimbal lock. 
The m s  performed the RCS configurntian as requested and advised 
they were seeing the vent through windm #1. 
An emergency p e r d m  was initiated at E E a Y  request at 56+15 per 
Crew m e n c y  checklist, page E 1-5. This muld make an initial pwer 
reduction of 10 A from main bus A. Shortly thereafter, the GNC sqgested 
w e  might attempt establishirg -the PTC before we powered dawn fktkm since 
the sun was apprmbately mrmal t o  t@ad A. This reammdat ian  was 
discussed, and due t o  the venting and the fact I di&llt  think we had 
adequate contr?ol or time, this nxcmmdatian was  notl accepted. 
The m continued the pawer down and at 56+22 had reduced the main 
bus A power t o  41 qs. S u b ~ e q u ~ t l y ,  they advised that the venting was 
giving -them rate  m -pit& and -xwll, and they were using DIRECT SMRCS 
t o  the rates. 
A t  abcut 56+25, EECOM requested that we p e r  up the AC 2 bus in 
order for  him t o  look at O2 tank #2 telanetry. He  also expressed the feeling 
that w e  had los t  2 fuel  cells and that we didn't have an i n s m t a t i o n  
problem. As a result ,  inverter 1 was canfigured t o  supply p e r  t o  both 
AC busses. I&* the emergency p e r  d m ,  the crew advised that per the 
checklist, they had turned FC #2 p m p  off, and asked us if we wanted it 
back an. We gave them an affirmative reply and the pump was placed an 
AC bus 1. 
A t  arcund 56+27, the a-w advised they wauld leave -the pmbe and 
dmgpe out unt i l  we gave them an O.K. t o  install it, and FIE0 reparted 
that they had seen venting in their tracking data. By 56+25, I had 
requested the Gmputer Super~isor t o  k i n g  up the Dynamic Standby Ccmputer, 
and standby foul telem-try delogs. The netwrk w a s  also brclllght up t o  maxirmm 
status with dual co~rmui7ication processors a d  activaticm of the Parkes 
210-foot site. (This was acmydished w i t h i n  24 hours and excellent support 
ccmtinued un t i l  splash. 1 The QJC was noting sustained f i r ing  frwn WRCS C3 
thrusters t o  ccruntemct the -pitch and -roll rates fmn the venting. 
The c r e w  requested us t o  verif3r that there was not sane spurious RCS j e t  
firings. The SMRCS was r e c o n f i e  per MCC request t o  place A3 on 
main bcls A. 
A t  56+31, EECOM, after revie* the data, identified +ht O2 tank 1 
pressure was at 318 ps i  and decaying, and that he wanted t o  per  d m  
further ~n? iur  t o  bringing the cry0 heaters on. The crew powered Body 
Mounted Attitude Gyro (W) 2 to  OFF, lights t o  mininum: (still per 
Crew Rnergency Checklist--additional items y e r e d  dawn as r~quired) ;  
and a t  MCC request, ope,~--circuitsd fuel  cell 83. 
A t  56+33, we had used about 7u# of SMRCS fuel;  the usage was  tapering 
aff, and we remmmded turning quad B off, and quad D t o  main b s  A. This 
wauld better balance the quads and eliminate concern that  quad B was causing 
tlle atti tude problem. 
Be-tween 56+34 and 56+35, EECOM remmended m v h g  battery A fm 
the main hs A, and also isolating the surge tank t o  preserve the en-&y 
oxygen supply. A t  56+36, the battery was off-line, and the main h s  A 
oxlld sustain the 5A load increase fran the O2 tank #1 heater. The 
amrent apparently increassd at 56+38 indicating the crew placed the heater ON. 
Subsequently, EECXlM recannended isolating the repress pack. I asked the 
AFD t o  get one of his backman personnel t o  keep a coherent spacecmft 
configuratian listing as we passed it up t o  the crew. Similarly, 24-hour 
LM Flight Controller mnning was initiated. 
By 56t40, we had seen no increase in. O2 tank pressure and the crew 
was requested t o  turn the tank 1 a y o  fans to  ON 'and check the q a  
&it breakers on Panel 226. The fans did mt m s t  the L2 p ? ~ ~ s m  
decrease. Ehth the GNC an4 c r a g  identified that the vehicle had stabilized 
considerably, and the venting had essentially stopped. 'The EECOEl advised 
at 56+41 that he did not think he cmld save the fuel  cell 12 ,  and that 
we should consider using the LM. Subsepently , I requested the LM 
,pmamel t o  start establishing a minimun power pmfi le  t o  get hane on. 
A t  56+45, at G. Lunney' s suggestion, we requested the m e w  t o  survey 
the spacecraft displays ard conbmls and give us the readouts. The 
EE024 advised me that we had ?bout 2 hwrs remaining on the fuel cell 
prior t o  depletion of the c y o  O2 tadc #lo A t  56+46, EWE 1 was turned 
OFF l 
A t  this time the s p a c e c d t  was on a non-free-return trajectmy w i t h  
a 62 n.m. pericynthion. The m e w  had an abart pad onboard which required 
an SPS burn of 6079 fps at 60+00 t o  land in the Pacific Ocean at 118 hours. 
A t  56+48, the F.light Dyndcs  team was advised t o  in i t i a t e  all of the 
return-to-earth pl- based on going around moon, and assuming use 
of the LM descent engine and IM RCS, and that w wcdd not use the S H  
except as  a last ditdi effort. 
Shift handover t o  the Black Team occurred at 57t05. The White Team 
roved t o  rxm 210 of the MCC t o  review the telemetry delogs ad g r o p e  
a LM pwr mile. 
Although .tl-.ere weis sc-ane possibility that the pmblan was being 
magnified by a loss or sh i f t  of irstrumentation due t o  an electrical 
problem, it rapjdly became evident that the following situation existed. 
1. A l m d  bang was reported at the tire of +he main bus B 
undervolt and observed venting fram the SM was vehicle r&tes. 
2. O2 tank #2 pessure had gone t o  zero and was considered a 
emf- failure. O2 tank #1 w a s  decreasing in pressure. 
3. Fuel cell # l  and 83 b m e  not supplying any airrent a d  had 
been o w t e d .  
4. Main bus B and AC h s  2 wxe essentially zero (both f d  ty 
fuel cell 83). Althmgh AC bus 2 had been pepowezed by main A, as noted 
above with mmml o p e ~ t i m .  
5. Ebel ell #1 xeferenoe N2 supply was essen-y m, although 
other pressures leaked dl 2ight. 
6. h-sidexeble reconfiguring had been p e r f d  t o  get the 
Umsters an main bus A, a~ci the ppellant hlatian valves in quad C 
were indicating closed (siniilar to previous flights at pym s e m t i m  
times). They owld not be reopmedkithwt main bus B pawer. 
7. The surge tank was  isolated and W repress padc was not yet 
amfined t o  be isolated. 
W i t h  the vehicle rates essentially under csntml and a reasmable 
RCS amfigt ian,  our attention was foaused on -trying to  save what 
we caild of the CM QYO-fuel cell capability. Ey this t i r e ,  O2 tank $1 
was n d h g  about 255 psi and it was apgamnt that thatever started the 
problem, was w i n g  O2 tank # l  t o  a s  lose pressure. Ihe =ts t o  
fuel cell #3 were closed about 57 : 06 t o  attempt t o  isolate- a possibility 
of an O2 leak within that celi. O2 tank #1 mntirned t o  drop. A t  a b u t  
57+14, we re-& closing the reactant valves in fuel cell #1. Again 
the O2 contirued t o  deaease. 
By 57+35, the m and UP were making their €n-&y into the 1l.1, A t  
this time ue had one gmd fuel cell (#2) ht the O2 pressure was still 
dmpping. The fans in O2 tank 82 t#re tumed on fmm 57+39 t o  57+55 in 
the final hope that this wxld raise 13e p s m ;  hmever, no change 
was seen. Initial activation of the IM was designed to get the E r n r h m m t a l  
Can-trol System, batteries, and d c a t i a n / i n s i n m e n t a t i a n  system 
OOnfigurd for  use. The initial IN signal was received at 57+57. 
EstabEShhg IN d c a t i a n s  was made sanerJhat msre difficult due t o  
~S IVBS-Bandbeacanbe i r rgon thesane~uencyas the INS-Band  
d c a t i a n s .  Fbever, contingency prrxledures had been developed by 
NEXWRK and INCO to drive the SIVB slightly off W e r q  while 1- 
up the LM carpier. These pmxedws wxe u- . * with minor mdificatim 
and all d c a t i a n s  functicns were satisfactory. A t  abaut Ifhis juncture, 
we decided t o  .try to get a U4 inertial a l i g m m ~ t  mmferred to the '3¶ 
Guidance System since same propuhim nmeuT~er was going to  be required. 
A t  57:54, GR had +& U@ start pmering as nuch dasl as he d d  - 4 S e  
leaving up .the 61 Guichme asten; e.g., FC pups, etc. Fuel cell #2 
was used t o  &axge battery A for a &art time pion? t o  pitting the battery 
onthemainbus. Becauseofthedeaeasing02,weverewatchingtosee 
a d q y a d a t i o n i n f u e l  cell #2 inardertokxwuhentoputaCSMbattery 
an. We intended to  stay up in the CSH until a IN Qlidance System aligmmt 
was =&;and once on battery A (58+04), we wanted to  minimizt! the n m h r  
of a n p h a u l s W i ~ f ~ i t s i n c e ~ d i d n a t ~ 3 w e & d d z a r g e  
it frotn the LM umbilical because w e  tere not certain of Main Bus B. 
k r h g  the period of -tMnsferring .the aljgmmt, we  made what I amsider 
au? one errar in this t i m e  sequence. For a few minutes, we had an airbme 
03nfQmaticlr~ w i t h  no attitude mtml system on. This was  quickly 
mmcted as soon as m q p k d  and 7 was .turned off the (23 busses 
at 58+40 with the  O2 tank #2 pressure essentially gcme and fuel cell #2 
gene (about 20 anp haus were used frwn battery A before the CSM was 
ccmpletely pmaed dam). 
The asoent O2 tarik 1 2  valve had a h u m  leak and by 58+52 the 
higher pr?essum of the descent O2 tank had raised the pressure in 
ascent O2 tank 2 t o  the point at which it was felt neoessary t o  use sane 
O2 t o  reduce the pssure. Cmsequently this t d  was used until 59+59 
after which the descent O2 tank was again selected. This same pmcedwe 
was used again fm 63+52 t o  65+20. 
A t  58+54, the pi lots  reported a l o t  of particles and no ability t o  
xeoogrLze any amstellatias for an al&pmt, which s- cur 
resolve t o  save the reference fo r  the present until the maneuver plan 
and consumable picture be- mre clear. A t  about th is  juncture, E 
had time t o  confer with the persame1 surveying the retum-to-earth 
o p t i m .  It was obvious that te wxe e t t e d  t o  going ammd the mmn 
rather -than performing a direct abort because the linge AV.caild have 
been supplied by the SPS anly if the IM were jettiscned, but that was cxlt 
of the question. Naw our attention, in the period be- 59 and 60 bwrs, 
was focused on the mumbles xeded for  such a return which involved 
a t o t a l  t r i p  time of appmximately 152 hours. A t  about 59+50, the LM 
w a t e r  was  the critical item. The initial w a t e r  usage rate w i t h  the LY 
Primaxy Guidanoe and Navigation System (PGNS) up w d d  have resulted in 
KO depletian in 34 hours; i.e., at 94: 10. Although this high usage 
. . 
rate of H20 was t o  SUE degree charged t o  the initial load of cooling 
the entire loop dam (including fluid), it was severe enough t o  farce 
us to  entertain h w  t o  keep an a l igmmt  up with the LM Abort Guidance 
System (AI;S) while powering the PGNS down unt i l  j+ was needed again. 
The power was projected t o  l a s t  67 hours; i.e., 127+00 GET., at the m t  
rate of 35 amps. 
At 59+41, the mew suggested rigging the backup urine dump on the side 
hatch to  save urine heater per an the prinary system. This suggestion 
was w e d  by MCC at this t b  and again at 61+40 when it was rnentiond 
again. These exdmges led the MCC into thhkbg that the crew was &wing 
urine as r e q W  (al- the postflight debriefing sha#d this to be 
i n m m c t  1. 
In the tim period frrm about 60+00 t o  60+15, w e  had time to 
mnsider our makuver options which w essentially the follaJing .two: 
1. Do a midcourse correction qyickly to reestablish fme return 
and +-'nen paer down. 
2. Fkwer dawn M t e l y  and plan on p m a h g  up f o r  a maneuver 
about 2 hwrs a f t e r  passing pericynthicm (PC+2 1. 
It was quickly detemhed to  take the opticm to get on the free 
retun as soan as pmctical. as long as all systems = up. If the 
mmable situaticn did not impwe, the tmjectcny would be 
established tward a safe Indian Ocean larding at 152. At 60+23, we 
suggested a time af execution for the midcourse burn of  61 hwrs, which 
the a e w  suggested mving to 61+30 t o  assure proper checklist poedmes. 
In about the r e m a h b g  hour, the flight crew called out each appropriate 
sequence af the 2-ha~r 1l.1 Activation olecklist as the vehicle was prepared 
for the LC0 fps MCC with the desoent engine. A l l  b u m  pmaneters were 
m m h a l  and the posthm doppler I x d c h g  oonfirmed the manaver. The 
doppler confirmation was also iqarbnt in that it verified the aligmmt 
ixwlsf- fmn the m. 
Midcourse Correction t o  PC+2: 
Once the  bum was perf&, an attempt was  d e  t o  set up a FTC, 
with the usual difficulty w i t h  a new vehicle/procedure as w i t h  the WCSM 
Qcked configumtion. A t  63+05, K C  passed a preliminary pad for a PC+2 
hour mneuver of about 890 fps designed to land at the  MPL at 142+40 
(- t o  the free return mast landing time of 152). 
By 63+20, currwt output was 27 amps, and the usage mtes had 
se t t led  down t o  something mre like nminal for the power load. The 
projected profiles were c m i q  rmre in line with keeping the PNGS up t o  
PC+2 t i m e  (79+30) and then powering dam t o  a life s u p p o r t / m  mde 
after the  maneuver. M i d m e  maneuvers w e e  budgeted at 104 and 140. 
Projected ahead at an average 25.6 anps: 
EPS wuild last t o  142+00 GET 
H20 waild last t o  138+30 GET 
O2 WWld l a s t  t o  233+00 G l 3  
Rwering t o  15.4 amps after 80 hours: 
EPS waiLd last t o  163+00 GET 
H20 would las t  t o  155+00 GEX 
This  picture gr&iLly began t o  improve. At about 63+32, the  consumable 
o f  mm was the  %I2 m v a l ,  and people were aheady working on the 
problem of how t o  use the  CSM cannisters. 
At 63+47, we begm t o  review the requirawnt fov the  a Guidance System 
heaters. The Lrst recamendation was t o  -hy t o  turn the heaters back 
on using LM per.  However, we were reluctant t o  t r y  to establish -the 
required electrical canfiguration until all three pi lo ts  =re up because 
of the required switch pmcedums; although th is  was a mnfigwatian whkh 
we felt we muld  definitely want to  establish at sane time far other 
m e s  ;e.g. , battery A. Subsequent disarssian of the heaters 
indicated that it wuld be satisfactory to  l a v e  these heaters OFF until 
power up for  entry. 
By 63+50, the dynanic PIC was given up because of the difficulty in 
setting it up,& a LN yaw schedule of a t t i tude  holds 90° apart every 
1 hour was instituted. Atmg other items, the wer qlifier was taken 
offline t o  save the 2.5 anps ; as a result the amn had a lo t  of background 
noise, but was readable. 
A s  the FTC a t t i tude  hold and vehicle systems stabilized, we began 
looking ahead t o  the dadmess opportunities for a Guidance System 
alignrrent (P-52) while i n  the rmon shadm and/or an earth-sun P-52 
technique fcul either checking the pmxnt  al igmat or . . far the 
b. ConsideMtion w a s  also being given t o  the minimnn per mde for 
P52 using the LM Aligrnnent Optical Telescope W) which rqy5r.d 
mvhg the rendentous I7adar antenna, etc. Also -the CSM optics w e  being 
oansidered as another way t o  check the LM aligrmnt. 
For the sleeping in the (EI, MCC advised the c r w  t o  take the 
long CDR suit hose and put it in the tunnel t o  fome ciKlllation dawn 
into the CM. The crew =ported extending the hose w i t h  *e vacuum hose 
t o  aid in this. The M E  passed a pmcedum for using a snail ~ l r o u n t  of 
surge tanlc O2 to obtain CM potable water for &&king. 
SPAN was m c t y  amsidering the pms and cans of jettiscning the d c e  
d u l e  and burning most of the descent fuel t o  get an earlier landing 
t k  of ll8+00. The p r k r y  w a s  -the a d  enviroamnent to w h i c h  
the heat shield and CMRCS would be exposed and the fair ly small amwnt of 
descent fuel that U d  be left. The White Tean' s recanmendatian based 
on their understanding of the cument state of the relative advantages 
of dropping or keeping the Service k h l e  was to keep the Service Module. 
There was m real urgency to decide that issue at that particular time and, 
slang with the descent propellant budgets, this subject was W t e d  
for cclnsidemtim by the mxt shi f t .  
During the period after the bum, M E  recamended keep* one 
crermnan on duty at  all times. This was done except for the times of 
mai~wering and the sew toak shwt rest periods throughout the rest of 
the flight. The LMP tmk a rest period from about 63+00 to abart 69+00, 
with the CDR and CMP scheduled for a rest period when the ;MP m k e .  
By 67 hours, the LM s p a c e d t  lifetime pmjectims were reasonable 
and were  based on the fo- plan. 
Stay  p e r e d  up u n t i l  PC+2 at  79+30 GET. 
T h e n p a ~ ~ d a w n t o a b o u t 1 5 t o 1 8 ~ ~ .  
h bans of p e r  up t h  far each MCC (at 104+00 and 140+00 GET). 
The follming issues identified as open. 
1. SelectiM of return time opticn with question of jettis0nh-g 
the SM. 
2. Find a suitable method far checking or n d q p m g  . . prim to 
the burn. 
3. The CSVLM umbilical pxcechm had to be finalized anl available, 
but shculd be implemented with all 3 awmen awake. 
4. Consumables studies need to be refined. 
5. Need a procedure far C02 remmal w i t h  CSM cannisters . 
6. W i d e r  ooarm duty cycle for power conservatian. 
7. Need pmcedum formving rendezvous radar at for usingm. 
8. Possibility of trmsferring PLSS H20 t o  LM ascent H20 tanks. 
The Gold Team caw on duty at 67+00 and in all ~ ~ ~ p e c t s ,  t k
performance of the flight can-trol team &ing this period w a s  exemplary. A t  
the start of the shift,  the F M  w a s  instructed t o  begin w o r k i n g  on a flight 
plan assuming a descent engine burn at PC+2 hours wi-th a landing time i n  
the Pacific at 142 hours. A t  l 2 ~  time, this plan w a s  tentative but appeared 
t o  be the strongest option. A t  68+00 hami, TELMl w a s  instructed t o  get 
the post-PC+2 LM pck~embwn checklist in shape. A t  68+18 F'IDO reported 
that the point of closest approach t o  the man was holding steady at 135 n.m. 
SPAN reported that the pmcedwe to use CSM LiCH cannisters in the LM w a s  
in p ~ l M ? a r y  farm and being reviewed by all areas. UNlXOL =parted 
at 68+40 that he had a plocedure av&le for  redesignating the rwdemous 
Mdar antenna out of the way af the Aligmmt Optical Telescope (PDT) 
for use in making an aligment. A t  68+45, the crew was told t o  m v e  
the used a LiOH cannisters frrm the loop so that they would not ell up 
and get stuck. The mew adawledge this west, but it w a s  not clear 
uhm this pmcdxe was carried out. A t  69+30, a n r r e e t h g  with a l l  the 
managers w a s  mvened in order t o  finalize the overall missim plan. 
The results of this meting were as follaws. 
1. The PC+2 maneuver would be performed w i t h  the descent engine for 
apprcximately 850 fps, giving us  a Pacific Ocean landing at 142+00 GEI'. 
2. An ADT check of the sun wmld be performed at 74+00 t o  check 
the p s e n t  wt of the LM platform. If  the AOT check was within 
:lo, the p-ent aXgment muld be acceptable for the PC+2 burn. If the 
AOT check failed, then a sun-earth platform aligment would be p e r f o w  
prior t o  goirg behind the m n ;  and an AUi' star check w a d  be pe~famed 
while i n  darkness. 
0thw options available at this pint were as follows: 
1. P e r f m  a PO2 hour abort burn with t k  Service Mule 
Pmpulsicn System for a lan- at 118+00 i n  the Pacific Ocean. This option 
was  rejected unanamiously as being too risky since no data was available 
as t o  the smdural integrity of the Service Rdule. This option w a s  
put into the category of "last ditcht'. 
2. Jettison the Service Module and perfaurn a descent en$.ne 
PC+2 b u m  t o  provide a landing at 118+00 in the Pacific Ocean. This plan 
was rejected because it would require burning the descent engine very close 
t o  depletion, would require uncovering the heat shield of the CM. for many 
hours and thereby reachhg the hazy area of thermal limits, and because of 
the uncertain a1igrrmen-t of the LM platform could rapire a very l q e  
midoome correctinn t o  get back into the amidor. 
3. Do nothing and perform a midcourse comction sanetime af ter  
pericynthion in order t o  get back on the free return corridor for a landirg 
at 153+00 in the Indian Ocean. This plan w a s  unacceptable since such a 
-trip time would push the LM consumables very close t o  depletion. In fact,  
it was not clear at this point that there w a s  encugh water in the LM t o  
f ly  that long. This optim muld also require landing in  an area w i ~  a 
relatively poor ]?emvery posture. (Although the Recovery C o o ~ t o r  and 
W D  had established that them were 4 U.' . destroyers in the area and 
retrieval eqyipnent d d  be flaw in before splash. ) 
4. A f h l  option w a s  not discussed but was available, and the 
crew was k d y  updated (at  59tOO) w i t h  a pad t o  make the burn if required. 
This optim was a DPS burn to  very mar depletion w i t h  the SM still attached. 
This optim w a d  p v i d e  a landing at 133+00 i n  the Atlantic Ocean. This 
plan had obvious drawbacks, Cur was given t o  the c m w ' i n  the case of a 
loss of d c a t i m  and consuanablss usage too high t o  stay an the free 
return. 
The f inal  overall plan was passed t o  l3-e W at 70+53. He can.fked 
that he understood the plan and cancumed and that he waild brief .the CDR 
when he wake up. A t  71+42, RFTKQ repmted that the latest Iradcirg s h a d  
that a t  90+00 a 4 fps maneuver waiLd place the spacecraft in the center of 
the corridor. The crw was updated with -the detailed POT sun check 
pmoedure at 72+30. The rendezvous mdar (RR) redesignate pmcecbm was  
also read up at this time in order t o  move the RR antenna out of the way 
of the AOT detent reqyhed far the sun check. A t  73t12, the RR was 
redesignated and at a p p x h a t e l y  T3+50 the AIJT sun check was made with 
excellent results. The check indicated a platform misaligmmt of appmximately 
112~. W i t h  this M t ,  a subsequent sun-earfh -t was n9-c reqyix& 
and preparation f o r  the PC+2 Ceun were begun. 
The sh i f t  handover t o  the White Team was ampleted at 74t00 GFT. 
The major flight oontml activity on this shift pertained t o  ampletion 
of * PC+2 maneuver. The ground rules established fo r  this maneuver wze : 
1. I f  no maneuver, stay on free return -trajectory with an Indian 
O c e a n  landing at 152:PZ GFT after a small MCC-5 of a p p r d m t e l y  4 fps 
at apFawrimately 93tOO GFT. 
2. No PC+2 m u v e r  -trims were requhd. 
3. If a shutdawn occurred dming the PCc2 maneuver, a subsequent 
MCC would be rep- with earliest possible executim time of PD4. 
4. If the maneuver had t o  be delayed, a PC+4 maneuver w d d  be 
performed at a AV cost of 24 fps w i t h  a Pacific Ocean landing at 142:46:30 GET. 
A t  75+35 GEI', a PC+2 Maneuver Pad was updated, and the State Vector 
and Target b a d  were uplinked. 
A t  76+00 GET, a M E  Mission Rules Review was conducted for the PC+2 
maneuver. 
I. The shutdam cr i t e r i a  for the maneuver were: 
a. .Thrust chamber p m s m  = 85 psi  an the grand or 77% 
thrust onboard. 
b. Engine in le t  pressure = 150 ps i  on the gmund or 160 ps i  
onboard. 
c. AP fuel/oxidizer greater than 25 ps i  (based on a gmmd 
call-out > . 
d. Attitude ra te  l i m i t ,  except s t a r t  tr;ulsients, loO/sec and 
attitude e m r  limit lo0. 
e. An engine gimbal light. 
f .  Inertia. reference system w a r n i n g  l ight  plus ccapwter 
prom ahm* 
g. A LM guidance cxmnputer warning l ight  or control ele-nic 
systems DC p e r  fai lure light. 
h. An inverter l ight  after switching inverters. 
2. If an early sk~tdcwn ocamed, for  m a n s  other than above, the 
LN descent engine was  t o  be =started by ullaging, depessing the engine 
start phbu t t on  and tuning on the descent engine cumand override switch. 
A t  76+16, PTC was terminated and an Am star check was satisfactarily 
mnpleted indicating the platfarm was still reasonably aligned. 
At  76+49, the crew started V49 maneuver t o  CPlrn attitude and an AOT 
s ta r t  check at lxlrn attitude was accanplished satisfactorily. 
Moon occzlltatim caused LM loss of signal frrm 77+09 t o  77+34. 
AT 77:56:27, -the Satum SIVB mpcted on the nwxrn and was recorded 
by ALSEP I instrunrents. 
A t  77+59, ~e findl FC+2 Maneuver Pads w e r e  passed t o  the crew. 
A t  78+12, LM p e r  up was begun, and it was  determined that to  maintain 
a burn configmatian in the Dl, it wailld take approximately 38 t c  40 amps. 
Also.', the crew was advised that PCt2 maneuver ignition time w s s  not 
time critical. 
P1.eviou.s planning for PTC was based an the free drift mode t o  conserve 
water, RCS propellants, and 7. SPAN did not ooncur that this w a s  an 
acceptable PTC moCe and m e r  planning on a free dr i f t  inode of PTC 
PC+2 ignition occurred at 79: 27 :38.30 and the bum was naninal. The 
PGNS residuals were: 
Transearth Coast: 
A t  794-34, L t l  power down was initiated except those functicns necessary 
for  PTC. Also a report was received on the radiation e n v h m t .  The 
solar flare activity was repeed  t o  be relatively low and m pmblems 
w e  anticipated fm a Mdiation standpoint. 
A t  79+52, CAPCOM read up a detailed promime for establishing FTC 
in an attitude of LM roll oO, pitch 90'. lhis attitude was::held until  
rates nulled tD .1 degrees/sec in all --:at which t i m e  a yaw maneuver 
was initiated. While maneuvering to  establish FTC, the cllew reported 
sighting several pieces of material apparently frrm the SM. Considerable 
tim and effort was expended in establishing PTC due t o  moss -ling 
between the roll and y a  axe:. W v e r ,  by 81+17, rates wze low errough 
t o  curqlete the FI'C p m u r e .  
C r w  h 7 :  -over t o  the Marom Tean was crynpleted b j ~  82+00, and t ?  
1l.1 was w e r e d  da(m t o  about 1 2  anps at 82+37. The consunables status 
(except for  LiOH) for the f i r s t  time was  ~1-i~ q t i b l e  with the 
landing t ime  including reasclMble nurgirs. The consurnable SCSL~LS at 
d4t00 was: 
Water O2 Batteries 
Total Usable 205.8# 43.25 1454 alq, horns 
Rate 3.0#/hr . 25C/hr 12.2 a p  
GT Depleticn at 152+36 257+00 2i;4+00 
-lt Rate 
Three hours aft= rhe W 2  ameuver the crew still saw lose utal and 
particles amhg out of 3 4  m. C s n e ~  settings t o  take pictimes of these 
items were passed up, but few cp&ties were qec ted  since it d d  
have want waking ap -the CIlR and 0.IP who W ~ E  asleep a f t e r  a Lcng day. 
The SURGEON reoxmended extaxiing the a02 partial p m s u m  l i m i t  fm. 
7.6 mn t o  15.0 nm. This was dcceptecl and it was decided ro let the LM 
primary canister stay on mtil this level af ter  w h i c h  we would stat using 
the LM secondary canrrkter. The improvised (M cannisters had bee? grwud 
tested an3 would then be used t o  verify the mnfigmaticrm. 
The FAO was able t o  keep a I?ough check of the PTC attitudes by 
plz~tting the earth-- motions thm@ a e  Ianding mition Display. 
h e w ,  it was planned t o  accept h t e v e r  PTC mtians ensued unless the 
cacm loss becam intolerable. 
A maneuver pad was passed up to  the rn for acecutim- at &try 
Interface (E.)-8hwrs for a loss of oJrmrnication case. The tine was 
;licked to allm as IIUG? time as meal far rxestablishiw camn before the 
maneuver. The MCC-5 zi@pwmt pmcedwe (in genew terms) uas also 
passed up for the first th .  This procedure was about the sane as that 
pm@ fm Apollc 8 backup and Well -xed the gae rd  philosophy. 
By 87 haus, t lm follwing V e n c y  pmedwes wxe available, 
although nrost of them were held in  the MCC until needed or  until  a suit- 
able - was available for  the &-up. (This usually depended an which 
clxstan was awake). 
1. wat= transfer fnnl rn to PLSS to ascent tank. 
2. Main B paar-up and in t eg r i~  check. 
3. Enw pawer-up. 
. a3 entry battery charghg. 
5. a3 LiOH caMister fix. 
The Black Tean cane an duty at 9W00 w i t h  the and LMP in rest period. 
The oonsumabie picture r a a h d  in good shape and the i?l current was 
down t o  &out U-12 amps. 
All w a t e r  sams for  N c o o l k ~   we^ being resead& and a C91 
checklist (launch) was in w d c  t o  assure that all mnporaents were off 
the main busses ard t o  provide a starting point for the entry checldist. 
The ME-5 time was being changed to  104tOO v i e  an earlier selected 
U8+00 time to  all- mwe imxkirg after t h i  burn. 
At  90+09, MCC started reading up the CSM d t e r  fix t o  the UdP and 
LMP, Mw &. Severel pelxmel wexle g&g to the checklist meetings 
fo r  the MCC-5 burn and PTC procedures. I advised them of our interest 
in getting these checklists early and t h a k  the burn checklist should 
be read t o  the crew at leas t  5 hours before the schectded ME-5 which 
entailed the new earth terminator aligmmt technique. A t  91+10, it w a s  
suggested that  we  arrange t o  try the PUS w a t e r  feed early t o  avoid getting 
into this new procedure at the end of the f l igh t  whem things would be 
busy. This was a good idea, but the procedum called fo r  q t y i n g  both 
ascent H20 t& f i r s t  (wald take 30 hours). Also, thexe kcis a mncem tilat 
the descent stage w a s  getting cold and the descent w a t e r  might f ~ z e  by 
140+00 GET. This l a te r  turned out t o  be not so, but there was enough 
justificaticq based on pmsent a m s m ~ t i o n  t o  decide not t o  try the PLSS 
watep transfer whi&- really w a s  not guaranteed t o  work anyway (maybe not 
enough AP t o  force the dxansfer). 
A t  91+20, EECOM acfqised that  North Pmerican Roclcwell W d  have a 
reamnendatian in two hours on whether t o  clcse the m t o r  switches which t ie 
the battery hsses t o  the main bus. The CM electrical system wculd then 
be ontrolled with the circuit breakers. Their concern was that the m t o r  
switchez might not work at low d tempemtures. Without any evidenm as 
t o  the '~xea lne~s '~  of .this concern, I personally considered this t o  be 
a high piority-very important subjeci. Expecially since it cwld be 
dane with no attendant disadvantage e x e p t  the time t o  do it. I also 
f e l t  that this was mre important at this time than a main bus B check. 
It w s  easy to check both busses krhm closing the mtor switches, but we 
did not .=e any real evidence of a main h s  B problem, per se. 
A t  91+53, MCC started to read up the W i e d  launch checklist. A t  
about this t b ,  FEI'RO discussed his options fm mving the target to  
avoid any potential weather pmblem and we -tried t o  reschedule the 
reconnaissance airplanes t o  get another mport by GEX! 98+00, but their 
schedule did not permit it. 
A t  92+07, control =ported that the SHe burst disk wwld probably 
r2lieve -where around 107+00. This was of interest in scheduling 
MCC-5 because it w k  assumed that this event would disrupt any established 
mc. 
A t  92+46, the CMP finished copying the modified launch checklists 
anl went over t o  the W t o  establish the cmfiguration. By fhis time 
92+52, both EECC!M and SPAN m p r t e d  that they wanted t o  activate the 
motor switcht?~. Again, I personally was anxious t o  do this -to assure CM 
power for  entry. A t  93+00, the LMP asked &nut storing urine in the 
andasate oontakrs .  W e  shald  have remgnized and reopened '-f- 
questicn of dumping 'sine at this pint, but did mt. A t  93+28, the C02 
partial pressure. was about 7.6 mn,and MCC advised the UP t o  (20ifigz-e the 
sui t  loop t o  use the CSM cannisters. The hoases WE extended-LMP hose 
to fmrrt of IN, CDR hose tc tunnel, and CQ2 was scrubbed dam by 94+00. 
The LiOH cansidenations irrmediately disappared except for later discussians 
on &en t o  change cannisters. 
A t  about 93+50, we had ano*. amversation about the landing weather. 
Based on the fact that there was rn real storm organization, no rea l  
aonsistenq i n  winds, and the location was forecast t o  be SO (306 miles) 
away, we concluded that no weather a v o w  w1i3uver was e d .  
A t  94+30, K C  advised m e w  of 2 mom CBts t o  be opened for the 
modified checklist and the procedure for u s i n g  the motor swi+ches and 
checking both busses. The (EIP reported ane of his own deviations t o  the 
mnfiguration as read and that was  leaving the H20 acwmlator valve 
an Panel 382 in the OFF position; K C  concurred. 
The CMP reported 32.3 V on main A, 37.0 on B, and zem batter] cumats .  
A t  94+19, the voltages were consistent w i t h  the existing state of charge 
on the batteries and the zero c m t  verified the proper CSM switch 
mnfiguratim. The circuit breakers =re pulled and the mto r  switches 
l e f t  closed. 
A t  94+36, MCC read up the oonfiguratian necessary t o  rwdout the 
IPS pmpeiiant tanks because of the concern for  a cooling descent stage. 
TEXMU reported a change in O2 ilm rete up t o  6.O#/hr at 9W44 and 
ZQ apparent glitch in the demand ~ g u l a t o r  A. The crw reported I= change 
of that switch and cycled it closed and back t o  cabin at M E  reqiest. 
The O2 flcw ra te  subsequently &d at the previous value of .2 t o  .3#/hr. 
The Recovery W r d h a t o r  and the Depatmnt of Defense representatives 
made a s m e y  of additional f o m s  available in  the Pacific landing area 
a ~ d  at 95+00 had decided ti, -1-t a plan auppnting the p d s s i o n  
fares. This new landing area array included a ~ t h w  ship ~k+lich was 
positioned at the landing area far l%e backu:~ =try mnitoring sy3tems 
and increased -the HC-13011 -aft support frrm 2 aircraft t o  4. 
Starting at about 95+00 GFT, -the MOCR operetors s~marized their  
oonsideratians on the MCC-5 time: 
FIDO and REi'RO f e l t  they had as good a vector at 1@4+00 as at 
U8+00 and wanted t o  execute MCC-5 as early as practical and mdmize  
the after the MCC. 
111-31 
(XNIRlL felt the SHe burst disk might re l i eve  anywhere f r un  105t00 
t o  108+00 and probably &add not effect the PTC. 
Slight ly  after 96+00 GET, it was decided to  lxy to  schedule the ME-5 
in the ear ly  Mnge of times under mnsidemtion and near the SHe burst 
disk time. Our thought was that the vent might upset  the PTC ar.d it 
would be preferable to  b=e both the MCC-5 and the vent over while the 
1l.1 Abcrt Guidance System am-1 system waiLd still be up from its use for 
the MCC-5. We also waited to minimize the Abat  Guidanae System pak~erup 
t b ~  because of the cunsumables. 
At 95+03, t he  crew reported another good "jar'' &ng out  of the o ther  
side of tk SM down below window #5. At 95+12, K C  advised the crew of 
the expected SHe vent around 107+00 and up a e  pwxdue for pmering 
probable subsequent use and in case of loss of IM ~ c a t i m s .  The 
aeu reparted the PllC wbble was getting mrse,but no ~10mct ive  action was 
deemed necessary. 
By 95+47, M E  read up procedures far us- the densate containers 
t o  store urine. By abcut 96+00 GFT, it was evident t h a t  there was a strong 
interest in obtaining saus (234 High Bi t  Rate telemetry far insight i n to  
the 5M t h d  canditims. ?tRlve amps were expected to  be rewired 
sinc  ! there would be a MSl3 static01 with a 210-foot dish available at 97+30. 
A typical hourly sumnary is l i s t e d  belm. 
Total Usable 173. Q# 39.2% 
mat Rate 2. 5#/hr .25#/Zn, 
GFl' Depletion 165+12 252MO 
at Present Rate 
Bro MCCts warld cost mt 5 hours of both H20 and battery pme~  
so that H20 d d  tile critical consmmble with a predicted depletion 
at about 160+00 CET. 
&ah in the timefmme amund 96+00 t o  96+30, I asked ELNU i f  
t h e  were any single point failures associated w i t h  the LM t o  CSM p e r  
procedure which would leave the descent batteries deadfaced and unavail- 
able. I asked this t o  assure that any changes we made in this all 
inportant area were w e l l  cansidered. As  a mat te r  of fact, I asked three 
different T E W '  s this question and got an questioning af finnative. 
Therefo~,  I becane very reluctant t o  mve into t h i s  clonfigumtion at 
this tinre, and said so severel t h s  an the loop. (It was la ter  determined 
cm the next shift that the procedure could be W i e d  such that the worst 
result of a single point failure waiLd be -that ascent battery #6 cculd not 
be m v e d  frrm the h . 1  
A t  about 97+00, EECDEl reported that dcu la t ions  sftcxJed that the CSM 
H2 tanks would start venting abcut nm and that w a s  possibly what the crew 
reported earlier. He also .reported that, based on 6#/man day, the potable 
water in the CSM w a s  depleted. These facts were reported t o  the crew as  
they reported particles ncw fmm the descent stage although we could see 
nothing t o  correlate with it on telemetry. 
A t  97+24, the repoIrted that the CSM optics were clear and usable. 
Within MCC, we discxlssed the other potable w a t e r  SOUPC~S- - (~~#  in CST.I survival 
kit, 15# in bsth PLSS units, 1.5# in Liquid Cooled Gannent C E I  1, a d  people 
were mrkbg  on pmedures fen, drinking the PLSS water. This water was 
chemically pure, but not steri le;  hawever, the surgeon was p r e ~ d  t o  
allow t o  drink it, if necessary. A t  98+07, OONTROL reported that the 
descent stage was not a x l i n g  dawn as quickly as had been postulated. 
In handing over t o  the next shift ,  the checklists were pmnised for 
&p t o  the by 98+40. 
The Gold Tern came on &ty at 98+00 with the &or planning for 
ME-5 finished. The burn was  scheduled for  105+30 and was appmxhstely 
7.0 fps. It was  also planned t o  pclwer up the CSMtelemetry f c r  a short 
burst of data t o  analyze the tanpemture in the CSM, Another m i d e r a t i a n  
t o  p a e r  up the LM for ME-5 was the SHe pressure in  the descent stage. 
The trend of the SHe pressure rise rate was such that it appeared that the 
low range of the burst disc would be reached arrxlnd 105+45. This was good 
fmn the standpoint that we w d d  aheady be pawered up for ME-5 and that 
f i e  vent might take plaol: while positive attitude can-trol was  available. 
This later p w e d  not t o  be the case as the rise rate decreased, and the 
decision was  made t o  go ahead and get MCC-5 behind us and let t k  SIe vent 
during PTC. A t  a p p b t e l y  98+30, dll crewnen were aake. The crew 
reported that the SM venting had ceased at 98+34. A readout of the (34 
repress pack at 98+48 was  820 psi. A t  99+49, master alarm and battery 
malfunction O P ~  U.I battery #2 was ilhmdmted. The battery voltage and current 
were normal. TELMU suspected a battery overtemp and requested the crew t o  
take battery 82 offline. A t  100+00 the procedure for MCC-5 was read t o  
the crew, It was a derivatian of the 30 m i n  Activation mecklist. A t  
100+16, TELMU stated that he was fa i r ly  sure that the battery malfunction 
was a sensor prablm but that he wanted t o  ' Je the battery off far 
apprwcimately m e  hour. A t  the end of the l-hour period the battery was 
again placed cmline and the battery m d l f ~ . i ~ c t i a ~  and master alarm reappeared. 
Since a real wertemp d t i o n  wxld  har~e cooled in this time, TELMJ was 
convinced that the tempem- soJlsor was failed closed. The battery was 
l e f t  anline and continued t o  function normally f a r  the mnahder of the 
mission, altlmugh the alarm mntinued t o  reappear s p o d c a l i y .  
A t  101+08, the CSM tel-w p e r  up checklist was read up t o  the 
crew, and at 101+38 the O.IP ccmwnced the CSM power up. AppmXimately 
10 minutes of data was collected and the CSM was again powered dawn. All 
voltages and pressures appeared t o  be in expected limits; and tapmtures, 
in general, were wanner atl expected. TELMU suggested at 103+52 t o  place 
Lhe su i t  temperature Aeostat xr, the f u l l  cold position. This decreased 
the flow of glycol t o  the sui t  heat exchanger. Nonnally this glycol is 
wan and heats the 02; since the LM was so cold, the glycol w a s  actually 
ax l i ng  the oxygen ccming out of the O2 tanks. Going t o  f u l l  cold 
decreased the flow of cold g l y a l  t o  the heat exchanger and did increase 
the cabin tempemhue slightly. Although PIE-5 was scheduled t o  o c w  
at 105+30, the crew was ahead of the t h l i n e ; a n d  since the execution t i m e  
was not critical, the mew was given the go-ahead t o  prform the burn early. 
The burn was amplete at appmxkmtely 105+18. 
The Maroon T- came on duty at 106+00 and VTC was established in 
a gross fashion using the LM Abort Guidance System. The mmmications 
were satisfactory and any motion at all satisfied file thennal experts. 
A t  107+00 hours, the spacecraft was within ascent stage capability 
(assuming wing PLSS O2 and water t o  supplement). 
The SHe was predicted t o  burst at tires between 107 Fours and i10 hours. 
This became a cancern in that it might exceed the maxirrrum gauge reading 
and vis ib i l i ty  into the pressure status waild be lost.  F!medues for 
venting the SHe e r e  being developed when the disc mp-d at 1937 psi  
(108+54 GET). This caused no problem othm than reversing the FTC 
roll direction and inparting a slight pitch motion. Since the motions 
were not critical fmn a t h e  standpoint, they were  dilcklled t o  zcntirtle. 
The roll rate went up frrm 18 &rev t o  2 min/rev which caused 
frequent antenna switching. The crew was given an opticm to not switch 
and allow data dropout, but they apparently chose t o  c a n t h e  switching. 
A t  1 1 2 + l l ,  the battery A charge w a s  initiated with all currents and 
voltages as expected. The CSM meter was  used t o  &or the charge statm. 
The Black Team came on shift at ll3+00 w i t h  the data showing 
an entry flight path angle (6) of -6.25O (the cornidor was -5.25O t o  
0 
-7.4' w i t h  -6.5 d e s k d l  . 
The LMP and (L3P w e  resting and the CDR was  on watch duty, soon 
scheduled for  s rest. 
A t  113+i5, MCC advised -the cylew of the need t o  tape another CSM LiQF! 
carmister in front of the ones already in use. Both w e m  rigged by ll3+56 
and the CDR was  off duty for a rest. Voltage and c u m t  readouts an the 
battery A charge were w e s t e d  every 30 mhtes and the crew provided those 
frun the Q3 guages. The cmmmble picture had long since stabilized and, 
even w i t h  the additional 8 amps for  battery charging, the situation was  good. 
A s  of GET 114+00 
Total Usable 
Percent 
GET Depletion 
at Present Rate 
H2° oxygen Batteries 
1241 34.721 1084.7 AH 
2. 5#/hr 0.26#/hr 19.2 amps 
163+00 247+00 169+00 
This w a s  a typical hourly update and subsequent ones stayed very 
close t o  that thmughout the mission. 
A t  ll4+30, the FAD reported that the stowage plan w a s  t o  p e e d  
fm the present configmation and minimize r e q e d  changes. Another team 
of people was working the en-try checklist p b l e m  and the simulator runs. 
A t  115+00, there was  SUE discussion about the lack of urine dumps. 
I assumed that scarre previous discussion had addressed not using the QY1 
side hatch o r  that it had h z e n .  In retrospect, t h i s  was not c o m c t  
and we should have advised the c r e w  t o  use the urine d q .  
A t  115+40, the CDR relieved the watch and had no questions. The 
3AT MAL on descent battery #2 began blinking, and we advised the CDR. 
A t  117+00, MCC requested another readout on the descent propellant tank 
temps, and CONTROL reported 'hat no mre were needed since the descent stage 
was thermally in good shape. MCC also advised the CDR of the upccaning 
quantity l i te on descent water at 16% and reccmmended he reset it. A t  
ll7+55, OR reported it was too cold t o  sleep in the a. Fk l a t e r  reported 
that he and the LMP were wearing the i r  Im boots and that he, the CDR, 
had on a second pa i r  of underwear. A t  118+38, TELMl noted a change in 
the su i t  relief valve position. The CDR put it back in CLOSE ancl 
reparted that the hoses apparently bumped it. 
By th is  t h ,  it was clear that  the ASW/themal team wanted sane 
mre CS4 High B i t  Rate tel-try and that was pmjected when the ISIN 
210-foot dish coverage started samethe af te r  121+40. 
The Gold Team came on duty at 120+00, and the c r e w  w a s  briefed on 
the overall plan for  the enny p e r - u p  sequence a t  120+22. After a 
generdl discussion of m? entry sequence, the crew added that they would 
prefer t o  f l y  the entry unsuited, which was concurred w i t h  by the ground. 
A t  121t51, the changes t o  the LM and CSM stowage lists for j e t t i sm and 
entry were updated t o  the crew. The Q3P pawered up the CSM telemetry at 
123t06 for agprwtimately 1 0  minutes in order t o  give the gmund another 
"snapshot" of the CSM data. The CSM continued t o  look as expected with 
tapemtures sh- a slight drop from the p r e v i u  data. At  125+00 
the crew w a s  advised of the camera plan for obtaining pictures of the SM 
after jettison. The CMF reported tliat the CSM potable water tank 
was empty at 125t19. A t  125+24, the yeadup of the G% p e r u p  and 
entry checklist was  initiated. The readup was  temporarily delayed by 
~ p r c d u c t i m  problems, and was  zeinitizted at 126+15. Ihring the checklist 
delay, battery A reached f u l l  charge (abmt 20 anp hours had been restored), 
and it was decided t o  go ahead and charge battery B back t\j frill charge. 
A t  126+03, battery B charge w a s  irithtd. 9.e C?IP rzprted that the 
windows in the CM were coated with w a t e r  and that he w-.. J d  try to clear 
than the best he could prior t o  SM photcgmghy. A t  the end of =.r? shift, 
latest  tmckjq indic&ed an entry f l ight  path angle of -6.::' requirk 
a MCC-7 of 2.7 fps. 
The Maruon T e a  came on duty at 127+00 and read up LM pmcdms for 
power-up and entry. 
A t  128+05, the LM was switched t o  ascent water tanks which fed 
praperly and the crew was told that they a d  drink fmn the descent 
tank. 
At 130+00, the stowage w a s  reported t o  be satisfactmar w i t h  a 
resulting WD of .29 (. 31 was ncminal). It was decic.ed t o  add ad S-Band 
p e r  a p  t o  entry List (post-blackout) to  allaw mcmexy HC-130 ls to  
track at altitude (Cost -.3ah.). 
It *came dbvious the crew was unable t o  rest due t o  the cold 
tmpemtures a7. - .3zcisian. was  made to pmer up t?;3 LM early (133+24). 
At & time, the battery atid w a t e r  -in &wed a 6.9 hour pad at a 
p e p  l e v e l  of 4C. 7 amps. The p s i b i l i t y  of also using IM w i n c h  heaters 
was discussed, but the reported heavy fros' gn the panes and windm 
heaters w e  not used due t o  the possibility of cracking. 
After TN p w x w p  there das tim to acccmplish a LM P r b x y  Guidance 
an3 Navigation System (KNS) d g m m t  using the sun-M)nn technique 
which was  dope w i t h  little di f f icul ty .  
The White Team cane on at 135+03 t o  conduct the entry. The crew 
was in the process of readiqg out the V06N93 torquing angles at the 
ampletian of their aligrmnt. The MCC-7 manewer was q t e d  to  occur 
at  137+39+48 &T (EI-5 hrs), the AV was -3.35 f~s. The LM systems 
looked good, the LH Guidxlce Ompita? (UX) erasable memory was ver i f i ed  and 
-ihe entry, SM szp and LM jett data was voiced to the crew. 
At 13€+12, the maneuver lo& w uplinked to the m, and -the 
weights for the md LM m loaded. 
The crew initiated CM RCS p a t  using LM umbilical p e r  thrmgh 
CSb1 Mair~ Bus B to  heat Ring 2. CM battery C power was p m i d e d  to Main 
Eus A to prwride p e r  to heat Ring 1 and to CM RCS instrumentation t~ 
mni'rw the preheat. 
A t  =bout 136+45, we remmeded to the cyw that wc would perfom 
ME-7 -uskg the PC;NS. 
N O S :  This w a s  a change in overall  stmtegy far the bum. 
-We had intendd to  use the P(;NS to  provide a mi toring 
zrt h c h p  attitie mn-I mility. w'tfr lacking at 
the system, there appared to be m mascn mt t o  use the 
FWS far ME-7. It wxld v i d e  a slightly better 
maneuver execution apabiliw. It should be mted that 
CkLs maneuver was relatively insensitive, haever. 
The consumable status at this the was excellent. 
LY Power 691 AH rembhg 
38 A H h r  usage 
16.5 hrs reminbg 
RCS 37% usable remai&g 
M c t e d  25% mmiirhg at LM j e t t i s ~  
Tne crew q d e d  thrwgh Fkogrm-30 ax5 41 in preparation far their 
bum. In meuvering .kt0 burn attitude, they used FQJS PJJrO, which 
appeared to lave an unusually high duty cycle. We requested them t o  
After the maneuver t o  turn atti-, * advised the sew t o  perfom 
an Pbart Guidance System (PGS) body sris align. At this time, the crew 
advised that the R X  r o l l  and yaw e m  d e s  did not d after m e t i m  
of the manewer. At Ignitim - 15 min, after discussions w i t h  LN CONlXlL 
and CAPOOE.I, I decided t o  return t o  the original plan and use the AGS for 
MCC-7. 
NOTE: The p r h  reasas-far mtuming to AGS was the tmxplained 
pr&lemwiththeP(;NSermrmedlesandthehigherthan 
expected PGNS RCS usage. 
T l r e ~ s a l ~ A G S , ~ l i s h e d a n A G S t o P ( ; N S ~ , a n d  
accr ' Sed the tun1 at 137+39+48, using t3-e PGNS P41 fan? mnitarhg. 
Af te r  MCC-7, the spacecmft initiated the a t t i tude  meuver  t o  S/M 
s e p a ~ t i a n  attitude. A t  137+57, the CM RCS  as activated and a hot-fire 
tes t  was acrrrmplished an all thrusters on both rings. 
S/M s e w t i o n  was  accanplished at 138+02+00, using .S fps with 
the +x thrusters followed by S/M separation; then .5 fps w i t h  the -x thrusters. 
The crew then initiated a pitch up mneuver t o  obtain photqgqhs of the 
S/M. 
The crew relumed to  the S/M separation attitude and &ed there. 
NOTE: The arigirlal d i g ~ ~ l e n t  pmedure was deveicped in casc 
xe could not see stars thmugh the CSM optics. It 
required 2 U.1 manewers t o  place the CSM optics f ield of 
view an the  rrroon and then the am. I believed that this 
pmedure w d d  wmk; haever, I believd thzt it was  
wmlhhZle t o  first accanplish a reverse d&ed coarse 
aligmmt,  then attempt a CSM nrrmal P 5 2 .  Additi-y, 
the docked coarse aligrmmt by itself w d d  be adequate 
far entry. 
A t  138+00, the RCS usable r m a b b g  was down t a  19% and we advised the 
mew t o  minimize further usage. It should be noted that t h e  is a 
13% unus&le/uncertainty in our capability to gauge the RCS. The onboard 
quantities w e r e  reading about 32% at this t h .  
The CX w a s  pm.& up and placed t o  standby at 138+21. A t  this 
time w ~~lem still abaut 2-hours fm pawering up the Ccmnand W u l e .  
minor W l e  shooting was  acccmplished t o  find a (2-1 Main Eus A 
load of 2 amps that was not expected. 'Ihe entry, weather, and xcwery 
aata w a s  voiced t o  the crew. 
A t  139+15, LM battery 3 was reml -=. fran the line. Its a m n t  
mtput was about 1 anp, inlicating it was  essentially depleted. 
btter?~ 4 was past 5ts spec life- of 400 AH at 139+34 per our 
oomputatio~ls. . 
A t  139+46, the ooarse align gimbal angles, hsed on the SM jettison 
attitude were passed t o  thecrew. 
1l.1 umbilical was m v e d  at l40+10, and the CM pccer up fa? 
reentry was initiated. 61 telemetry was activated at l40+24. Ihe t o  the 
spacecraft attitude, the v o i e  and High B i t  Rate tel-m data was very 
broken. Several 03nfiguMtion W e s  were made; hcwever, we were unable 
t o  maintain High Bit Rate data. The L m  B i t  Rate data ttas selected t o  
obtain a better signal and at 140+30, g m d  loading of 
the OlC was initiated. Five mmunil loads wexe required t o  prepare -the 
spacecraft far entry. These updates took longer than normal since we did 
mt have High Sit Rate. The erasable was &mped, and fartunately 
the m t e  site @ed me ful l  i t e ~ t i a n  of the clump. 
l& crew mnpleted the coarse aligrment of the CM Guidance System and 
pmeeded into the f ine  aligrPnent which was rrmplete at 140+55. A t  this time 
rJe cleared the specraft t o  mve into t h  L!i jettiscn attitude. The 
CSM GNC Cantruller identified that k was concerned w i t h  the injector 
t eqedxrs  on the -yaw thrusters on Rings I. and 2 of the Of RE. I 
decided not to take action on this request because w waild be separating 
within 20 mimtes, and because the crew had canpleted izwsfer to the Of. 
NUE: The U3: was holding an attitude close t o  the CMgimbdL lock 
attitude. X was amcemed about any att iwe perturkticms 
that warld cause the IM thrusters to start a high &ty cycle 
(LM -x impingement on the CSM). We should have examined the 
LM jettison attitude mre closely t o  avoid being close t o  
CSM gimbal lock. 
A t  141+06, the %- O f f i c e r  advised that the LM was not in -the oomct 
orientation fo r  separation. The telemetry indicated that we wre y& 
4.5' North instead of 45O South of plane. The X axis was properly aligned 
along the positivie radius vector. I was not concerned, because the .-. 
separation was  a minimum af 4,000 feet  at entry interface and was probably 
going t o  be 8,000 feet  or -tw. Even though the initial lift m l d  take the 
spaemaft North, subsequent d u l a t i n g  lift would be away fran the LM 
orbit plane. Therefore, no a t t q t  w a s  mde t o  change the attitude. 
The tunnel was vented dam t o  abaut 2.2 psi  at l41+19 and pym a m  
and jettison occurred at 141+30. The CM almst went into gimbal lock at 
LM jettison and the mew had t o  *se DIRECT RCs t o  keep the CM under control. 
The crew performed the sxt star ard INS checks at 141+40, and tk 
entry pad was read to  the crew. Tz-a- data indicated the reentry f l ight  
path angle had changed slightly t o  -6.2 degrees; h e v e r ,  we m still 
belaw the l i f t  vector orientatim line and we wmld not have t o  perturb 
the initid &new procedures; i-e., htds down for initiation of entry. 
A t  142+00, the final a m p t e r  loads were transmitted t o  the spacecraft. 
arv=.nt state vector, Z pipa bias and a clock inmemnt update wene 
loaded, and the smcraft then went t o  the mcm dheck attitude. The 
Primayy Glycol 1 3 a ~ t o r  was  brought on line, the Entry %n.i.tor System 
was initialized, and the crew went t o  their  normal entry checklists at 
Entry L i f a c e  - 20 min when they selected Pmgrem 61 in the UE. 
A l l  s p a c e d t  systems w e  GO; the m n  check was satisfactory, 
and the pcw-r profile was rmhl at loss of signal at Honeysuckle 
MSIN statim at 142+39, 
Voice contact was abtain4 3% the Agollo Range Thstmcmtatian Aircraft 
at l42+45 ; droeple deploy was rid tored at 8,000 feet, and main chutes 
were sighted via TV at :J:-Zi SO, 
Splashcbwn ocamed at 142+54+47, the recove3 prw2eecled very rapidly, 
and the crew w a s  anboard the Itl~ Jha at 143+39+00. 
AC 
m 
AGS 
A/G 
M 
AMP 
AOT 
ARIA 
CllPCOM 
CDR 
CES 
CH 
cw 
CHP 
CoNrnL 
Uternating Current 
Assistant Flight Director 
Abort Guidance System 
A i r  t o  Ground 
ampere Hours 
ampere 
Alignment Optical Telescope 
Apollo Range Instrumentation Aircraft 
Booster Systems Engineer 
Capsule C o d c a t o r  
C o d e r  
Contra1 Electronics System 
Carpmand Module 
Camand M u l e  Computer 
Cormnand *dub Pilot 
Guidance, Control, and Propulsion 
Officer for  the LM 
Command and Service Wdule 
Digital Auto Pilot 
Dhect Current 
Descent Propulsion System 
Dpmic Standby Computer 
Elestrical, En~irclnm~mtal,  Sequential 
Systems Enginear for  CSM 
Rnergency Detec+don System 
Entry Interface 
&try %nibring System 
HGA 
INCO 
Flight Activities Officer 
Fuel C e l l s  
Flight Director 
Flight Dynamics Officer 
Feet P e r  Second 
Ground Elapsed Time 
Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
Systems Ehgineer for the CSH 
Guidance Officer (CSM and LM software) 
EIydrogen 
High B i t  Rate 
High Gain Antenna 
Honeysuckle USB Tracking Station 
Instrumentation and C o d c a t i o n s  
Officer (CSM and U) 
Impact Point 
Inertial Subsyutem 
Instrumentation Unit 
Liquid Cooled Garmsnt 
Lunar mule 
Lunar mule Pilot  
Midwurse Correction 
Master Caution and Warning 
Mission Operations Control Room 
Hir! P a ~ i f i c  Line 
Maned Space Flight Netmrk 
Neb ark Controller 
blcrth i!mrim&ochrell 
sic 
SHe 
SLV 
SM 
SPAN 
SF'S 
SXT 
TCE 
TELMT 
TIG 
TLM 
TM 
Tv 
Plane Change 
C b a b e r  Pressure 
Carbon Diodde P a r t i d  Pressure 
Portable Life Support System 
Primarg Navigation ad Guidance Srstem 
Operations and Procedures O f f  i c w  
Pressure/~emperature 
Passive Thermal Control 
Reaction Control System 
Retrofire Officer 
Rendezvous Radw 
Spacecraft 
Super Critical Helium 
Saturn Launch Vehicle 
Service Module 
Spacecraft Planning and Analysis 
Service Propulsion System 
Sextant 
F'uel C e l l  Condenser Exhaust Temperature 
Electrical, Bmironmental, Extra 
Vehicular Systems Engineer for t b  ? LM 
Time of Ignition 
Telemstry 
Telemetry 
Television 
Vanguard USB Tracking Ship 

CSM 
CMP 
CM POWER TO LM-ON 
QUADS C&D DISABLED 
- - 
FLIGHT PLAN 
LM 
CDR LMP 
MCC-H 
I V T  TO CSM I 
CSM 
9 UADS C&D ENABLE LOSE LM HATCH 
TERMINATE BATf  B 
CMC RESTP.RT LT. 
MAIN B BUS UNDER 
MAIN A BUS UNDER 
CHARGE 
VOLT 
VOLT 
/ 
MNVR 
FIRST INDICATION GF 
SYSTEM MALFUNCTIOI 
MISS101d 
r . 1  1 f . l t r  1'1 ntrr l f \ ir ,  I \ I ~ A N ( : I I  
EDITION 
-- - - 
DATE P A G E  TIME DAY/REV 
w
 
A
 
=
 
r
 
k 
g 
O
L
L
 
lL
W
 
m
o
w
 
lL
 
rz 
lL
-1
4
3
 
Od*" 
N
U
e
Z
 
W
W
 
C
J-II-w
 
4
 W
 I-- )
. 
5
=
4
x
 
m
L
m
0
 

rr. 

0
 
V
) 
1
 
.
-
 U
 
"
 Liz 
d
 
a
n
.
 



n
n
n
 
3
3
3
 
o
n
n
 
W
W
W
 
U
U
O
 
u
m
u
 
O
O
O
P
:
 
>
*
>
r
n
 I
 
W
W
W
 
d
P
:P
Il- 
3
X
X
U
 
a
n
n
w
 
W
W
W
J
 
U
U
U
W
 
O
O
O
V
)
 
0
2
.z
 P
: 
n
a
n
 

FLIGHT PLAN 
CMP CDR 1MP 
POWER UP' LM SYSTEMS I 
START MISSION TIMER I 
AGS ACTIVATION & BODY ALIGN I 
MCC-H UPLINK LM S.V. & REFSMMTS, V66 
(SUN-MOON) 
P62 - LM IMU REALIGN, OPT 1 
LM E-MEMORY DUMP 
MCC UPLINK: MCC-7 TARGET LOAD 
KCC UPDATE: MCC-7 MNVR PAD 
CM/SM SEP PAD 
LM JETT PAD 
P30 - TARGET MCC-7 
P41 -RCS THRUSTING 
COFIPLETE CM RCS PREHEAT 
AG 
MNVR TO SEP ATT 
CMP CDR LMP 
C M T FIRE i-1 138:02 
SM PHOTOGRAPHY & DESCRIPTION 
MCC UPDATE: ENTRY PAD 
RECOVERY WEATHER REPORT 
MCC UPDATE: CM COARSE ALIGN 4's 
I POWER UP CM SYSTEMS MCC UPLINK S.V.. REFSIIMATS, ENTRY TGT I CM COARSE ALIGN CM P52 IMU ALIGN, OPT 1 ,, 
LM MNVR TO JETT A l l  R 228 
LM CLOSEOUT 
PRESSURIZE TUNNEL ~125 
HATCH INTEGRITY CHECK 
Ym 
MNVR TO ENTRY ATT: R &. P 91.3, Y 2 
SXT STAR CHECK I MCC UPDATE ENTRY PAD & f .V. MOON CHECK ]TI - 1,42:40:39 1 SPLASHDOWN 1 - 142: 54: 5 6  
r 
MISSION 
M:C r ~ r m  04511 O R I ~  69)  FLl C l l T  PLRNNINC BRANCll 
- 
EDITION DATE 1 IME DAY/REV PAGE 
GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 
HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA 
TO : M. L. Windler, FC DATE: April 21, 1970 
MSFC/Rd-MO-F/121/70 
FROM : Manager, MSFC Flight Control Office, 
m-MO-F 
SUBJECT : Apollo 13 BSE Position Report 
REFERENCE: 70-FCll-49, subject : Apollq 13 Accident Evaluation Memo #1, 
dated April 20, 1970. 
The referenced memorandun requested Apollo 13 mission reports for each 
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BWSER SYSraLS FNG1NE.FR REPORT 
PRUAUNQi 
All prelaunch comands were successful. The S-IC IllX vent valve could 
not be closed for  awhile, but a procedure was established which closed the 
vent valve. lhe loss of F4-424 S-IVB LIU[ chilldown flokrmeter was verified. 
m PHASE 
Liftoff was 19:13:00 -60 GF. S-IC burn was nominal. WITY) reported a 
step input in the crossrange accelerometer. The center enpine on the S-I1 
cut off a t  approximately 00:05 :31 (nominal was 00:07:43). 'Ihe S-IVR 
bum duration was approximately 11 seconds longer than naninal t o  compensate 
for the S-I1 engine out. The only other additional problem during launch 
was 1053 of FS-404 l'M measurement, S-IVB 1,H2 chilldown flowmeter. 
EARTH ORBITAL COAST AM) TLI BLm' 
This phase was nuninal . TB6 was initiated a t  02 :26 :08. TB7 was initiated 
a t  2 :41:37. S-IVB mainstage bum (STDV t o  TB7 ini t iate)  was 5 minutes 
and 51 seconds long ( ~ 5  seconds shorter than prelaunch nominal due t o  
the longer f i r s t  S-IVB bum). A l l  indiaations from the c rew onboard 
monitoring, thp--tracking data, and the LVE data indicated that the TLI 
bun perfornrance and trajectory were very good. 'Ihe bum was approximately 
4 seconds longer than the pad data passed t o  the crew. Hawever, the 
propellant residuals were comfortably above the 3 c level. The crew 
reported a vibration during the bum. 
TRANSLUNAR om 
A l l  onboard progranmd functions were nominal. A comnand was sent a t  
03:03:42 t o  d u y  the s ta te  vector that was stored onboard the LVDC a t  
TB7 plus 2 minutes and 30 seconds. Spacecraft separati m ,  tumamund, 
and docking a l l  appeared nominal. 
The 80' yaw maneuver w a s  c m & d  a t  04:09:01. This was 5 minutes l a te r  
t h  nominal due t o  a crew request-to wait until  they had manewered 
so that the S-IVB/IU was in sigt.lt. The evasive bum (TI@) was  camnanded 
a t  04:18:00. A l l  Time Base 8 functions were nominal. 'Ihe midcourse one 
(lunar impact) cosamtand was uplinked a t  05:48:08 and the LVDC stored 
data dumped back by camnand a t  05:49:10. The midcourse burn was 217 seconds 
long. Tracking data indicated the midcourse burn resulted in an impact 
point within the desired 200 KM radius. mere was some confusion in 
real tirrre regarding which vector HOSC should use for targeting the midcourse. 
In addition, there-was some confusion in the MDCR concerning the vector 
extrapolated lunar impact point. The onboard systems were monitored 
until  the data bacame useless. A t  ~14:00:00 a 60° pitch change occurred. 
lhis was due t o  an LVDC clock overflow and the mthod of software imple- 
mentation. One unexplained oc:xrrence was that the acclmailated accelerometer 
data indicated a gradual increase in O V  of approximately 5 t o  6 meters/ 
second from eleven hours into the miss:on unti l  the LVDC stoppcd functioning 
a l i t t le after nineteen hours. 'Ihis was not confirmed by the tracking 
data. A second unexplained occurrence was approximately 11 fps bV '%crease 
a t  4 9  :17 :00 reported by mX) fran his tracking data. This was  a f t e r  the 
LVDC had stopped functioning so th is  could not be verified fma the accel- 
erameter data. 
After the lunar mission was aborted and the IM was  activated, it was very 
difficult  t o  lock up on the IM telenetxy. The IM and I U  S-band frequencies 
are the same. h r  th is  mission the IU transponder was active t o  lunar 
impact for tracking purposes. Contingency procedures for offsetting the 
IIJ frequence were worked pre -mission. 
The Saturn portion of the Apollo 13 mission was successful through lunar 
impact. The following anonaalies and/or occurrences require further 
evaluation : 
1. 'Ihe cause of the S-I1 center engine early cutoff. 
2. The difference between the HOSC predicted TLI burn parameters and the 
actual bum parameters @urn time, propellent residuals, e tc  . ) . 
3. 'Ihe confusian in the MOCR concerning the vector extrapolated lunar 
impact point. 
4. Ihe confusion that existed cmcerning which vector to use for targeting 
the first lunar iapact burn, 
5. The gradual incrzase of velocity indicated by the accumlated accelerometer 
data after 11:CO:OO (33. 
6. The approximately 11 fps AV increase at ru 19 :17:00 that FDO reported. 
7, I recomnend methods be investigated on 'hard and on the ground to 
minimize CCS/IM conrrmnications interference in the event the IM is 
powered up on the way to the moon. 
IN REPLY REFER TO: FC5 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
MANNFD SPACECRAR CENTER 
. " HOUSTON. 1- 77058 
MEWRANDUM 733: Apollo 13 Fl ight  Director 
FROM : F c ~ / ~ e t r o f  ire Officers 
SUBJECT : Apollo 1 3  Postf l ight  Report 
A.  Prelaunch - Recovery reported undesirable weather i n  p a r t  of the  
Mode I1 area.  The decision was made t o  f ly over the  bad weather. 
B. Launch through KC-2 (hybrid t r ans fe r )  - Recovery reported bad 
weather f o r  ID+25, 35, 60 P37 block data. L0+33, 6@ P37 block data 
was retargeted and updated t o  the SIC. 
C . KC-2 through E+2.  
1. 'Ihe CSM suffered a power f a i l u r e  and ECS problems j u s t  p r i o r  
t o  56 h r s  GET. These problems ser ious ly  affected CSM consumables (CSM 
lifetimc), and caused 'b iss ion  abort" t o  be executed as  a first impulse 
lunar f lyby a t  6 1 ~ 3 0  t o  re turn  t o  a free re turn  trajectory, and a second 
impulse a t  PC+2 t o  speed up the  re turn  and s e l e c t  the  recovery area.  
2. The f lyby maneuver was executed a s  a minimum f u e l  burn with 
a *mter landing. However, the  r o l l  r i g h t  backup ent ry  area contained an 
island. Since the  crew had trained f o r  r o l l  left  backup e n t r i e s  also,  
non-execution of PC+2 would merely require a r o l l  l e f t  constant g -., - - 
backup entry.  
3. The CSM systems problems i ~ c l u d e d  ar, inoperative SMTC. 
RFO a l t e red  previously developed cor.tingency separation procedures to 
allow the  LM t o  be used t o  evade the SM and the  LM tunnel pressure f o r  
CM separation from the  M. 
4. Prior  t o  PC+2, Recovery reported a storm near the  ME,. After 
reviewing the  t a rge t  location, it was f e l t  the  m a t h e r  would be good a t  
landing -thus the PC+2 plannim continued t o  the  same target .  
D. Transearth Coast - Recovery had questionable m a t h e r  near the 
t a rge t  point .  The weather was good a t  the t a rge t  point and l i f t  during 
ent ry  could be a e d  t o  avoid the  weather, thus no weather avoidance 
burn was attempted. 
E. XC-'7' through Entry. 
1. The i n i t i a l i z a t i o n  of the CK: was hampered by commu~ication 
problems during powerup. A CM2 clock update of 77:26:11,09 was:~sompu.ted 
during low b i t  r a t e  1M data. This update was l a t e r  found t o  be i n  e r r o r  
by .06 sec. !Ibis e r r o r  was corrected a t  EI-45 min along with the  
s t a t e  vector update. 
2. The CM was 90; out of yaw a t t i t u d e  p r i g r  t o  M je t t i son.  
Instead of being yawed 45 t o  the south, it was 45 t o  the  north. Since 
the  LM closeout was underway, the HFO advised the Fl ight  Director t o  
j e t t i son  t h e  LM i n  the  'northerly d i rec t ion a s  the inplane separation distance 
would be adequate . 
jumped t o  -6.2' from -6.5' when the  post WC-7 R X C  
t r a j e c t o g  Z u 2 1 t e d .  After verif'ying t h a t  the  tre jectory was the  test, 
the  f i n a l  ent ry  pad and s t a t e  vector were  sent  t o  t h e  S/C. 
11. Mission Narrative. 
A. Preiaunch. 
1. During the CDDT, the CMC clock was observed t o  have a d r i f t .  
From KSC readouts, the d r i f t  for  the CM: clock was determined t o  be ,00069 
sec/hr f a s t .  'Ihe LGC was determined cto..bit .OW&: sec/h.r' f a s t  base& on a 
frequency t e s t .  On April 10, 1970, a t  10:lO GEir the CM2 was biased 
.02 sec slow in  order that the clock be correct a t  l i f t -off .  
2. Lift-off (T-6) mass properties (wts, cg's, and ~ e r o ' s )  were 
generated without incident and loaded i n  the R E C  by T-2:46 (h, m). 
3. >very rgported undesirable weather fo r  Mode I1 betweeg 
67 '~  (5:10 GET) and 44 W (8:20 GET) fo r  launch azimuths less  than 86 . 
It was decided t o  overfly the weather i f  the syystems were good. 
B. Launch through ICC-2 (hybrid transfer). 
1. The GMT of the f i r s t  motion was 19:13:00.606. The C I E  
l i f t -off  was 19:13:00.65, which was ingut t o  the R E C  as GMPLX). 
2. The Iim gyro-compassillg error (as expected) caused the CW 
t o  think it was s l ight ly south of the ground track. 
3. me crew reported vibration during 'ELI. 
4. Ihe CSM ephemeris was accidently azlnhored.on a pre-?ZI 
trajectory. The FDO corrected the problem shortly. 
5. The TLI cutoff trajectory had a resulting perigee of 9% n.m.-- 
la te r  revised t o  -331 n.m. 
6. Recovery reported bad weather i n  the MPL fo r  LO+25 and IXk35 
hr abort RTE block data that was onboard, Present GET was too close t o  
25 hrs $0 update the LOt25 hr abort. The W.35 hrs abort was updated t o  
= 155 W (10 east of MF%) t o  avoid the weather. 
7. The pre-MCC-2 (hybrid) return trajectory. 
GECL = 155 hrs 
8. The XC-2 AVc bias from GNC was -0.34 fps for  the maneuver pad. 
The crew EM3 AV bias check (pm-W~-2) was 0.45 A V / ~  sec . 
9. me Ti24 hr telescope data was generated and shipped t o  a l l  
four stations. 
10. The S-IVB predicted moon impact time was 77:51 (h, m). 
11. ?he W25 R E C  mass propertiss were run but an update was 
not needed. (P, Y trims were within .O1 of !L?t6). 
12. NC-2 burn p a r a ~ t e r s :  (Docked, SPS, G and N)  . 
Planned Actual 
-
Tig 3:40:49.0 3:40:49 
~ T B  . - .?:% seC 3.49 sec - -
C/O 30:40:52.50 3:40:52.49 
hpc (postburn) 60.22 n.m. 60 n.m. 
C . WC-2 through R+2. 
1. WC-3 was not required. 
2. The Dl% "burp" burn fo r  SHe pressure considerations was not 
needed. DPS trims for  this t e s t  had been computed. 
3. Thci post WC-2 T1% trajectory was close t o  nominal. merefore, 
TLC abort AV's were like the premission values. 
4. I b e  WI$O abort RZE block data maneuver onboard was updated 
from MPL t o  1 = 153 due to  weather on the MPL. 
5. Ihe LO1 abort chart update rug i n  thg R E C  went %ell a t  
GET = 37:OO. Ihe pitch 9 changed from 83 t o  82 while the AV curve was 
within 10 to  20 f p s  of the nominal curve. Therefore, the pitch 3 was 
a l l  that vas required t o  be updated. 
6. About 48 hrs GET, the f i r s t  RETRO abort/~!E block data status 
report was passed t o  thc Flight Director. 
7. R E C  (LM burn) mass p r ~ p e r t y  decb  were updsted t o  Tt55 decke. 
8. !Be LM crew sent illto LV early: 
53:26 (h. m) - Crew cleared t o  s t a r t  iogress. 
54:25 - LMP had entered IN. 
9. WC-4 was not very probable a t  9 : ~  -. 
10. Crew Report Z. -2 .05 docking 3.  
+1.047 docking index misalignment 
- 
Area 
MPL 
MPL 
AOL 
MeL 
MPL 
AOL 
EPL 
ll. Generated new telescope data with XC-2 i n  it for  Bldg. 16. 
Data was e t  REXBO console ready t o  pass t o  Andy Sauliets when CSM accident 
happened a t  -56 hrs . 
12. A t  GET -55:57 (h, m) the CEI= had a restart .  A CW clock 
check showed the CM2 s t i l l  i n  sync with GET. Several CSM problems 
started a t  agproxi~nately th is  time. Specific mission abort p lar i  began. 
!Be f i r s t  aborts t o  be looked a t  were SPS direct aborts with Tign -58 t o  
60 hrs because of lunar sphere crossing a t  -61 hrs and because SFS 
capability was s t i l l  a s s w d  t o  exist  a t  th i s  tie. MPL/AOL fas t  return 
direct  aborts were passed t o  Flight for  review. A f l igh t  controller 
team change was occurring. Tbe on-coming Retro continued t o  run abort 
plans of a lunar flyby and pericynthian +2 hrs f a s t  return nature as 
docked DPS burns. Ihe off-going sh i f t  retired t o  Fim 210 t o  debrief; 
the abort options of a docked DPS flyby and FC+2 f a s t  return nature were 
presented. Direct aborts were not discussed because GET was at/or near 
sphere crossing ti= and we apparently d id  not have the SPS. Ihe best 
choice available a t  th is  t ine was t o  do an K C  in  the neaz future because 
the present trajectory was non-free return, and because LM Systems t o  include 
PNGS alignment could s u p ~ o r t  a burn cow and mag not several hrs l a te r  
with as good an a l i g m l t .  A second impulse (maneuver) was being considered 
a t  PC+2 t o  control landing tims within the LM consumables schedule and 
to  select landing area. me consumbles budget d i d  not requi2.e the 
GETL = 133 hrs return t o  the AOL and would allow the 10 hr  l a t e r  landing 
GETL = 143 in  the MPL. By the ti= th i s  status was reached i n  the debi-iefing, 
ac t iv i ty  i n  the M?CR was already occurring t o  do a f i r s t  impulse a t  
&1:30 t o  get back on free-return an3 t o  be followed by a second impulse 
a t  FC+2 (79+30) to  speed up the return and select  the recovery area. 
3 .  ImmediateAv a f te r  the ticcident, the following trajectory 
options were cornp&ed. me weather and recovery ships of opportunity 
for  these areas were SOOil~de available. The AV capability of the 
docked DPS with the SM was 19% 3 s  and 4 8 3  fps without the SM. Ihe LM 
RCS capability with the SM was 44 fps. 
Direct Return 
TiiZ AV f l  A GE2.LI.C Weather Recovery Ships 
60:00 6079 2l:05s 1 5 3 ~  n8:12 Good Iwo Jim 
6 0 : ~  10395 26:13$, 1 6 5 ~  %:15 ~ o o d  Iwo Jim 
FC+2 with no flyby maneuver fo r  free return 
79:30 670 31:35s 1 6 5 ~  142:47 mod ~ w o  ~ i m a  
7g:g 4657 28:26s 1 6 5 ~  118:07 mod Iwo Jim 
79:3  1798 22:4& 2% 133:15 Very Good some 
FC+2 with flyby for free return 
79: 30 854 21:38s 1 6 5 ~  l42:47 mod IWO ~ i m a  
79:3  48% 12:24S 1 6 5 ~  1 1 8 : ~  Good Iwo ~ i m a  
79:3 1997 23:2ls 2% 133:15 Very Good Some 
79:9 1452 22:1& 86:40~ 137:27 O.K. None 
1 .  A PC+2 block dats  pad assuming no M2C t o  f r e e  re turn  was 
uplinked a t  -59:OO GET. It was a DPS msneuver a t  79:30 GET t o  the AOL 
with a landing time of 133:15 GET. The DFS t r i m  t h a t  was passed t o  the 
crew on the R+2 abort pad was challenged by the LM Control; but, l a t e r .  
they agreed with our data. Ihey had used the premission mass properties 
which was not the  best  datci available.  
15. The UZC clock was updated a t  -59:OO GET k i t h  a -88:59:32.74 
sec pad. After t h i s  update the UZC was within .O> sec of GET. 
16. The options f o r  the f r e e  re turn  flybys were computed f o r  
several  f i g  t*s f o r  minimum f u e l  re turn  and target ing t o  the Indian 
Ocean. 
17. The plan t'st seemed t o  be most acceptable t o  a l l  was 
executing a f r e e  re turn  t ransfer  f lyby ASAP and then t o  speed up the return 
a t  FC+2. This plan' allowed performing the maneuver with the PNGS since 
it was already up. Also, it provided the option of speeding up the re turn  
a t  PC+2 (79:3)  t o  the MPL with e i t h e r  a 850 fps  maneuver landing a t  
143 h r  o r  a 4 8 3  fps maneuver landing a t  n 8  h r  . The PC+2 option decision 
could be delayed u n t i l  the l i fe t ime on the  l i f t  support consumables 
could be determined. 
- 18. After the F l ight  Director decision t o  do the f r ee  re turn  
f lyby NC, one more i t e r a t ion  on the maneuver was performed t o  achieve 
an impact point i n  the I n d i m  Ocean. Ihe minimum f u e l  maneuver had an  
impact point on Mdagascar. 
19. !Be f r e e  return flyby M2C was computed as:  
IIG = 61:29:42.&, A!EI = 9 . 7 2  sec, AV = 38.0 fps  
GETEI = 151:45, and $!! = 20:37S and X 6 0 : 1 0 ~  
20. The maneuver was computed using a two-jett 10 sec ullage; 
but, s ince the DAP was configured f o r  four - je t t  ullage, we gave a GO 
t o  use 4 j e t t  ullage. The bDCR m l l  clock was several  seconds i n  error ;  
however, the RETRO clock was r igh t  arid quickly confirmed the IlZC and t h i s  
ended the MOCR confusion. 
2 On Tuesday, Apri l  14, 1970, the RFO attended a meeting In 
the WC second f loo r  VIP room with the other  f l i g h t  control lers ,  ASPC) crew 
representatives, and others. The ,=.in topic  was what R+2 mneuver 
should be performed. The R1Kl presented the following options f o r  PC+2: 
GETI: AV GET landing Area a t  105 Gm SM jett isoned 
e r ro r  a t  FC+2 
( E+2 ) 845 142 MPL -22 fps 
79: 30 
AOL -50 fPS no 
DPS AT? without SM = 4726 
Dl3 AV with SM = 1977 
The HFO presented t.he following options f o r  t ra jec tory  speedup a f t e r  
execution of E + 2  of 845 fps:  
GETI: AV GETlanding ;Ong SM jett isoned 
DPS without SM 2899 a f t e r  E + 2  of 845 fps  (3 low)  DPS AV with SM 1100 
The re turn  t ra jec tory  would have always been within 4 f p s  of the en t ry  
corridor during the 845 f'ps PC+2, but was a s  f a r  a s  200 f'ps a,way during 
the 4728 fps FC4-2. Bsed  on consumbles, uncertainties i n  SIC  c h a r a c ~ r l s t i c s  
f o r  SM j e t t i son  60 hrs  pr ior  t o  EZ, mneuver s ens i t i v i t i e s  and available 
speed-up bneuvers,  the decision was reached t o  execute R+2 with 845 ips. 
Since a 1 a t t i t u d e  e r ro r  had a s m l l  K C  AV, the decision was 
m e e  t o  re lax  the LM IMU alignment accuracy and perforn a sun check. 
A b ~ i e f  description of SM separation and LM j e t t i son  sequence was a l so  
prosit:;ted. This sequence was adapted from procedures developed by the 
RFO1s f o r  e a r l i e r  lunar missions and verif ied by MPAD. m e  sequence 
optinrizes separation distances and directions while leaving the en t ry  
conditions unperturbed. Ihe proposed SM separation and LM j e t t i son  timeline 
which was a l s o  passed 1.3 MPAD f o r  ver i f ica t ion  is a s  follows: 
( la te?  revised 
t o  m-5 )  
EI-3: 30 b. Align the LM +X out the radius vector and 45' t o  the south 
( le te r  revised out-of-plane (when SM separation ti= was revised the 
to EI-4: 30) out-of -plane was deleted due t o  change i n  cen t r a l  angle 
of t rave l ) .  

c . Perform IN +X 1 fps ( la te r  revised t o  1/2 fps since 
ea r l i e r  separation and to allow S M  photography). 
d. R?rf o m  c ~ S M  sewrat ion followed by LH -X 1 fps (revised 
t o  1/2 f p s ) .  
'Ihis puts-SM t o  the south and behind tl.9 CM-IN; the EI-4 l/2 SH separation 
puts the SH ell behind the S/C a t  entry. 
EI-1 e. Align the CM +X axis out thc radius vect3r and 3-w 45* 
out-of -plane t o  the south. 
f. With the IM holding at t i tude and ut i l iz ing the Wtunne l  
pressure f o r  jet t ison AV perform LN jettison. AV assumed 
t o  be 2.5 f'ps ( la te r  updated t o  2.0 fps). 
g. CH mceuver t o  entry att i tude.  !Chis puts the LM south 
ard behind the CM a t  entry. 
MPAD used thissequence and verified the procedure f o r  several AVts of 
separation. 
22. Just  @or t o  K32, Recovery reported a storm near th+ MFL. 
Based on the storm's predicted position a t  landing, the PC+2 planning 
was not altered. 
a. Assuming no E+2 =newer, NX-5 Air uas -5 fps t o  tweak 
up the free return trajectory. 
b. !Be f i m l  lT+2 pad e n t  t o  crew a t  $3 hrs based on GYM 289 
vector. 
c .  FC+2 t o  the W L  (GEIZ w 143 hrs) was exec~ted  on time 
as a docked, PNGS burn. llhe burn was nomml with guided cutoff within 
0.13 sec af predicted BT. Howver, subsequent tracking showed hp high 
(-87.4 n.m. ) and a K!C-5 AV = 4 to 8 fps a t  104- hrs . Postburn tracking 
a f te r  WC-5 and EC-7 also showed a consistent trend of hp significantly 
high. 
d. TC+2 burn parameters (docked, IE?, mGS) : 
e. Ihe PC+2 confirmed me;:;iuver showed MCC-5 AV a t  104 h r s  = 
-1 fpsi- However, FC+2 ear ly  tracking showed EC-5 a t  106 hrs  = -4 t o  6 fps . 
D. !I!ransearth Coast. 
1. Around 90:00 GET, the weather i n  the recovery area was 
questioned. Ihe predicted weather a t  landing was good but with same 
degree of uncertainty. However, since a weather avoidance burn would 
require the LM R?GS as  the COAS could not be facing the earth, and since 
the storm could be avoided with l i f t  during entry; it was agreed not 
-
t o  perform a weather avoidance maneuver. 
me uncertainty in  the weather was forcing WC-5 t o  be possibly delayed un t i l  
the uncertain,.{ MS. removed. With the weather resolution, WC5 was performed 
as scheduled a t  105:30. 
2. K!c-5. 
a. SHe burst was predicted t o  occur a t  -106 hrs . 
b. hp without WC-5 was d 7 . 3  with GDS 250 vector. 
e .  KZ-5 AVest q (7.83, 7.81) a t  105:g (h, m). 
d. May do burn within - +3Ch! of nominal Tig f o r  - +.lo Ay. 
e. .WC-5 was passed t o  the crew based on GDS 253 vectar. 
f . Crew burned es r ly  -12 -29 (m, s ) . 
g. M=C-5 burn parameters (docked, DFS, manual - COAS t o  
earth a t t i tude) .  
Planned Actual 
-
15 (14 sec DFS + 14 sec + trim 
RCS trim) 
0 h. Ibe confirmed maneuver showed = -6.52 . 
7: = -6.51~ targeted 
3. Prior t o  the  SHe bursting, there was some concern tha t  it 
wouldn't burst. There were several ideas on how t o  vent the SHe. 
Same techniques would re ta in  DFS capability others wouldn't. We recomk?nded 
a plan tha t  was f i na l ly  agreed upon. The first pr ior i ty  was t o  minimumize 
the venting i n  order t o  preeerve the trackiag with no consideration given 
t o  retaining the DPS capability. 'Ibe trajectory was w e l l  within RCS 
WC capability. 'Ihe venting was t o  be performed i n  the FTC att i tude6 
If ventinq i n  the F W  a t t i tude  failed, the next s tep was 30 do a vent 
during a 10 sec ullage maneuver. 'Ibis maneuver was t o  be cut-of-plane 
using the E C  alignment technique and aligning perpendicular instead 
of para l le l  t o  the terminator. 
4. Ihe G and C requested a cg f o r  the stack weight without the 
SM i n  the CSM reference. This data was run off l ine  i n  the R W .  
5. On Wednesday, April15,  1970, the RFO attended a meeting t~ 
develop an ihtegrated crew checklist f o r  MX-7, SM separation, CM powerup, 
Cm ini t ia l izat ion,  IMU alignmnt, IM jettison, and entry. From t h i s  
10-hr meeting c a b  the EI-8 h r  t m l i n e  and crew checklist, which included 
=OMy GNC, GDo, RFO, crew representative, and data pr ior i ty  inputs. Ihe 
HFO presented the separation sequence with MPAD showing the i r  analysis of 
the sequence. 
Since the horizon would be dark :Inti1 jus t  pr ior  t o  EI, the RF'O suggested 
that  the CM be given a rwon check a t t i tude  t o  hold u n t i l  moonset and 
then track the horizon. The GDO discussed the CK! IHLTalign procedure 
which was a l so  incorporated. 
These procedures were then t r i ed  by the crew representatives who suggested 
that  K!C-7 and SM separation be moved 1 hr ear l ier .  This was coordineted 
among the fligbt controllers a d  accepted. 'Ibe IZM), GM), and FDO ran 
data and generated the necessary pads f o r  the crew t o  use i n  t he i r  
simulations of the entry timeline. The RF'O, GDO, and FDO then ran the 
timeline i n  the R E C  area t o  check t h e i r  procedures. An er ror  was found 
i n  the l?EC entry processor i n  that it could pick the wrcng m S M 4 T  
f o r  entry. An acceptatle workaround was found. 
a. ~n m-6 was not required a s  WC-7 AV was currently 
computed as  -3 fps. 
b. Telescope data wcis generated and passed ( a l l  four s ta t ions)  
with mc-7. 
c. SM jet t ison was planned a t  EI-b l/2 hrs. IM je t t ison 
was planned a t  EI-1 hr. 
d. Final stowage definitions were used t o  compute entry 
aerodynamics a t  GET &- hrs. 'Ibese entry aeros were loaded i n  the 
R!EC a s  EDM aerols based on mass properties job 27 (I43 = .29052). 
7. On Ihursday, April 16, 1970, the EIFO attended the f i n a l  
checklist review. A few inputs were mde, but as a whole the checklist 
was very close t o  the one generated on Apr i l l 5 .  The checklist was then 
read t o  the crew. 
E. E C - 7  and Entry. 
1. Since the conournables were sufficient,  it was decided t o  
bring up the I24 F3S a t  EI-8 hrs. The IM IHU was aligned t o  the earth 
terminator alignmeat associated w i t h  NC-7 a t  EI-5 hrs . The RFO picked 
an alternate target point (50 n.m. dawnrange from the nominal) which 
would have t o  be used &f KC-7 was only par t ia l ly  successful and the 
')h 
was greater than -6.08 (too shallow) forcing a l i f t  vector dawn entry, 
2. W-7 vas gassed t o  ghe crew as a 3.1 fps retrogradeoburn t o  
correct 7 f r o m  -5.99 t o  -6.51 . The IN a t t i tude  was about 20 out 
of r o l l  a g i t u d e  due to error needle confusion. Ihe U4 control gave a %Ow 
on th i s  a t t i tude.  Ihe REW gave a %)-GOw, as  the inplane colnponent would 
h a ~ e  been reduced, and the GDO advised the FD -GO f l y  the FJW t o  the pad 
att i tude.  MX'7 was executed nominally w i t h  EKY residuals of .1 fps . 
3. !Be cY/SH separation was executed with a IH ~ u s h / ~ u l l  maneuver 
a t  138:25:00. 
4. m e  pre l imi~ary  entry pad did not get  onboard un t i l  138:46:00. 
5. About 140:20:00, the RM) generated a CH: clock update when 
the CK! 'IM becam available. 'Ibe proper com~and load was trsnsferred t o  
the  m o t e  s i t e  and uplinked, A correction of -.06 sec was required 
a t  EI-45 nin a s  the i n i t i a l  update was computed on l o w  b i t  rate. !Chis 
update was uplinked with the f i n a l  s t a t e  vectrJr uplink, During -the CH: 
in i t i a l iza t ion  a t  EI-2 1/2 hrs, the entry targets e r e  uplinked t o  the 
a ( h t  = 21.66s long 165.37~). 
6. Ihe IN maneuvered t o  a IM je t t ison a t t i tude  which uas 45' 
out-of-plsne t o  the north instead of the south. LM closeout was in i t i a ted  
without a fo rm1  %Ow, and,vhen the at t i tude error uas recognized; the 
hatches were being installed. Since time was c r i t i ca l ,  the HFO advised 
the FD t o  continue IM closeout,and t h a t  although the separation would 
not be optimum f o r  a roli r ight  constant g entry; the separation would 
be adequate. 
7. A t  EI-1:10 (lkl:3:00 GET), the LM was jettisoned and the 
radar tracking inprrupted f o r  processing. Ibe y had changed to -6.2' 
o r  a change of - 3  fran the Last 1-rajectory. verification of the 
data, the RF'O generated a f i n a l  entry PAD which was sent  t o  the crew a s  
the  state vector was uplinked. Ihe RM) advised the GM) thatoa second 
uplink might be required if subsequen& data refuted the -6.2 y 
Ihe subsequent data verified the -6.2 and the G and N was give£% GO. 
8. A sextant star check was p e r f o m d  t o  v e r m  the entry a t t i tude 
and the moon check was successful a t  moon se t .  
9. A f i n a l  y was c ~ p u t e d  as 6.28'. Ibe S/C was reported 
t o  have landed 1.5 n .E  short of the target  point. 
10. During the recovery, the RM) computed the IN cask IP and 
a s s e d  t h i s  data to the AEC. Ihe support to the AEC w i l l  be( covered in 
another mmo. 
1. Observatory telescope data shoulC be transmitted fran MCC only 
by teletype a d  not by telephone. 
2. The RTCC REE344AT identifiers should include vehicle nanenclature. 
Also the entry processors should have the capability t o  reselect the 
desired IElVMAT. 
Bobby T .' ~ g n c e r  
Thmas E . Weichel 
Enclosure 
cc: 
FC/E. F. Kranz 
J m  W. Roach 
M. F. Brooks 
C. A. Beers 
Flight Directors 
Branch Chiefs 
FS~/J. R.  Garman 
FCS/J. C.  Bostick (26) 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
MANkED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
HOUSTON. TEXAS 7 7 M  
IN REPLY REFER TO: FC5 APR 24 1970 
EQEMORANDUM TO: Apollo 1 3  Flight  Director 
FROM : Flight Dynamics Officer 
SUBJECT : Postfl ight  Report 
A. Prelaunch. 
1. During the  T-5 h r  trajectory run, no val id  data was received 
f ram VAN. The problem xas eventually traced t o  the  VAN CDP . h msuc- 
cessful attempt was made t o  correct the  problem by going with the 507 
tape. The problen: was not corrected. 
2. The I P  reported a problem with i t s  ALDS interface during the 
T-5 h r  run. No e f fec t  of t h i s  prciSlem was noted at MCC. It was reported 
t ha t  the problem was  procedural and w a s  due t o  a work-around required t o  
support a sim run. No further action was taken. 
B. Launch through MCC-2 (Hybrid Transfer). 
1. A t  T-2 hrs , the  VAN CDP problem s t i l l  had not been fixed. The 
e f fec t  of t h i s  problem w a s  t ha t  the VAN would not be able t o  transmit high 
speed data t o  Houston. This condition continued through launch. 
2. A t  ; 5 mins 30 secs i n to  the  launch phase the BII center engine 
s h ~ t  down early. This caused a subsequent delay i n  the  achievement of 
SIVB t o  C O I  and SIVB t o  o rb i t  conditions as well as a delay i n  SIVB shut- 
down. No other trajectory anomalies were noted. 
3. A l l  earth orbi t  ac t iv i t i es  were normal with the  exception of 
the tracking s i t e s  available fo r  the CSM pre-TLI s t a t e  vector update. P-ll 
tracking data was t o  be terminated a t  1:37:00. During t h i s  States pass 
the  TEX data was unacceptable due t o  a "header coding error". The problem 
was resolved as being a "cockpit error" by the  TEX s i t e  personnel. 
4. The SIVB LOX dump and evasive maneuvers were input t o  the 
RTCC a t  2 3:46:00. A t  t h i s  time, the Selects requested tha t  the 2:59:00 
zero AV maneuver (used f o r  CSM separation a t t i tude definition) be moved 
back t o  TU cutoff. m a m i c s  was so  instructed, however, TLI was moved 
instead. This wsul ted  i n  the ephemeris re-anchoripg on the  pre-TLI CYI 
vector. This s i tuat ion was ultimately corrected by deleting TLI and 
re-anchoring on CW08. (The consequence of t h i s  was t o  "turn on" the 
RTCC pre-TK vent model. With t h i s  vent on, and unknown, l a t e r  impact 
point evaluations w i t h  MSFC would not canpare. It was not u n t i l  24 hrs  
l a t e r  tha t  the "vent or," s i tuat ion vas noted as having invalidated impact 
point canparisono; attenpted pr ior  t o  a GET of approximately 6 hrs  . ) 
5. A t  2 5:50:00 MSFC s ta ted  they had targeted the  f i r s t  SIVB 
MCC ( ~ i g  6:04:00) using the B D A X ~ ~  vector. The usage of t h i s  vector 
was not as agreed t o  prefl ight nor as was done during simulations. It 
was our understanding tha t  a "reconstructed vector" representing TLT, LOX 
dump, and the evasive maneuver was  t o  be used f o r  the  first SIVB MCC. 
6. !The Selects reported seeing a small "glitch" i n  the  SIVB 
tracking tha t  had occurred at about 13: 42 :00. No explanation of t h i s  is 
available . 
7. A t  t 24:38:00, MILX99 shwed the SIVB impact t o  be 0.21°~, 
~.79% with impact a t  71:58:37. A t  19:17:00, the  Selects noticed 
another "glitch" i n  the data. MIIXgg represented all  data a f te r  t h i s  
occurrence. A vector canparison of the pre and post "glitch" vectors 
yielded: 
b. A; = -2.65 Pps. 
No real explanation w a s  available f o r  t h i s  gl i tch,  but it w a s  theorized 
tha t  the SIVB expended a significant mount of ene,rgy fram perhaps an 
unscheduled vent. 
C.  MCC-2 through PC+2. 
1. During the second d w  of the mission, the camaand c a n p t e r  a t  
HSK/NBE went "red" which necessitated using 30-foot s i t e s  as two-way 
when the  Pacific t r i a d  was i n  view. Although the coaaand computer did not. 
go "green" u n t i l  the f i f t h  day of the mission, HSK/NBE continued t o  s-qport  
as a three-way site. (See the Network Controller's postfl ight report f o r  
further d e t a i b  . ) 
2. After the spacecraft contingency arose and the  crew transferred 
t o  the IM, a problem was found i n  receiving I U  and IM tz .  Acing data simul- 
taneously. A premission plan with modiiicatians w a s  i n i t i a t ed  with the 
results being tha t  val id  IM data was received. (see the Network Controller's 
postfl ight report f o r  f'urther deta i ls . )  It should be noted tha t  it took 
approximately !, hrs t o  obtain satisfactory IM data. 
D. Transearth C o a s t . -  The SHe vent caused considerale  effect  t o  the 
spacecraft PTC mode, but had l i t t l e  obeemabLe effect  on the doppler 
residuals. Tnree hrs l a t e r ,  however, a .1 fps maneuver was input t o  the 
MPT i n  an attempt t o  model the  SHe vent t o  f a c i l i t a t e  data processing. 
E. MCC-7 through Entry. 
1. The SM separation maneuver, executed a t  138:02:00, w a s  t o  
have imparted zero effective AV t o  the  IM/W cab ina t ion  by usage of the 
"push/pull" sequence. However, the  "pull1' maneuver "netted" % -1 fps t o  
the W/CM. 
2. Jus t  pr ior  t o  IEI closeout, and subsequent je t t i son,  the  
crew was t o  have maneuvered the  U!/CM t o  an a t t i tude which would have 
resulted i n  jettisoning the  IN "up" and t o  the "south" ( re la t ive  t o  
the CM). The crew did not have the stack i n  t h i s  "desired" a t t i tude  but 
a check on the  re la t ive  separation of the CM and IM a t  E I  showed suff ic ient  
doknrange clearance though the IM would then be t o  the  north of the CM. 
This was not as desired, but was  acceptable, and mention was made t o  the 
FD but not t o  the crew. 
3. The vector u t i l i zed  t o  generate the  f i n a l  entry PAD data was 
GWMX307 which included only ikoseodata a f t e r  ICC-7. This vector indicated 
&n entry flightpatin angle t o  -6.2 , thus confirming the "shallowing" trend 
t ha t  was observed following MCC-7. Harever, as ear ly  as the  PC+2 maneu- 
ver, t h i s  constant "shallowing" of the entry angle was observed. This 
forced MCC-5 as well as MCC-7. No knam explanation is  available but 
with the  crew's report of continual "streaming of par t ic les  past  the  
window" it is probably t ha t  a continual "vent" was i n  progress. Addition- 
a l l y  powering up of the  I&! required the Uf water boi ler ,  which is "pro- 
pulsive" i n  operation. Further, a l l  a t t i tude maneuvering was accmplished . 
by using the  IM t ranslat ional  je ts .  Considering these possible perturbations, 
it seems reasonable t o  assune one or  all could have been respansible f o r  
the  shallowing of the  f l ightpath angle. 
11. Mission Narrative. 
A. Prelaunch. 
1. The prelaurdch phase was essent ia l ly  non-eventful. !he 5-hr 
trajectory run was good with the excel."Yon of VAN and en T? y r o b l a  which 
was caused by a procedural e r ro r  i n  preparing fo r  the  sim run. 
2. A second run was planned t o  exercise the VAN but was scrubbed 
because the VAN w a s  s t i l l  dam and the  I P  problem was  sa t i s fac tor i ly  
explained. 
3. The remainder of the prelaunch phase went as planned with 
no significant  problems. 
B. Launch throSwh MCC-2 (Hybrid Transfer). 
1. During launch phase the  SIC stage of f l i gh t  w a s  nminal .  
During SII  f l i g h t  the center engine shut down early which had the e f fec t  
of "slowing d m "  all trajectory "milestones". 
2. Insertion was n d n a l  with the I U  vector being used t o  t ransfer  
t o  o rb i t  phase. 
3. An I U  vector w a s  "saved" a t  insert ion and shipped t o  MSFC f o r  
t h e i r  analysis; this vector was ICHUO1. 
4. A t  2 T+1:00:00 the  RTCC 5-2 engine model was updated i n  accord- 
dam with the predicted values as supplied by the BSE. They were as 
follows : 
THRUST (LBS) FMXJ RATE (LBsISEC) 
169,696 394.235 before PU s h i f t  
200, 606 469.546 a f t e r  PU s h i f t  
5. U t e r  the NO TLI acquisition data had been sent t o  the  Network 
the second opportunity TLI was generated i n  the  IM ephemeris. T i g  was 
4:04:14 (based on cYI3). 
6. The interrupt vector t ha t  wr~a  established with a l l  States 
data pr ior  t o  1 : 37 :00 w a s  GYMS9. This vector was uplinked t o  the space- 
c ra f t  pr ior  t o  TLI. 
7. TLI was frozen on 1c1iuo6 which was the l a s t  I U  vecto:. available 
p r i m  t o  TLI. 
a. Following TLI cutoff, HAW was requested t o  provide high speed 
data such that  another source of trejectory information would be available 
fo r  "best TLI cutoff" vector determination. The choice of the best  post-TLI 
vector was aupented by use of residual  data from the Select .  O f  the 
three dytamic vectors available (IU, CMC, high speed) the  residuals were 
truncated on HSRC (high speed cutoff)  and the I U  (ICHUG~) vector.  The 
residuals on the  CMC ( C C H U O ~ )  were 77. C C H U O ~  was used t o  update the  
ephemeris as our "best" defini t ion of TLI cutoff.  
9. Shortly a f t e r  TLI cutoff ,  we received MSFC1s bes t  estimate of 
the  post-PIJ: conditions ( "IFT TLI BEST") . 
10. A t  c 4:20 :00, the  Selects had collected enough data t o  build 
another vector ( ~ D A  36) which could be used f o r  fur ther  t ra jec tory  source 
evaluation. This vector caupared sumewhat favorably with the  current 
ephemeris ( C C H U O ~ )  i n  t ha t  the MCC-2 AV on CCHUO8 was 23 while t ha t  ~f BDA 
36 was 17 fps. In  addition, t h i s  vector and impact data was sent t o  MSFC. 
BDA 36 showed good caponent agreement with the MSFC "IFT TLI best" vector 
which w t s  stored i n  the RTCC as LLHUO1. The BDAX36 vector was trans- 
mitted t o  MSFC along with the  information pertaining t o  i t s  ver i f ica t ion 
of the exactness of LLHUO1. 
11. The spacecraft eject ion,  SIVB LOX dump and SIVB evasive 
maneuvers were all input t o  the RTCC. 
12. The t r a .  -ing data following the  f i r s t  SIVB MCC w a s  sent  t o  
MSFC as GWMX53. This vector indicated no need f o r  a second SIVB MCC as 
the  impact point w a s  within acceptable limits. 
13. A t  2 10 : 30 :00 the G&C1s informed us t h a t  the AVc bias  w a s  
-0.34 fps. 
14. A t  ~ o ~ l : O O : O O  the SIVB vector (NBEX74) showed the impact 
point t o  be 8.149 S x 29.53%. This: qe&oiro&-,a .&pact intohatlbh"n 
w a s  sent t o  MLFC. 
15. A t  ; 14:30 :00 the SPS single bore engine values were loatied 
i n to  the  RTCC as the  MCC-2 maneuver would not be long enough (burn time) 
t o  two banks of b a l l  valves. 
16. A t  2 14 : 35 :00 N B E X ~ ~  indicated SIVB impact t o  be a t  10': 31's x 
28':26'w. 
17. A t  2 20:33:00 the SIVB impact point was updated t o  80:3!j1s x 
330:5hrw with impact a t  77:51:32 based on RIDX91. 
18. A t  2 24:38:00 MILXgg showed the SIVB impact point t o  be 
0.21'~ x 3.79% with impact now at 77 :58: 37. (see Problems and Reso3utions, 
Section I .B. ) . 
19. A t  29 :30 :00 MIXLO8 indicated SIVB impact a t  0.93%'~ x 29.53% 
with impact a t  77:57:37. This information and vector w a s  passed t o  MSFC. 
20. MCC-2 (hybrid t ransfer)  w a s  executed on time and was naninal. 
C. HCC-2 through PC+2. 
1. The final. update t o  the BIVB gpheneris vas an HAWX199 end 
predicted the foifaring infozmatioa: 
2. A s  a result of the contingency, a free-retam lunar flyby 
maneuver was executed using the DPS a t  61 :29: k .8L .  The f3ybg was targeted 
for  an Indian Ocem splashpoint a t  approxhateiy 152 hrs GET. The maneuver 
was  executed n&na3&-. (See tke  maneuver summary for details,)  
1. A D?S maneuver was executed appraxi.m%cly 2 hrs after pericyn- 
thian arrival tine. !Re m a a v e r  vas targsted to achieve ar: W L  lentling 
point. F i ~ a l  P4D cirrd Sir\' ere generated oa GWE289, Execution was 
nuninal. 
2. Ihe KCC-5 exec~tion technique presented two significant problems. 
These concerned d i g m e a t  of the AGS w d  the turn nuxitoring teciznique. 
ACS aligruient w a s  acc.~tglished usiag C O B  s i g h t a s  on the esrth. &&en- 
tialiy , +&a spcecraft +Z axis was &g;;eB dong the local vert ical  and 
the +X axis vrrs placed retrogr- aloag the local horizontal. This tech- 
rigw w a s  sodeled i n  +&e M E T  using sn OST -thst d q x c a t e d  the 
aligment and manuelly i terated AVN t o  achieve +he desired yEI. The 
RTE canputed maneuver gave the f $ s t  guess A'f -6 a v  small changes were 
required t o  campensa+le for  +&e 6' difference between the RTE desired 
thrust di-rection and *&e trtre thrust directly obtaioed ?ran the space- 
craf t  alignment. Ihe H e n u a l  guidance mode in the WT vas util ized t o  most 
correctly model the maneuver. 
The monitoring %echniqw was developed using two basic =sump- 
tioas. Firs t ,  tho- the AGS should perfonu n c m i n a . ,  it might not due 
t o  the I-? t a ~ r a t u r e s  t o  which its accelerometers had subjected. 
Secmd'Ly, the RTCC burn time prediction was considered t o  be accurate a f te r  
analysis of -,_.e PC+2 maneuver data. Cansidering these two points, it was 
decided t o  manually k n l n a t e  the burn at PAP. ATB ninus 1 second and l e t  
MCC advise m the trim procedures. If the kC;S appeared o f f -ndna l ,  only 
2 seconds of +X RCS would be required t o  achieve the proper burnout condi- 
tions an& i n  no case should the undesirable use of -X RCS be required. A t  
the end of the maneuver, however, a "GO" t o  trim the AGS was given as it 
appared t o  be f mctjoning naainally . 
3. The crev had enough difficulty i n  establishing PTC that  it 
was & a e d  desirable t o  ainimize the time delta between MCC-5 and the 
SYe vmt since both events would probably effect  the PTC. Thus MCC-5 was 
se t  a t  105:30:00 which was 4 hr prior t o  the predicted SHe vent. 
4. MCC-5 was scheduled a t  105:30:00 with the f i n a l  maneuver data 
being computed on GDSX252. Execution w s s  nauinal with the exception of 
Tig, which was so insensitive tha t  the crew was told  t o  execute the maneu- 
ver whenever they f e l t  ready within PAD Tig 2 30 mintues. 
E. MCC-7 thrsugh Entry. 
1. A t  135:10:00 the PNGS was being "brought up" with consideration 
then being given t o  doing a PNGS P-41 midcourse maneuver. 
2. MCC-7 was executed under AGS control. The burn w e s  cmpleted 
sat isfactor i ly  and no trimming was required. 
3. SM separation was executed as planned with the exception of 
the AV imparted t o  the (EI. (see Section I . E . ,  Problems aad Resolutions.) 
4. Tl,e tracking data following MCC-7 again reflected a "shallowing 
trend" i n  the yEI. This was noted and work continued based on the pre-MCC-7 
vector and the confirmed MCC-7 and separation maneuvers. (See Section I .E. ) 
5 .  The crev photographed the SM and continued with the U4C 
powered up and IMU alignment. 
6 .  W/IM SEP occurred a l i t t l e  early and with the AV's as follows : 
7. Tracking data w a s  interrupted just  pr ior  t o  IM SEP with the 
f i na l  entry PAD based on t h i s  data (GWMX307) and the confirmed m/IN SEP 
maneaver. 
8. The following is a summary of the  vectorslentry flightpath 
angles tha t  were observed priiu:-t& entrg; 
VECTOR FLIGHTPAWL ANGLE 
CROS 320 -6.27 
NBES 323 -6.295 
CROS 325 4.295 
VECTOR FtIGHTPATIi AilGLE 
is4& 335 -6.288 
9. Following aplabhdom the IM cask aerocIym&cs were input t o  
the RTCC, and the p o s t - ~ ~ / M  SEF data uas processed t o  detelmine the "cask" 
IP's. These IF'S g w - W  .pubU&h8dtirn; &.separate memol.Fiadm. . 
,. 
$iLDa\lid Reed 
William M. Stoval, Jr. 
u&3/Bmaz 
W i l l i a m  J. Boone , 
Enclosures 2 
CC : 
FC/E. F. Kranz 
J.  W. Roach 
M. F .  Brooks 
Branch Chiefs 
FC5/J. C. Bostick (26) 
FS!j/J. R. Garman 
FC/Flight Directors 
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
Housrm. Tuus 77058 
APR 24 1970 
MEMORANDUlf TO: Apollo 1 3  Fl ight  Director 
FROM : F ~ 5 / ~ u i d a n c e  Officers 
SUBJJ3CT : Apollo 1 3  Postf l ight  Report 
A. Prelaunch - %ere were no anomalies experienced during the  
prelaunch period. 
B. Lalmch through M=C-2 (hybrid t ransfer) .  
1. During powered f l i g h t  t o  ear th  o rb i t  insertion, a s l i g h t  
crossrange and downrange e r r o r  developed between the I U  and CMC. 
h s t  earth o r b i t  inser t ion  analysis ver i f ied  a de f in i t e  but acceptable e r ro r  
i n  the  IU navigation state. 
2. During the P23 operation, the OCDU f a i l  inh ib i t  b i t s  *re not 
reset during the optics mode switching. 
'Ihe crew p e r f o m d  the appropriate r ese t  procedure provided by ?.Se ground. 
1. A t  55:55:40 GET, a r e s t a r t  occurred i n  the  CW caused by a 
power g l i t ch .  The CK: vectors, clock, and REFSMMAT were checked and 
found t o  be good. 
2. I n  advance of the PC+2 h r  maneuver, it was decided t o  ver i fy  
the accuracy of the current LM platform alignment. Such a ver i f ica t ion 
of the alignment would allow waivering a P52 and conserving LM RCS. 
To adequately check the a l ig~ment ,  it was decided t o  ins t ruc t  the LGC t o  
point the LM AOT a t  a c e l e s t i a l  bcdy end have the crew indicate how well  
it was able t o  achieve t h i s .  
D. Transearth Coast. 
1. Since the LM had been powered down a f t e r  the FC+2 uaneuver, 
a method of executing the midcourse had t o  be determined. 
A procedure using earth terminator aligned on the horizontal  l i n e  of the  
COAS was d e v e l o ~ d ,  
Problem - PowEring down both 5M and CSM G and N ' s  necessitated 
a l t e rna te  methods f o r  executing MCC-7 and subsequently al igning the  
CSM platform f o r  entry.  
The approach proposed f o r  WC-7 executf GI and CSH platform a i i g r m n t  
followed two constraining guidelines. F i r s t ,  minimum re l iance  on 
the  LM was desirable due t o  possible consumable problems, and secontly, 
the  technique shouldn't require s t a r s  s ince  they might not be adequately 
v i s ib le  without use of auto  optics .  With this i n  mind, a plan was 
f ormul-9 t e d  requiring only AGS body ax i s  a l ign  and a t t i t u d e  cont ro l  cspabil i ty,  
and the  use of moon and sun a s  c e l e s t i a l  t a rge t s  f o r  the  CSM alignment. 
The plan a l s o  a l l o k d  a good deal  of f l e x i b i l i t y  if ext ra  capabi l i ty  
became available, such a s  the  LMPGNCS. 
11. Mission Narrative. 
A. Ekelaunch - No problems. 
B. Iaunch through E C - 2  (hybrid t r ans fe r ) .  
1. During powered f l i g h t  t o  ea r th  o r b i t  insert ion,  a s l i g h t  
navigation e r r o r  developed between the  I U  and CW. This gave the 
fo l lowi r i  differences bemeen the  two navigation sources a t  insert ion.  
k (downrange) = 6.18 fps 
m- (crossrange) = -7.67 fps  
&Z ( r a d i a l )  = 1.56 fps  
m e  crossrange e r r o r  buildup s t a r t ed  a s  a s t e p  function i n  I U  crossrange 
veloci ty  a t  l i f t - o f f  of sgproximtely 2.6 fps  . Thus indicat ing the  
IU out-of-plane accelerometer had se?sed a f a l s e  accelerat ion r igh t  a t  
l i f t - o f f .  Post-insertion o r b i t a l  parameter comparison between h5FN and 
IU confirme2 both the  out-of-plane and downrange er ror .  The downrange 
e r r o r  a c c m u b t e d  durirg powered f l i g h t  was at t r ibuted  t o  an I U  sca le  
f ac to r  o r  pipa bias.  The l a t t e r  would seem l i k e l y  since the  e r r o r  is 
more l i n e a r  then non-linear with time. Comparison between M F N  and I U  
a t  the  pre-selected time was a s  follows: 
GET 00:56:00 AFiV (downrange posi t ion) = +8059.6 f t  
L!a (semi-mjor ax i s )  = -.679 n.m. 
mmx (crossrange veloci ty)  = 12 fps 
GET 01:65:00 AFN (downrange posi t ion) = +63509 f t 
L!a (semi-major a x i s )  = 1.257 n.m. 
m m x  
(crossrange veloci ty)  = 15 fps  
2. During the  P23 operation, the  OCDU f a i l  i nh fb i t  b i t s  were not 
reset during the optics  mode switching. Ihe p o s s i b i l i t y  is a known 
program anomaly and was described i n  Colossus 2D program and operational 
note 1.2.1 (b . ) .  Br ief ly  s tated,  if a reslxrt occurs (due t o  POOD00, 
bailout  V37, o r  hardware cause) during ce r t a in  portions of IMU or  optics  
mode switching, ce r t a in  f a i l u r e  inh ib i t  b i t s  may remain s e t ,  preventing 
the program from sending appropriate alarms if a genuine f a i l u r e  occurs. 
Euring opt ics  mode switching a f t e r  the opt ics  have been i n  zero f o r  33 
cycles of ~ k ~ u p t  (15.86 - 16.32 seccmds), the OCDU f a i l  i nh ib i t  is 
l e f t  on f o r  an addi t ional  .4 seconds. A V37 was e:. ted during the  .4 
second in te rva l  which prevented the  OCDU f a i l  inhid  . b i t s  from being 
resr:t. !Be crew performed the  appropriate r e s e t  procedure ( ~ 2 5  N07E, 1331E, 
7E, E) provided by the  ground. 
3. M:C-2 - State  vectors and a target  load were uplinbed a t  
28:50. !the mneuver was executed a s  follows : 
Ple  nned Executed 
C . E C - 2  through FC+2. 
1. A t  55:55:40 GET, a r e s t a r t  occurred i n  the CK: caused by a 
power g l i t ch .  Ihe C E  vectors, clock, and ElEFSMK4T were checked and found 
t o  be good. 
2. A t  the point t h a t  ECCOM estimated t h a t  only 20 minutes of 
power remained i n  CSM, it was decided t o  bring up the  IGC and do a 
docked alignment. lhis was completed on CM bat tery  power. Ihe I&C 
is cnable t o  navigate i n  cislunar space, and how t o  handle state vectors 
and t?rget  loads became ow biggest concern. It was decided t o  meke 
sure t k a t  the RTCC vectors were i n  the  ear th  sphere of influence, and t h a t  
the s t a t e  vectors uplinked t o  the  LGC would be t imtagged a t  
- 9, 
which is the  t i m e  the  LGC woull have t o  integrate the vectors%'any 
burn program. Also the external  AV cunponents must be i n  the  same 
sphere a s  the vector. A state vector, ta rget  load, and FWSBMAT were 
uplinked. Ihe f r e e  re turn  mneuver was executed a s  follows: 
Planned Executed 
3. FC+2 Planning and Execution - m e  LM platform was aligned 
t o  the CM: using the docked alignment procedure a t  5tk40t00 GET. Ihe 
f r e e  re turn  maneuver was executed using t h i s  alignment. Since no stars 
could be seen by the crew, it was decided t o  perform a sun check p r i o r  
t o  going behind the moon, t o  determine if a P52 would be required while 
on the backside. It was desirable not t o  have t o  do the P52 t o  conserve 
LM RCS propellant.  Real-time evaluation of the FCi-2 hromeneuver with 
a t t i t u d e  variat ion indicated tha t  an a t t i t u d e  within +1 of desired 
would be adequate. Based on t h i s  l imi t ,  a tes-t, t o  s e g  if the U C  knew 
its i n e r t i a l  orientat ion w e l l  enough, was developed. A ground derived 
uni t  vector f o r  the  sun a t  GET 74:00:00 was provided f o r  input t o  P52 
t o  allow orientat ion of the AOT a t  the  sun a s  i f  marks were t o  be taken. 
A ground sun vector was provided because the current IGC ephemeris knowledge 
was unknowin with no telemetry available.  P52 was chosen over ~ 4 9  because 
it performs a two-axis versus a t h r e e e x i s  mageuver and achieves a t t i t u d e  
more quickly. m e  sun subtends an a r c  of 0.5 which indicates t h a t  if 
the center  of the AOT, a t  the  completion of the  maneuver, was ogf by more 
than two sun diameters an equivalent platform misalignment of 1 ex i s t s .  
The sun check revealed t h a t  the  IGC was able t o  place the  AOT r e t i c l e  
center  rrithin .66 sun d i a m t e r s  08 the  desired deviation. This equates 
t o  a platform m i s a l i g m n t  of .33 assuming perfect  a t t i t u t e  cont ro l  
within the deadband. Also a gross s t a r  check was made on the backside 
of the  moon. It a l s o  confirmed t h a t  the  LM platform was within acceptable 
l i m i t s  t o  execute the maneuver with0ut.a-E52. 
4. MPAD ran some window and AOT VIEWSAT T and t h i s  data 
uas passed t o  the crew. However, t h i s  data could %!'be ver i f ied  i n  the  
RTCC and Fl ight  was advised that it was probably wrong. MPAD reran. 
the data and discovered t h a t  they had made an e r r o r  i n  inputing the  
REFSIIIMAT t o  t h e i r  progessor. Ihis time they cam up with the  center  
of the  moon on the 14 mark on the  LPD a t  burn a t t i tude .  lhis was ver i f ied  
i n  the RTCC, and the  data was read up t o  the  crew f o r  a burn a t t i t u d e  
check. It was es&imated fmm the  sun check t h a t  the  platform was misaligned 
approximately 1/2 . Bssed on the  bes t  vector p r i o r  t o  hCC5, the  b v n  was 
probably executed with a p i tch  a t t i t u d e  e r r o r  of approximately 1/4 . 
Ihe FC+2 maneuver was executed a s  follows: 
Planned 
-.- 
Executed 
V!g IMtT X = +743.08 Vg IMU X = +742.21 AGS X = 858.7 
IMU Y = -426.42 Y = -425 -88 Y = 19.5 
D. Since the crew could not f ind  s t a r s  i n  the  AOT before going 
behind the moon p r io r  t a  E+2, a =tho13 of executing the midcourse 
maneuvers was recommended using the ear th  terminator aligned on t h e  
horizontal  l i n e  of the COAS with the  COAS mounted i n  the FWD window 
looking down the LM +Z body axis .  The s u n l i t  pa r t  of the ear th  could 
be placed i n  the  COAS a s  shown below f o r  e i t h e r  a posigrade o r  retrograde 
burn. 
POSIGRADE RETROGRADE 
MCC.5was executed with the  AGS body ax i s  aligned using the retrograde 
alignment. A REFSMMAT OST 009 was computed t h a t  was equivalent t o  t h e  
above alignment, f o r  use by other MJCR posi t ions and by MPAO i n  t h e i r  
processors. AGS addresses 404, 405, 406 were loaded with zeros. 'Ihe 
burn was monitored by 470~.  Ihe AGS accelerometer d r i f t  a t  T was 
determined t o  be -.2 f'ps. The burn ms cutoff  by the crew at1F4 fps  
and trimmed t o  7 .6  i n  470. 
1. To provide an a t t i t u d e  and burn monitor reference f o r  NC-7, 
the AGS was t o  be ;pody axis altgned -when ink& knavn,. &nertidi: or ienta t ion  
'Ihis was done by making c e l e s t i a l  fix on the  earth,using the  terminator 
cusp t o  s e t  vp an inplane posigrade o r  retrograde a t t i t u d e  dependent on 
the a c t u a l  XC-7 maneuver. From t h i s  point  on through CSM e n t l y  
preparations, the AGS NC-7 a l i g m n t  was t o  be maintained. 
2. Alignment of the CSM would then be prformed as  a LM t o  CSM 
course alignment using the AGS EC-7 alignment a s  the  LM alignment. The 
AGS MCC-7 alignment can be and was equated t o  a REFSMIWC by the ground. 
Tb CSM coarse alignment t o  a EC-7 IIEFSWT would then be followed by 
an alignment t o  the  desired ent ry  REFSMMAT through a CSM P52, optic 1 
using the noon/sun a s  f ine  a l ign  c e l e s t i a l  ta rgets .  
3. Implellbentation of the  above process applied use of ground 
computed data based on a knowledge of the  AGS KC-7 a l i g m n t  . Using 
the AGS driven PIMI as  an a t t i t u d e  rgference, t w ~ .  gets .  of FDA1 angles t o  
point the CSM optics, with shaf t  = 0 /trunnion = 0 , a t  the  moon and 
sun respectively, were computed. For the moon a t t i t u d e  equivalent, CSM 
coarse a l ign  angles were computed. Once a t  moon a t t i tude ,  coarse aligned, 
and with t h a t  equivalent alignment loaded i n  memory as  the "actual" REPSMMAT, 
a P52, optic 1 is executed switching t o  the  en t ry  FEFSWT which has been 
placed i n  the "preferred" memory location. a r k s  made a f t e r  coarse 
aligning t o  the  en t ry  REFSWT i n  option !. Llwepcp-do13n_ IWe:~o%ead 
sun respectively with a LM a t t i t u d e  mneuver t o  the sun between oucceseive mrka  
4. Several hours p r io r  t o  WC-7, it tns decided t h a t  suff ic ient  
LMconsumbles existed t o  power up the LM FGNCS as  well a s  AGS. As 
pointed out previously, the  addit ion of  the LM FGNCS was compatible with 
e a r l i e r  preparations . 
5 .  J u s t  p r i o r  t o  the  LM PGNCS e l igment ,  en AGS body axis  a l ign  
a t  a known i n e r t i a l  o r i en ta t iogwi th  respect t o  the earth, was performed. 
The LM was then coarse aligned t o  t h i s  AGS or ienta t ion  with the equivalent 
REFSMb?AT being stored a s  "actual" i n  LGC memory. Since t h i s  i n i t i a l  
orientat ion was not t h a t  o r ig ina l ly  planned f o r  MCC-7 and subsequent. 
ac t iv i ty ,  a  P52, option 1 was s e t  ~pp i n ' t h e  LGC' CorveBltgn'Do the  ldost.rdd 
EC-7 alignment. Ce les t i a l  marks made a f t e r  coarse al igning i n  P52 
were executed on the moon and sun since s t a r  v i s i b i l i t y  via the AOT 
wasn't acceptable. 
6 .  With a f u l l y  operat ional  LM PGNCS available,  it was i n i t i a l l y  
decided t o  parform a normal LGC burn f o r  MCC-'I with AGS a s  backup, but '  
not targeted via external  de l t a  V. However, jus t  p r i o r  t o  the  burn, 
w i t h  the PGNCS f u l l y  configured f o r  a  guided burn and near burn a t t i tude ,  
-it was decided t o  use AGS instead of FGNCS control.  This decision was 
based on current  LM RCS usage. Attitude control  modes were changed 
during t h i s  time period causing two confusion fac to r s .  The ac tua l  LM 
a t t i t u d e  d r i f t ed  away from burn a t t i t u d e  i n  yaw and roll,and the  crew 
reported t h a t  the yaw and r o l l  e r ro r  needles weren't nulled. Inotructions 
were given t o  maneuver t o  burn a t t i t u d e  via the  FMI, leave the XNCS l a  
141 a s  if  it were t o  do the  burn, go t o  AGS control,  and complete the  
burn by body ax i s  aligning a t  burn a t t i t u d e  and se lec t ing  ?: ;tude hold. 
The burn was performd subs t i tu t ing  an AGS t o  F'GNCS alien t':? 3ody axis  al ign.  
Flanned Executed AGS 
- 
Vg IMU X = +3.02 Vg IMU X = +2.91 470 = + 2 . ~  
IMU Z = W.07 Z = -0.05 
7. After campletion of EC-7, the  vehicle was maneuvered t o  SM 
separation a t t i t u d e  using LMFDAI a t t i tudes .  It was decided t o  v a ~ y  the  
or ig inal  CSM coarse a l ign  procedure and use the  SM separation a t t i t u d e  
ra ther  than the moon sighting a t t i tude .  This was done i n  ant ic ipa t ion  
tha t  s t a r s  might be available f o r  the  CSX P52, and the two LM a t t i t u d e  
maneuvers f o r  moon and sun sightings could be eliminated, CSM coarse 
a l ign  angles equivalent t o  the SM separation a t t i t u d e  were thus .ubs t i tu ted  
by the ground f o r  the .or ig ina1 angles a t  moon sighting a t t i tude .  The 
moon and sun F M  a t t i tudes  were held i n  r e s e n t *  u n t i l  it was ce r t a in  t h a t  
the crew would be able t o  see rMrs near the S:.I separation a t t i tude .  
8. Ihe cW: was patered up w i t h  the LV at. SM separatton a t t i t u d e  
and appropriate erasable loads put i n  p r i o r  t o  the  alignment sequence. 
!These vere a s t a t e  vector, time increment, "actualn IUZ'SWLT, and "preferred" 
IlEFSMT. P.e alignment seqwnce uas s t a r t ed  and completed subs t i tu t ing  
stars f o r  the moon and sun marks. 
9. During the CSM alignnrent sequence, an  unexpected program 
alarm 220, IMU not aligned, occurred. It can be explained by the  f a c t  
t h a t  the  FEE3MAT flee wasn't set p r i o r  t.o entering P52 a s  described 
via the  modified checklist.  B e  en- :IS corrected and no further a n c t d i e s  
were experienced. 
W i l l i a m  E. Fenner 
White team 
/&g&~ J. Ge Renick 
ikroon team 
;1Cknn&w.&elP 
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CC : 
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J. W. Roach 
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IN REPLY REFER TO: 
~E~~RAiDU?i TO: Distribution 
FRO31 : Apollo 1 3 EECOM' s 
SImJECT : Apollo 13 Post MLssion Report 
Attachzd i s  an adde1:dum t o  the Apollo 13 EECOM Post Mission Report. 
Also, correct  typographzcal e r ro r  on Page E-2, second paragraph from 
page bottom: 226.5 psia vice 224.5O~. 
A. GENERAL COWNTS 
1. An improvement of 0.15 volts was noted i n  fue l  c e l l  performance a s  
the result of the scheduled 02 and H2 purges. This improvemnt can be accounted 
for  based on the prelaunch cryogeaic pur i t ies  and was considered normal. 
2. Battery charging was succeesful. The cry0 02 tank anomaly ~ s u l t e d  
i n  additio9al usage of battery A energy, but the t o t a l  energy was restored t o  
118 a-h with IN support before entry. 
3. Battery energy margins during entry were ma5ntained approximately 
20 a-h above the established redline. There were 28 a-h remaining a t  splash 
(based on 40 a-h batteries) which would have provided one uprighting and 
approximately 20 hours on the water. 
4. For entry, Battery C was t i ed  t o  both main busses while bat ter ies  
A and B were on Main Bus A and B, respectively. Battery C was assumed 
depleted a t  lOk f ee t  leaving bat+&ries A and B t o  support sequential system 
and 32s dump events. 
5. Fuel c e l l  losd sharing in  the "spli t"  main bus configuration was 
a s  pn?dicted prelaunch; i-e., 1 and 2 each a t  32 p e r c e ~ t ,  and FC 3 a t  
36 percent. 
6. Waste water dumps w e r e  ptrformed per f l i gh t  ~ l a n  with no problems. 
7. The primary coolant loop performed nominally when i n  operation. 
The loop was powered up with evaporator fo r  entry and provided more than 
adequate cooling since the CM was already chil led down. 
8. The C02 pa r t i a l  pressure transducer appeared t o  give reliable 
readings. LICd cannister changes were reflected by the sensor. 
1. Fuel Cel l  3 Tce (SC 2083) 
Fuel c e l l  3 Tce was seen t o  "glitch" 2 4 b i t s  (2' F) every 70 seconds. This 
phenonrenon has been observed on a t  l eas t  one fuel c e l l  on every mission and 
has not affected nominal fuel  c e l l  operation. It i s  attr ibuted t o  slugs of 
cold water leaving the condensor and is a furtction of current load. 
However, a f t e r  WC-2 the f b l  c e l l  3 'glitch" pattern chaged t o  a sinusoidal 
ripple with a frequency of one cycle every 30 seconds ana a peak-to-peak ampli- 
tude of 6.20 F. The ripple continmd for  approximately 9 hours before it 
damped out. Although t h i s  is not a normal condition, a similar condition 
occurred on Apollo 10 and was attr ibuted t o  thermal oscil lat ions i n  the fuel 
c e l l  glycol loop. 
2. Potable Water Quantity Errat ic  (C~0009) 
Quantity fluctuations occurred af"kr each of the f i r s t  two crew sleep perlods 
ended, presumably when water was used for  food preparations. The greatest  
fluctuation occurred when the quantity dropped from a reading of 104 percent 
down t o  79 percent and recovered in approximately 1 minute. 
During the entry phase, a f t e r  CSM power up, the potable water tank quantity 
read approximately 61 percent and the waste water tank indicated a 24 percent 
increase. Both tank quantities were considered w m i i a b l e  a t  t h i s  time 
because : 
(a) It was calculated tha t  t3e  : :-:dble water tank should have 
been exhausted by 107 hours 13ET at  nomiria'- arsgc rates. The crew reported 
they couid get  no w a t e r  out of the tank a t  125 hours C;ET. 
(b) The waste tank indicated a 24 percent increase which is  not 
possible because the CSM had been completely powered down. 
3. Primary Coolant Glycol Flow Rate (cFO157) 
The glycol flow rate was lower on t h i s  mission than on previous missions. 
The lower flow rate reading was present duri% both prelaunch while on GS?, and 
infl ight;  i .e . , 210 lb/hr . Other f l igh t  data: 
Apollo i2 220-230 lb/hr 
Since a l l  loop temps were normal, it is possible tha t  the flow rate  transducer 
was biased. 
4. Hydrogen I;ow Pressure M: and W 
A t  32 hours CZT, a quantity imbalance of 2.38 percent existed between the,H2 
tanks and a quantity balancing procedure was commenced. Since Tank 2 had the 
greater quantity, the Tank l h e a t e r s  were turned OFF and Tank 2 l e f t  i n  AUTO 
taking more flow from Tank 2. Tn-this configuration, low cryo pressure master 
alarms occurred on the s t a r t  of every Tsnk 2 pressure cycle. 
Both tank's heaters were placed t o  AZrrO for sleep and on the first "down" cycle, 
a master alarm occurred due t o  H2  Tank 1 low pressure point shift ing lower than 
~ 4 . 5 '  F. The crew meet the alarm which did not occw again through the 
sleep period. 
A f t e r  the crew sleep period ended, the Tank 1 heate-s were placed t o  AUTO and 
Tank 2 OFF t o  determine the Tank i pressure switch activation point i n  anti-  
cipation of using t h i s  configuration for sleep. This was accomplished, and 
the tank heater configuration was =versed t o  Tank 1 OFF, Tank 2 AUTO t o  
drive the quantity balance i n  favor of Tank 1 fo r  sleep. This procedure was 
i n  progress a t  the time of the 02 Tank 2 anomaly. 
5. 02 Tank 2 Quantity Sensor Fa i l  ( ~ ~ 0 0 3 4 )  
The 02 Tank 2 quantity reading was observed t o  f a i l  off  scale high ( 101.17 
percent) a t  46 + 40 + 10 GET a f t e r  f l u c t ~ a t i n g  90r 10 seconds. This time was 
just a f t e r  crew wake up and probably occwred during the routine cryo fan operation 
scheduled a f t e r  each sleep period. The 02 Tank 2 fans w e r e  turned on again at 
47:55 GET a s  an attempt t o  restore the quantity gaging with no success. 
cm 
- 
Hrs :Min 
46 :40 
02 Tank' 2 Anomaly Chronology 
02 Tank 2 Qty fluctuating - Cryo quantities re f lec t  crew s t i r r i ng  
cryos . 
02 Tank 2 Qty transeucer fa i led off scale high ( 101.17 percent) 
02 Tank 2 fans - ON to attempt t o  restore quantity gaging. 
Cryo S t i r  
M: and W on H2 Tank 1 low pressure 
M: and W on K2 Tank 1 low pressure 
M: and W on H2 Tank 1 low pressure 
Cryo S t i r .  
A t  t h i s  time, Cryo 02 pressures were decreasing normally and 
approximately halfhay through the i r  downswing. 
Fuel c e l l  1, 2, and 3 02 flow transducers s tar ted slow fluctuations (.a one cycle per  40 sec) -hetween 0.4 lb/hr and 0.8 lb/hr. Small 
fluctuations were not an out-of-toleracce condition, but when 
couplcd with no similar H2 flow fluctuations, and no change i n  
fuel c e l l  02 pressures, can be indicative of cryo 02 pressure 
changes o r  instrumen%aation problems. Total SC current staying 
between 70 t o  75 amps. 
02 Tank 2 pressure starts t o  increase rapidly while 02 Tank 1 remains 
normal. Tank 2 press- a t  t h i s  time was 891 psi. (See mr 3) 
C 
02 Tank 2 pressure passed through 973 ps i  with no H i  C r y o  Press 
M: and W. H2 Tank 2 was below i ts  low pressure l i m i t .  02 Tank 2 
Qty dropped from 101.17 percent down t o  6.5 percent f o r  3 seconds 
and the temperature s tar ted i n c ~ a s i n g  from -lwO F. (See Fig. 3.) 
02 Tank 2 Qty rose t o  75 percent and appeared t o  give correct 
readings fo r  approxhately 5 seconds before f l u ~ t u a t i n g  again. 
(see Fig. 2.) 
02 Tank 2 press had rapidly increased t o  a max of 1008 ps i  a t  th5.s 
time, the r  s tar ted t o  dezrzase sl ightly.  
02 Tank 2 press dropped t o  998 psi,  indicating possible pressure 
relieving. Temp had increased t o  max of -1530 F, then dropped off 
scale low (-329' I?.) (see Fig. 3.) 
Three second loss  of data s ta r t s .  Crew report of &lain Bus B under- 
~ ~ o l t  may have occurrsd a t  t h i s  time, since no IE and W was presen-G 
i n  downlink. 
Reacquired data - 
02 Tank 2 pressure read 19 ps i  (OSL) and the  temperature was +84O F 
(OSH). 02 Tank 1 and surge tank pressures s ta r ted  decreasing. 
C r e w  had reported a "bang" and gas venting f ro2  the SM. A t  t h i s  
point, circumstantial evidence pointed t o  loss  of 02 Tank 2 and 
impending loss  of 02 Tank 1. 
FL 1 1 2  press had dropped from 55.8 psia t o  0 psia. This was an 
ilstrumentation probleln a s  FZ: 1 If2 and 02 pressure were normal and 
02 pressure regulators are  referenced t o  N2 pressure. Total SC 
current jumped 10 amps. Cryo 02 auto heaters could have accounted 
fo r  th i s .  K! aild W due t o  cryo tank pressures. 
FC 1 and FC 3 02 flow ra tes  had decayed t o  zera from 55:54:56. 
FC 2 02 flow ra te  dropped appro*. 0.1 */hr and returned t o  normal. 
FC 1, FC 2 and Ft 3 02 pressures, H2 pressures, H2 flow rates,  
and load sharing were normal. Total SC c u m n t  had fluctuated t o  
90 amps and back t o  a 75 t o  80 amps range. 
FC 3 02 pressure s t a r t s  t o  drop from 63.2 psia . 
FC 1 02 pressure s t a r t s  t o  drop from 64.3 psia. IE 3 02 pressure 
I s  38.2 psia with 02 t o  N2 &lts p re s l ;m  of 4.4 psi .  FC 3 load 
sharing i a  34.8 percent but stari;s t o  drop. 
K: and W - Main Bus B f a l l s  belaw 26.25 VIX: (FC 3 fa i l ing)  . iX 3 
02 pressure 55.5 psia, with 02 t-3 N2 del ta  pressure of 1.44 psi. 
FC 3 lcad sharing 28.2 percent with t o t a l  current 74.4 amps. 3C 1 
02 pressure i s  60.1 psis  and fa l l ing.  
Previous IC and W still on - AC inverter 2 automatic input dis- 
connect. AC Bus 2 voltage i s  0 volts .  Main Bus B voltage is 
17.6 MC . FC 3 has flooded with 02 t o  N 2  del ta  pressure of 0.84 
ps i  and is  lo s t  f o r  the mission. K! 1 and FC 2 are carrying 
54.2 amps load. 
FC 1 02 pressure has dropped t o  58.5 psia. FC 1 load sharing 
s t a r t s  'to drop. Main Bus A voltage is  28.3 V I X  . 
W and k! - Main Bus A f a l l s  below 26.25 MC. M: 2 carrying 45.4 
amps of to-t;al Main Bus A load of 54.1 amps. 
FC 1 carrying l e s s  than 2.0 mps  a t  Main Bus A voltage of 25.6 
MC . R: 2 is carrying 50.2 amps a t  skin temperature of 413O F . 
FC 2 current s tar ted fluctuating between 50 and 55 amps with 
Main Bur A voltage between 25.2 and 25.8 VDC. 
8ssum3d FC 1 and 3 off main busses. Requested crew reconnect 
XC 1 t o  Main A and FC 3 t o  Main B. C r e w  confirmed gray talk3acks. 
No change was detected i n  02 flow readings. 
M= and W unexplained - possible cyclc of Main Bus A voltage above 
26.25 m. 
M: and V unexplained - Possibly Main Bus A voltage. 
I 
M: and W unexplained - Possib:X. Main Bus A voltage. 
Sudden increase i n  FC 2 current from 54 amps t o  a t  l eas t  67 amps. 
Automatic signal conditioning equipment ( SCE) shutdown fo r  approxi- 
mately 0.4 seconds due t o  drop i n  Main Bus A voltage f a l l i ng  below 
required SCE operating level  of approx. 23 VIIC . 
Battery A on l ine ,  Main Bus A volta8e r i s e s  t o  27.4 VM: . FC 2 
current drops t o  approximately 35 amps and Battery A draws approxi- 
mately 19 rmps. 
Requested crew open clrcul.t FC 1 - confirmed. 
Crew performed requested emergeray power down per checklist E 1-5 
and reduced current level  t o  41 amps to ta l .  F i r s t  14 steps were 
accomplished. 
Inverter 1 connected t o  AC Bus 2 (on both AC busses, now) per 
request. 'Phis was to  allow us t o  look a t  02 Tank 2 readings. 
56 : 26 FC 2 pumps back on per ground request (placed on AC 1).  
Requested further powerdown -BMAGts off and l i gh t s  t c  a minimum. 
E 1-5, steps 15 and 16) 
Requested IX 3 open circuited.  
Requested and got Surge tank isolated t o  preserve entry  02. 
Pressure read 893 psia a t  t h i s   ti^ . 
SC t o t a l  current was decreased t o  cycling 40-46 amps. Battery A 
requested t o  be isolated from Main A and accomplished with 27.9 
a-h remaining. FC 2 skin temp has r isen t o  4360 F. and was stable.  
Requested 02 Tank 1 heater ON t o  pump up decaying pressure which 
was 310 psi.  No success. 
Requested and got Repress pkg. isolated fo r  same reason a s  Swge 
tank. 
Requested 02 Tank 1 fans ON t o  t r y  t o  get  pressure up, but no 
success. 
Verified FC 1 inl ine  heater and DSE both OFF. 
Crew performed FC 3 shutdown procedure per request. Eupose was 
t o  isola te  possible 02 leak i n  fue l  c e l l  manifold by shutting 
reactant valves. 
Crew performed FC 1 shutdcwn procedure per request. Purpose was 
same a s  fo r  FC 3 a t  27:OO. 
HGA power and overaoard dump l ine  heaters OFT. 
Started charging battery A t o  get  a s  much energy back i n  befcre 
loss  of a l l  02; i. e., FC 2. 
02 Tank 2 fans ON a s  l a s t  di tch eff,:t t o  see i f  any pressurization 
could be accomplished. 
ECS 100 ps i  02 . mifo ld  dec~eas i rq  with 02 Tank 1 pressure of 130 
psi.  
Terminated Battery A charging with 0.74 a-h restored. 
Primary coolant loop radiators bypassed anu glycol pump turned OFF. 
02 Tank 2 fans off. There was no change i n  pressure or  temp. 
FC 2 pumps turned OFF. All RCS heaters OFF. 
58:04:05 Battery A t i e d  t o  Main Bus A t o  support SC loads i n  anticipation 
3f FC 2 loss. 02 ~ a n k  1 pressure was 65 psi .  
9 :07  Primary USBPA - OFF 
58:15 FC 2 flooding occurred with loss  of a l l  02 pressure. 
( approx 
58 : 18 02 Tank 1 heaters and fans turned off. Panel 276, CB3 and CB 4 - 
opened ( SM ~nstrumentat  ion) 
IMU powered doun 
C K  powered down 
IMU heaters - OFF 
SCS electronics - OFF 
FDAI/GPI - om 
Auto J e t  Select ( 3.6) - OFF 
Rotational Control power and Auto Coils - OFF 
Direct RCS; powered up t o  hold a t t i tude.  
F1: 2 open circuited and reactant valves closed. 
A l l  inverters powered down. 
Total CSM power down accomplished when Battery A taken off Main 
Bus A (20.5 a-h remained i n  battery). Batteries A, B, and C were 
isolated from a11 loads; i .e . , off bat tery  busses and main busses. 
Battery rela$ bus had been powered down and Main Bus Ties - OFF. 
7. Sui t  Pressure Sensor Er ra t i c  (cb'O012) 
The s u i t  presgure and cabin pressure-diverged during t h s  launch 
phase when the cabin was relieving. The mhximum divergence was 0.7 psid, 
i .e . , cabin pressure = 6.1 ps ia  and the  s u i t  pressure = 5.4 psia. During 
ea r th  orbi t ,  the 4P remained constant a t  0.5 psi .  A t  3+30 hours GET 
when the CM cabin pressure was increased t o  5.7 ps ia  fo r  IPll presslnizaticn, 
the  s u i t  pressure sensor gave a maximum reading of 5.0 psia. A f t e r  IM 
press was complete, the AP = 0.5 p s i  f o r  4 hours, then i n c e a s e d  t o  0.8 
psid where it remined. Similar behavior was seen when the IN was again 
pressurized f o r  the  first  ingress (LM  am) a t  53 + 34 hours GET. m-e AP 
remained constant a t  0.7 t o  0.8 psid u n t i l  af'ter the  02 Tank 2 anomaly 
when the s u i t  f'ressure reading dropped .2 psia resul t ing  i n  cabin 
pressure = 5 .1  ps ia  and s u i t  pressure = 4.1 psia. This concition then 
stayed constant through CSM powerdown. 
The cabin and s u i t  pressures both = 5.1 ps ia  during both b'ief CSM 
activations. The pressure readings were a l so  normal when the CM was 
powered up f o r  entry. 
During the  mj.salon, SPAN =ported t h a t  s u i t  press- variat ions were 
observed during the a l t i t u d e  chamber test. I n  addition, suit pressure 
transducer er ra3i c behavior occurred on Apollo 12. 
C. IICEMANT CSM OISFUTIONS PHASE (59+00 C;ET thru 1$+00 (EI-6+30) 
Shortly a f t e r  the 02 Tank 2 anomaly, and a f t e r  the CSM was completely 
powered down, it b e c e  apparent tha t  knowledge of the complete CSM switch 
configuratizn was uncertain. This si tuation was expected t o  worsen a s  w e  devel- 
oped n e w  CSM procedures for crew operhtions. Work began cn a %seline Con- 
figuration Checklist", then referred t o  a s  the "Square One ~ist- .  The list was 
constructed by making changes to the prelaunch switch configuration section of 
the CSM Launch Checklist. This was accomplished and performed by the crew a% 
92 hours GET. The intent of t h i s  list was t o  remove a l l  loads from busses and 
t o  provide a baseline for  further procedural changes which would be mquired. 
This bf-seline would be reestablished whenever a particular procedure was 
comple-zd. 
Even before implemntation of t h i s  list, a procedure t o  provide potable 
water with the drinking gun w a s  developed since the 100 ps i  manifold did not 
have pressure . The procedure in~olved  pressurizing the manifold, i .e . , the 
water tank bladders, using the Surge tank whenever water was required. It 
was read to  the crew a t  64 hours GET. 
The condition of Main DC Bus B was i n i t i a l l y  unknown due to  the way 
IE 3 "died on the vine" and a Main Bus B checkout proced- was developed a s  
a "deltan t o  the square one list. The procedure called fo r  powering Main Bus 
B with Battery B to  establish tha t  them were ;lo shorts and was performed a t  
95 hours GET. !l"he baseline checklist had already isolated a l l  loads from a l l  
~ U S S ~ S .  
It becam apparent tha t  the powered down CSM would become very cold 
by eutry interface. Concern arose a b ~ u t  he entry bat ter jzs  ab i l i t y  a t  t ha t  
t im t o  provide sufficient p o t e ~ t i a l  to drive the battery bus-to-main bus t ie  
motor switches t o  the Closed position. Hence, a !&in Bus T i e s  Clcse procedure 
was reat? up and the crew closed the motor switches a t  95 hours GF,T. The 
c i r ca i t s  were then left open using appropriate c i rcu i t  breakers. 
C02 remoT.e?. became cause for  concern b a ~ s d  on the lifetime of IM/PISS 
LIOH canisters. l%e total. manhour ratings added up t o  approximately 136 hours 
(not t o  exceed 7.6 mnHgj . Based upon the quick return time horn, the C02 
scrubbing would be reqgired for  approximately 261 manhours . 
A negati-e aargin sxisted (approximately 125 manhours) tha t  required 
uti1izat;on of the CM LIOH canisters i n  which over 288 manhours of C02 removal 
remained. 
A simplified procedure was developed by C r e w  Systems Division personne 1 
t o  use two CM WOH canisters attached t o  the two I M  K S  su i t  return hoses by 
placing a f l igh t  data f i l e  card bridged over the canister outlet  side and sealing 
around the in l e t  hose ends inside the bridge with tape and plas t ic  bag material 
t o  prevent collapsing d w  to suction. This procedure was later modified t o  
create additional pressure drop within the IM ECS t o  prevent overspeed of the 
centrifugal water separator by par t ia l ly  taping over the out le t  hose ends and 
over the complete CM LIOH canister i n l e t  side bypass ports. This technique 
provided very low C02 FP readings (approximately 0.1 mmHg) a f t e r  ins ta l la t ion 
when indicated cabin C02 was approaching 8 nmHg on the IM secondary LICR 
canister. 
A f t e r  approximately 20 hours ((;ET 93 to 113 hours) the CG2 PP apprcxlched 
1.8 mmHg on the two CM IJOH canisters. Another procedure was implemented a t  
113 hours t o  i n s t a l l  two additional CM IJOH canisters i n  series with the 
i n i t i a l  two canisters by simply stack5ng and taping together. This technique 
provided very low C02 PP readings for  the remainder of the IM l i f e  support 
scrubbings requiremnts . 
The CM reentry phase C02 scrubbing was accomplished fo r  30 minutes 
with two newly insta l led canisters. In i t i a l ly ,  the C02 PP read 1.6 mmHg 
and 30 minutes later, when the s u i t  compressor was deactivated, the C02 PP 
had been lowered t o  0.2 mmHg. 
A t  102 hours GET, a procedure for  the F i r s t  CSM Activation was ini t ia ted.  
It involved using battery B power for  a pa r t i a l  parer up t o  provide telemetry 
t o  MSFN fo r  the purpose of system and thermal evaluation of the spacecrafl. 
The power up lasted less  than 10 minubs showing the powered systems t o  be 
nominal and a 52O F cabin. It was decided t o  charge entry battery A a s  early 
-=ss- a s  112 hours GET (followed by battery a) t o  make sure t h i s  could be sue,, 
fu l ly  accomplished. The entry seqwnce being developed was contingent upon 
f u l l  CM batteries.  A series of procedures was necessary t o  e f fec t  CSM battery 
charging using IM power. The f i r s t ,  CSM t o  IM Power ~ G s f e r  involved feeding 
the It4 by Main Bus B power provided by CM Battery B just long enough t o  set the 
IN control relays which would then allow I&¶ power to-be fed t o  CSM Main Bus B. 
This accomplished, a P o ~ e r  Main E Frm I34 ya.xedure uas perfomed and Main Bus 
B was successfillly powered solely from the IM. The Battery A Charge 
procedure was in i t i a ted  with batteo- A voltage and charger current readouts 
provided by the crew on request so that  the f l igh t  control team could integrate 
the battery charge. 
A t  123 hours Q3Ty bat%ery A charging was interrupted t o  allow IM power 
t o  be provided for  a Second CSM ~ctivatio.1. This was another par t ia l  power up 
t o  provide MSFN with telelrretry for  7 minu~t  look a t  systems and thermal data. 
!The-Powered systems were again nominal and the cabin &rnperatures were a t  
460 F. 
Battery A charge was r e s m d  immediately and termioated a t  126 hours 
GET and battery B charging was commenced using an appropriate procedm. 
When 311 charging was complete a t  128 hours mT, the battery energy status 
was calculated t o  be: 
Batt A 40.0 a-h 
Batt B 40.0 a-h 
a-h (not charged 
a-h t o t a l  
This t o t a l  energy available was used t o  build the entry and post- 
landing phase power profile . 
One procedure had been prepared but not read up t o  the crew. A 
procedure for Transfer of CM Waste Water t o  I24 was ready i n  the event the IM 
rrtn short of water for  cooling. It involved using the PLSS a s  a transfer tank 
and proved t o  not be necessary. 
E . CONCLUSIONS -UiD RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Cryogenic Caution and Warniq 
A master saution and warning of the cryogenic 02 tank pressure 
problem was not available a t  the time of the 02 tank 2 fa i lure  because of a 
previous out-of-tolerance cryogenic H2 pressure condition. A lcx H 2  tank 
-
2 pressure warning precluded the warning of 2 high 02 tank 2 pressure. This 
demonstrates the undesirable feature of using a single caution and warning 
lamp driver c i rcu i t  t o  provide both master alarm trigger signal and lamp 
activation for  several parameters. 
2. Wl Cell  Reactant Valves 
It is  probable tha t  fue l  c e l l  1 and fuel c e l l  3 would have 
continued t o  function properly u n t i l  loss of Tank 2 oxygen pressure, a s  fue l  
c e l l  2 did, i f  the oxygen reactant valves had been reopened a f t e r  the "bang". 
Unfortuna;teSy, positive warning cues were insufficient t o  allow the crew t o  
perform the necessary corrective action. A c i rcu i t  revision i s  requirtd tha t  
would preclude a similar occurrence. For exanple, a c i rcu i t  tha t  would 
automatically reopen the valves, and give the crew a visual indication of the 
occurrence. 
3. CM LIOH Canister Usage 
Several al ternate prccedums were i n  work t o  control PP C02. 
These are l i s t ed  below i n  t h e i r  order of pr ior i t ies :  
(a)  The I24 ECS and CM ECS be connected with the IVT su i t  hose for 
C02 scrubbing within CM canister assembly. This procedure was thought t o  cause 
a high flow rest r ic t ion for  the ZM compressor. It was learned later tha t  t h i s  
technique would have worked i f  the I M  canisters were remved. 
(b) Venting the combined cabins and replenishing with o.xygen (100 percent) t o  nominal pressures. This procedure woulti be used a s  a l a s t  
ditch e f for t  because oxygen margins were not sufficient for  many ventings and 
subsequent purgings plus efficiencies are very low for  t h i s  mode of controlling 
high C02 levels. 
RECOMMENDATION : 
C02 scrubbing could have been accomplished by operating the CM s u i t  com- 
pressor with two canisters inntalled i n  the canister  assembly i n  t h e i r  normal 
configuration. 
This technique would have eliminated the makeshift I M  setup plus creating some 
much needed heat i n  the CM cabin environmnt . However, the  power requirement 
fo r  t h i s  and the i n i t i a l  unknown condition of the CSM Main Bus B eliminated 
t h i s  setup. 
D. ENTRY OPERATIONS PHASE 
Immediately ak'ter the  32 Tank 2 anomaly occwrence and ac t i v i t i e s  
se t t l ed  down, it became obvious tha t  a modified, power conserving, entry  
sequence would be required. The i n i t i a l  cut  of the entry  phase power prof i le  
was completed a t  approximately 70 hours GET. This power prof i le  was based on 
t o t a l  bettery energy capabil i ty of 98 amp-hours (no IM power), an E I  -2 hour 
power up, and worst case recovery requirements ( one uprighting and 12 hours on 
the water). Using this power prof i le  a s  a guideline there was a margin of 23 
amp-hours (based on a 40 amp-hour battery) remaining after uprighting. 
After receiving additional entry  requirelllent s and expanding the time l ine  
t o  provide the crew additional time, it was evident t ha t  the  CSM ba t te r ies  
would have t o  be charged t o  a minimum of 115 am?-hours. This was 
p e r f o m d  as described i n  the dormant operhtions phase. 
!l%e entry  sequence timellne was then eventually movzd back t o  EI - 
6+30. The primhry plan of operation was t o  have the crew ingress the CM a t  
E I  -6 1/2 hours and use IM gower t o  support Main bus B loads and bat tery  C t o  
support Main bus A loads, during CM RCS preheat and up t o  EI -2 1/2 hours 
where the CM went fu l l  internal .  A l l  possible loads during t h i s  time period 
were placed on Main B only (IM power). A contingency plan of operation using 
l e s s  power was a l so  available, but not upiinked, i n  the event tha t  the It4 was 
unable t o  supply the CM with power during the entry phase ( see f i g i .  4 fo r  
redlines) . 
A s  can be noted from Figure 4, the actual  battery energy margin w a s  
approximately 20 amp-hours above the redline a t  a l l  times. Battery C was 
depleted, as predicted, pr ior  t o  splash, thus leaving two good ba t te r ies  
(A and B) to support EIS sequential functions and Main Bus A and B loads. 
Figure 5 shows the load profi le as  predicted w i t h  r e a l  ti= loads superimposed 
on the predicted graph. It hed been predicted tha t  the Battery V I  characterist ic 
would be degraded due t o  low temperatures. This concern turned out t o  be invalid, 
a s  the Battery V I  characterist ic was comparable t o  previous f l i gh t s  with Main 
A = 29.2 MC and Main B = 29.2 VDC for  a t o t a l  spacecraft load of 38 amps on 
two bat ter ies .  I n  the event t ha t  the loads had been higher than predicted, a a  
the battery energy redline violated, the following equipment was planned t o  have 
been turned of2 i n  the order shown: 
(1) BMAG No 2 ( i f  G and N was GO) 
Amps 
2 5 
( 3) EM, SCE, PMP, and Xponder 2-7 
(4) Suit  Compressor 4 .O 
( 5 )  Prhary Coolant I m p  (pump and ~ v a p )  3.7 
General Conrments on Entry Sequence Timeline 
Hrs and Min 
EI -6+30 The CM Main Buses were configured with the IN supplying power t o  
Main Bus B and entry  Battery C supplying power t o  Main Bus A. 
This configuration was used u n t i l  EI  -2.5 hours with Main Bus B 
supplying power fo r  CM RCS Ring 2 preheat, C and W equipment and 
l ighting and with Main A supplying :I power f o r  CM E S  Ring 1 pre- 
heat. Battery C was used because it was predicted t ha t  whichever 
battery was placed on l ine  at  t h i s  t i m e  would be depleted pr ior  t o  
splash, thus i f  Battery A or  B had been used there would only 
have been one Battery Bus t o  support EIS f u c t i o n s  which uses 
battery busses fo r  redundancy. 
EX -4+40 CM RCS activation was performed without a Go NO/GO from MSFN on 
*.he arming of the SECS Pyro system. Tbis was primarily because of: 
,- above the (1) The l imitat ion of both the I M  and CM t o  furnish powe- 
exist ing power requirements and, (2) the impact t ha t  it would have 
been on the tirneline t o  power up the COMM equipnoent a t  t h i s  time. 
EI -4+30 CM RCS checks and CM/SM separation was performed with no problems. 
EI - 2+3O A complete t ransfer  t o  CM entry  ba t te r ies  was performed which was 
followed by the power up of the Zklcomm, G and N, and EPS systems. 
Maximum inverter  efficiency was achieved by going to single irl- 
verter  operation. 
EI -1+30 The ECS coolant loop pump was turned on 'at t h i s  time t o  provide 
glycol circulat ion fo r  the G and N system. A modified CM cabin 
pressure in tegr i ty  check was pe2formed by decreasi r?  the CM 
tunnel/IM pressure t o  a &? of 3.0 t o  3.5 and verifying the bP 
did not decrease. This is different  than the normal in tegr i ty  
check, such that ,  the normal checklist has the tunnel pressure zero 
psia a t  IM/CM jet t ison.  
E I  -1+10 When the s u i t  compressor was turned on, it was noted t ha t  the C02 
pa r t i a l  pressure decreased from 1.6 t o  0.1 rnui(-Ig. This indicated 
the C02 p a r t i a l  pressure was normal and the s u i t  compressour could 
have been turned off then t o  conserve entry  bat tery  energy. 
EI -30 When the  primary evaporator was activated, the evaporator out le t  
kemperature was 60° F. Temperature trends indicated t ha t  without 
an evsporator, i.e., the p r i m a ~ j  coolant loop, the evap out temp 
would not have exceeded the l i m i t  of 80° F pr ior  t o  splash. Hence, 
the primary coolant loop evaporator could have bezn turned off t o  
conserve power. 
11. OPERATIONS 
A. GENERAL COEIMENTS AND FECOMMENDATIONS 
Staff Support Room ( SSR) 
The EECOM SSR personnel performance during the missionwas 
excellent.  The EPS personriel i n  part icular ,  a re  due special  praise f o r  t h e i r  
e f fo r t s  since the 02 Tank 2 anomaly rapidly became a power sanagrnent problem 
Loth at  the time of tne anomal~ and f o r  en t ry  planning. 
2. HSD F o m t  30 
Format 30 was available f o r  the f i r s t  t i a e  on t h i s  mission and 
proved t o  be valuable. It was used extensively fo r  data playbacks associated 
with the 02 Tank 2 anonaly. 
3. S i t e  Data Tapes 
Early i n  the mission it was discovered t ha t  the NOD required 
the s i t e s  t o  only hold the data tapes f o r  24 hours (and without cutt ing a 
dupe) before shipment t o  GSFC . This was changed t o  72 hours which should 5e 
made standard f o r  a l l  missions. 
111. SUPPORTING INFORMATION 
A. Graphs 
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Front 
I 
Color 
!I.-XRGESCY POLXR DOLX 
HYCOK CAMERA - OFF 
MSc FORM 2 2 a A  (JJL 67) 
E-22 
02 HTRS (2) - OFF (CTK) 11.1 
02 FWS (2) - OFF <CTP.! 5.4 
H2 HTRS (2) - OFF (CTR) 1.4 
it2 FAVS (2)  - OFF (CTR) 0.7 
C.6X OPT PUR - OFF 3.1 
POT H20 HTR - OFF 1.6 ZUU( 
ECS W HTRS (1)  - OFF 17.2 !2i 
SPS LT!& HTR - OFF (CTR) 6.2 (A/B) 
SPS GAUGING - OFF 3.0 
t';HliL ?(TRS P2 6 Y2 - OFF (NOT LAUKCH) 10.0 
cb SPS P 1  6 Yl (Pnl  3) - OPEN 
TVC G%L DR (P6Y) - 1 
I F  UNSUITED, SUIT COW - OFF 4.0 
FC PUKPS (3) - OFF (UNTIL ' S K I N  >460°F) 3.7 TOTAL 
sn RCS HTRS (4) - OFF 2.9 EA HAX 
i , (ELECTRICALLY ISOLATE I F  QUAD <5S°F) 
aJ 
B ~ A G  #2 - OFF 2.6 from OL 
1.9 from WARWP 
LICATS - ?nN REQD 1.6 
S BD PWR AHP - OFF (CTR) 4.0 
TAPE RCDR - OFF (CTR) m 1.6 
0 ECS PRI GLY PUHP - OFF (G&N LIMIT 2.5 HRS) 2.6 
-2 SEC COOL EVAP - RESET (58 SEC), THEN OFF 4.3 
SEC COOL PUHP - OFF (CTR) 
0 cb ECS IUD CONT/HTRS (2) (Pnl  5) - OPEN 
CMC WWERWU:; 6.3 
CFtC MODE - FREE 
GCN IHli PUR - OFF 
v4& 
F V04 N46 LOAD 0 (NO DAP) I N  LEFT DIGIT OF R1 
PRO,PRO,PRO 
V46E 
V37E06I'; 
I: V 5 0  W25, 00062 CNC PUR DN 
e. 
5 PRO REPEATEDLY UNTIL STBY LT - ON 
- (AN YUR - OFF 1.5 
PWR - OFF (CTR) 0.7 
" <;/W NORMAL - ACK 
VHF A! (2) - OFF (CTR) 0.2 EA 
HGA PWR - OFF 1.3 
TELECOM GRP 162 - OFF 1.3 
cb INSTR ESS HN A&B (Pnl  5 ) - OPEN 6.9 
- 
/ 
. 3 DIS FUtiC - 3' <beg 
DIS F!OI)E - STRY / 
GTk - off (do:;n) / -  
M3 GTA COVER - Secure 'y  
CHC All' - N?! r /  
FDA1 SCALE - 515 ' 
4 FDA1 SEL - 3 r- 
)r ED.-'LI SOURCE - e c  G D S. J 
ATT ~k - GDC 
WiN ATT ROLL - RATE CND 
jr MI? ATT PITCH '- AS-= 2e.l r C- -0 ' 
MAN ATII YAK - RATE CND 
LIH CYCLE - OFF 
o ATT CED - XIN 
RATE - HIGH 
# TRlLYS corn Pint - c*) 0- / 
y FEC PLa NORM (2) - -fi - 
BE1C PUR DIR (2) - C?@* / 
a 
4 "I 1 SC COhT - SC5 CMC EIDDE - FPiEE 2 %# BLU WCDE BOLL - RATE D L - 
r E 4 G  MODE PITCH - RATE Q L Y - 5 3 RUG AGDE YAW - RATE O Z 
SPS T!lRUST - A'ORW (lock j 
AV TmUST (2)- - OFF (guarded) 
SCS TVC PITCK - A'JTO 
SCS TVC YAV - AUTO 
. SPS QfBL WT PITCH (2) - OFF 
SPS GMBL MOT YAW (2) - OFF 
AV CG - LM/CS?I 
ELS LOGIC - OFF (guarded) 
8 ELS AUTO - :& .  Ale*? ' . .  - 
f M RCS LOGIC - L?FG C ~ r l )  
E CM PRPLhT DW - OFF (guarded) 
V1 
o PRPLW PURG - off ( d m )  (guarded) 
fMU CAGE - off (down) (guarded) 
EMS ROLL - OFF 
.OK; sv - OFF 
YSC FORM ZZOA (JUL 67) 
. . 
E-23 
I 
Back Color 
N C  GUIBL DX PITCtI - AUTO 
Lri 
TVC CKBL DK YAK - AUTO 
CLI EVST T?X RSET - up (center)  
E1 EWXT 1lR STRT - caa&s S s p P .r 
e. EWT 1XR NIX - cen te r  
d EVST T>F. SEC - cen te r  
PANEL 2 
PL VEtiT vlv - push (lock) 
PROBE EXTD/REL - OFF (guarded) 
PROBE ZYTDIRETR (2) t b  - gray 
DOCK PROSE RETR PRn1 - OFF 
DOCK PROBE RETR SEC - OFF 
EXT RUN/EVA LT - OFF 
M T  Rh'DZ LT - off  (center) 
TUNL LT - OFF 
LM PWR - OFF- 
SM RCS H e  1 (4) - cen te r  (onsup*) 
Sf RCS He 1 t b  ( 4 )  - gray 
UP TiM Cn - BLCCIC . 
UP TIN I U  - BLOCK 
CM RCS PRESS 1 of f  (down) (guarded) 
Sf RCS Ih?) sw - PRPLNT QTY 
SH RCS He 2 (4) - center  (onsup*) * 
SM RCS a e  2 (4) tb  - gray 
RCS HTRS (4)- - OFF 
a RCS PRPLNT (4) - center  (on, up*) 3% RCS P " m  t b  fl) - &9G, pPPL,.,r ( b  ( q )  - b p - RCS CLiD - cen te r  (OFF*) I 
RCS TRNFR - cen te r  (sH*) 
Qt RCS PRPLST (2) - cen te r  (onsup*) 
CM RCS PRPLtii tb(2) - gray 
- SM RCS SEC FUEL PRESS (4). - Center (CLOSE*) 
9 EDS' AUTO - on o/tF 
CSM/LY FINAL 'SEP (2) - off  (down) (p. .arded) 
a/? SEP (2) - off (down) (guarde ', 
S ;i'B/IM SEP - off  (down) (guarded) 
. $ PRPLNT DWfP - XC-s cfilb > 
$ 2 ENG OUT - ~ F f l  
J, LV RATES - AlJTO 
w'- 
Y 
MSC FORM 222068 (JUL 67) 
41SC FORM 2206 (JUN 67) 
L 
1-3 
='w 
y TWR J L T  (2) - BFi4Y) (down) (guarded) 4 
LV GUID - I U  
LV STAGE - off (down) (guarded) 
XLUNAR - INJECT 
BIN REL - off (dovn) (guarded) 
MSN 1TK HR - off (center) 
HSN 13R MIN - off (center) ' 
HSN RR SEC - off (center) ' 
jt C/W NOD1 - 0 0 8 S T A c ~  - 
1: CIWCSM-e+lc' :N\ J 
$ C/W PWR 7 +- 6~-6 J 
C/W LANP TEST - off (center) 
MSN RIR - START 
RCS IND sel - %I D 
CAB FAN (2) - OFF 
0 y 112 m s  (2) - a3xl O F F  f l  v 02 HTRS (2) - Auw QF-4- \ 
QI 
\ 02 PRES IND sw - SURGE TK 
rn H2 FANS 0) - OFF 
a 
d - 8  
02 'PANS (2) - OFF 
ECS IND s e l  - PRIi'i' 
ECS BAD FLOW AUTO COXT - AUTO 
ECS RAD tb - gray 
ECS IWD FLOW PWR CONT - off (center) S% ,S,,,S,L-,l. 
0 g 
-
* c ECS BAD PRIM HTR - off (center). 
ECS RAD SEC HTR - OFF a POT 8 2 0  HTR - OFF 
SUIT CKT H20 ACCUM AUTO - 1 
SUIT CKT 820  ACCUM - off (center) 
SUIT CKT HT MCli - off (center) 
SEC COOL LOOP EVM - off (center) 
SEC COOL LOOP PUMP - off (center) 
H20 QTY IND sw - POT 
GLY NAP I N  TDIP - MAN 
GLY NAP STM PRESS AUTO - MAN 
QI GLY EVAP STi4 PRESS INCR - center 
0 
r( GLY FJAP 820 FLOW - off (center) 
CAB TMP - MAN 
' o CAB AUTO TEMP ed - max deer 
BI .GAIN ANT TRACK - AUTO 
HI GAIN ANT B ~ A M  - WIDE 
BI GAIN ANT PITCH EQS - 0. 
H I  C l i IN  ANT YAV POS - 180' 
H I  CAIN ANT PKR - OFF 
H I  641s PBT SERVO ELECT - P R I N  
PANEL 3 
WC FOwA 2206 (JUN 61) 
VHF ANT - Sl LEFT 
SPS EKC INJ VLV ind (4) - CLOSE 
F C . M  (3) - center (K0PW.L") 
FC KRD (3) tS - K/A 4 FC fflKS (3) - 4 9  PC-6- W ' 
FC INIl sel  - 2 
S P S  QTY TEST - off (center) 
OXID FLOV VLI' IKCR - TTZ1T SCJCR 
OXID FI.0I.f VI.V P R I N  - P R I i I  
PUG PIODE - NOX.1 
.FC  PURG (3) - OFF 
FC R E X  (3) - center (e) 
FC RFAC tb (3) - gray 
aJ 3
$ FC 1 Fh' BUS A - -d O C E  
FC 1 >IN BUS A tb - gray 
9 FC 2 mi BUS A - -q c,FF- / 
FC 2 EN BUS A tb - gray 
FC 3 PEJ BUS A - OFF 
FC 3 P N  BUS A tb i b p  y d * ~  / 
3 MN BUS A RSET - c w v i i )  c FP J 
- 
crJ FC 1 MN BUS B - OFF a s  X FC 1 PIX BUS E tb - bp ijany v 
F C  2 blX BUS B - OFF- 
# FC 2 S l X  BUS B tb - b p j i r ; ~ ~  /' 
.j FC 3 PIX BUS B - e z P )  c F F  W 
FC 3 EM BUS B tb - gray 
$ BUS B RSET - e c p r  4 
DC IhD se l  - t.INA 
BAT CHARGE - OFF 
S P S  H e  vlv (2) - AUTO 
S P S  H e  vlv tb (2) - bp 
SPS L I N E  HTRS - off  (center) 
S P S  PRESS Ih?) sw - H e  
q S BD XPNDR - B C;€NTS,L <6Fc) / 
S BD PWR A W L  P R I N  - P R n I  
$ S BD PWR AMPL H I  - EM C B & ~ C ~  (* F F )  J 
4 PWR AYPL tb - m b p  J 
.- 
(Trim front page on solid crop marks; back page on dash crop niarks.) 
hSC FORM 2206 (JUN 67) 
I I I ! I .- I 
- 
I 
L - -. - 
1-5 
S BD NODE VOICE - VOICE 
S BD NODE POI - P a l  
S BD NODE RNG - RKG 
S BD AUX TAPE - off (center) 
. S B D A U X T V - o f f  (center) 
Uk TLEi DATA - DATA 
UP T I N  C>ID - =3f (1 W ,  
S BD ANT ONNI - B 
S BD ANT - @IN1 
VHF AM A - (center) 
+ VHF MI.B - c u p  &-arc< v- 
VHF Mi RCV - off (center) 
VHF &I SQLCH t w  (2) - noise threshold + 1 div 
VHF BCN - OFF 
VHF BXG - OFF 
.lr S BD SQUELCH - EXhhM 
+ FC REACS vlv - E=XS & ' @ R ~ ~ o c  f l . . .) 
82 PURG L I N E  HTR - OFF 0 
I- TAPE RCDR P a  - POl/A.NLG 
21 rn 
2 
TAPE RCDR RCD - RCD 
# ~ E R C D R ~ - ~  C G ' i - ~ r z i ,  
4 TAPE MOTION tb - - L? 
j. SCE ?k'R - N@tM c E ~ * ~ ~ R  4 -  
. $ P M P P W R - N 0 S l  CE~vi-iEt? Y( I aJ 4 
P W B I T U T E - H I  I gz 2 EX AC INV 1 -+!?k4 acc .0 2 El g2 -3  AC INV 2 -H@ cFZ 4 Y) Q 
m 0 AC Ih'V 3 - OFF /' . # INV 1 AC 1 - on) bGF I 
INV 2 AC 1 - O F F  
INV 3 AC 1 - OFF 
x ,4C 1 RSET - c-*) 06-/ J 
INV 1 AC 2 - OFF I 
I N V ~ A C ~ - ~ ~ - & ~ ) O ~  J I 
INV 3 AC 2 - O F F  
AC BUS 2 RSET - C-) b FF )/ . 1 
* E 1m re1 1 BUS 2 0 ~  .- QI 0 
Pi 
8 PANEL 4 
0 
d 
-. J SPS GAUGING - S 4  b6f 
.y, TELCOM GRP 1 - @FP 
J TELCOM GRP 2 - kg4 b GF J 
+ GLY PUMPS -1- 0-F J I 
r SUIT C O I I P R ~ ~ ~ ( ~ O T -  li) - 
SUIT COFlPR 2 -' OFF 
CB Panel 4 - a l l  closed 
FC1 FtPlPS - E;"Z fip# - - ,  
FC2 PUP!PS - ,422 CJflg 
FC3 FLlFlPS - ASP arc A 
G/N Y ~ J R  - Ft= 
MN BUS TIE BAT A/C - m+&-) c'fG 
MN BUS TIE BAT B/C - err-(up) c ~ C  - 
BAT CHM - A C l  
NONESS BUS - OFF 
INT INTGL LT - .?tTF 
INT FLOOD LT - OFF, f- . 
INT FLOOD LT DIN - 1 
I 
I 
INT FLOOD LT FIXED ., .? . OFF 
'. ... cb Panel 5 a l l  e v .  ot'rg J - 
Ga&FCTL--J , -nnen 
V? qgerr 
PANEL 6 
MODE - INTERC(5M/PTT 
PWR -- 0- L' 
INTERCOP1 - T/R- 
PAD C O X 4  - OFF 
S BD - T/R 
VHF Abf - T/R 
AUDIO CONT - NORM 
SUIT PWR - dq~J c?E-'s 
t w  settings - as desired 
PANEL 7 
J EDS PWR - OFF J 
9# SCS TVC SERVO PWR #l - 0- 
+ SCS TVC SERVO PWR #2 - @= J' 
FDAI/GPI PWR - -a 0- J 
'4t LOGIC 2/3 PWR - ea+k) 0Ffl - 
# 
o MODE - INTERCOM~PTT + PWR - A€mw+ww OF?= 
INTERCOM - T / R  
PAD COEIM - OFF 
S BD - T / R  
I M F  AM - T/R 
# S C S  ELEC PWR - G f f i G A .  ofl@ - . 
3 SCS SIC- CONDR/DR B I A S  1 '- AGk L ' F ~  - 
$ S C S  S I G  CONDR/DK B I A S  2 - K-2 OIEF ' 
S E3nG PWK $9- ( ' 8 e ~  \l\ -I) FF - 
$ DIRECT 0 2  VIV - G* m-f- -1 - 
C L o : . E  . 
' . PANEL 8 . 
$ cb Panel 8 - a l l  closed 
cb CEI RCS HTRS (2 )  - open ' 
cb FLOAT BAG (3) - o p e n  
AUTO RCS $EL A/C ROLL A1 
AUTO RCS SEL A/C ROLL c i  
AUTO RCS SEL A I C  ROLL A 2  
AUTO RCS SEL A/C ROLL C 2  
jc AUTO KCS SEL B I D  ROLL B1 
Y AUTO RCS SEL B I D  ROLL D l  X 2 AUTO RCS SEL B I D  ROLL B 2  - Ht?~cf'?e 
* AUTO RCS SEL B I D  W L L  02 - M E  13 /cf. ,  / ~ ~ ~ w  
WSC FORM 2206 (JUN 67) 
4 
NASA - MSC ! 
It AUTO RCS SEL PITCH A 3  - H i B r - f l f l  - # I  (, t u I' B EJ 
.J AUTO RCS S E L  P I T C H  C 3  - mA &FO 
A AUTO RCS SEL P I T C H  A4 - WA @FC - ' ' ' re 
AUTO RCS SEL ?ITCH Cl: - =:PI c ~ F  - 
a m  X AUTO RCS SEL YAI? B 3  - XIH O F F C  2 4 AUTO RCS SEL YAW D 3  - W3 &'- 
Z % d AUTO RCS SEL YAW B 4  - WB o'yp - . 2 E cn a if a AUTO RCS SEL YAW D 4  - WA O F F  .- a s  m o  
a I N T  NUbf L T  - g&-M e=c .I . 
C 
I N T  INTGL L T  - c?cs / 
Y I N T  FLOOD LT - OFF,  k t J  
FLOOD LTS  DIM - 1 
. ( F M O D  LTS  FIXED - OFF 
FLOAT BAG (3) - VENT (locked) 
4 SECS LOGIC (2) - \ 0- C D O L U ~  
x SECS PYRO ARM (2) Y ) 0 s .  ( 
m I 
- '! 
. .
(Trini f r o ~ i t ' ~ a ~ e  on solid crop nlarksi back page on dash crop rna!ks.) 
AID10 CONT - NORM 
9 SUIT PWR - e i 3 3  W/= - 
VHP RXG - N O ~ I  
-. tw settings - as desired 
PANEL 10 : 
MOD'E - INTERCO>I/PTT . 
2 PWR - A&-YJ:X t?/-F / 
PAD COhbl - OFF 
INTERCO>I - T/R 
s BD - T/R 
VHP AN - T/K 
AUDIO CONT - NOm[ 
ff  SUIT PWK - CFfl  J 
tw setting?' - as desired 
PANEL 12 
LM 'L'UXL VENT vlv - U l / O l  AP 
PANEL 13 - 
-- 
a I W A I  ow (2) - INRTL 4 EARTHILUIVAR - PWR OFF 
,SET-100 % LTG - OFF s 2 6 MODE - HOLD/FAST 
SLEW - off (center) 
PANEL 15 
COAS PWR - OFF 
LiiIL PWR - OFF 
PL BCN LT -. off (center) 
PL DYE MARKER - off (down) (guarded) 
PL VENT - OFF 
PANEL 16 ' 
DOCK TRGT - OFF 
LTIL PWR - OFF 
COAS PWR - OFF 
(Trim front page on ~ o l i d  crop marks; back page on dash crop mar4s.) 
PANEL 100 
--
UTIL PWR - OFF 
FLOOD LTS D P I  - 1 
' FLOOD LTS FIXED - OFF . 
OPT PWR - OFF I 
Jw IMU YIJR -4u+-) OF-/= + 
RNDZ XPNDR - OFF 
3 NUMERICS LT - -d O c f l  
- 3 FLOOD LTS - of f ,  -, WL w 
4 INTGL LT - OFF - 
PANEL 101 
2 I OPTZERO-ZERO 
OPT TELTRUN - SLAVE TO SXT. 
OPT COUPLING - DIRECT 
- c 
OPT MODE - KAN- 
0 OPT SPEED - LO-' 
4 COND LAEiPS - b;) OF*  
UP TL?l - ACCEPT 
SYS TEST (LH) - 4 
SYS TEST (RH) - B 
CM PCS HTRS,'--OFF . 
y URDrnlP  - m 
0 
h X WASTE H20 DUMP - 0 66 
PANEL 162 
SCI PWR - OFF (verified a t  panel closeout) 
\ 
Q\ 
\ 
(3 
PANEL 163 
6 
RNDZ XPNDR - OPR 
PANEL 122 
Ei 
4 SCI/UTIL P'JR - OFF (verified at  panel closeout) 
E $AG- P ~ N ~ C  2'91 
UY 
u PANEL 225 Fa-0 UW* m & ~ - ~ &  
cb Panel 225 - a11 closed except: 
cb HI GAIN ANT FZT BUS - open 
cb HI GAIN ANT GRP 2 - open 
# bb S*aqyD F f i . X M  I T T ~ ~  OA7n S ~ C ~ A & P :  E 
: cb FLT. AYL ' ; i c ~ ; ~ # A  ( k r f ~ )  I I I cb C T E  C & * H J -  o ~ d  V 
' tb RCba xpktoa aur-  
HSC FORtd 2206 (JUN 61) 
/' 
. E-31 
PANEL 226 
c t  Panel 226 - a l l  W d  cxcept: 
.-.n 
-t&eaem c.C, L.~-tirth\ C. [:LCYI) I l \u~,r \ub,$ FL~/?L, - C C C ~ C O  
.C) . *. 
-en cL Caca.ub uurcnir 3 / J ~ ~ G ~ ~ I ~  LE,5 . hi 
- 1  G 315 E-qtmt J L M 3 ~  -paGI  , ( Her vc -fir. 
- c ~ ~ : ~ ~ , ~  
PAXEL 227 
--- 
SCI PiJR - OFF 
cb Panel 229 all closed except: 
cb EMIN REL PYRO (2)- open 
cb 02 VAC ?OX FX.IPS (2) - opcn 
jr C1. Zth,zK s nw.\ 3' 6~ Q CZ) - CI.cil  
PANEL 250 _ 
@,-Gd K 
t 
- 8 
cb Panel 250 - a l l  W except: 
-=34FxO=EAZ~333 r.- ---Jpen - 
d 
-*lT Se-apen --' 
cfr-BRT=BSX%S-pen 
BAT VELT v1.v - CLOSED 
+ WTE STOWAGE VEXT vlv - m x ~  c:c C - S ~  i> 
PANEL 275 &r'~" Y 
Y cb Panel 27.5 - a l l  eb6e.e. w: \ d 
c k a B = = e v n  
4ikEEeE-n 3 U 
cb-n-c - 
(Trim front page otl solid crop marksi back page on dash crop marks .I 
PANEL 276 
cb Panel 276 - a l l  closed 
' PANEL 278 
# cb Panel 278 - a l l  w d  -: / 
/
PANEL 300 
]IIi SUIT F L O W  vlv - FULL FLOW 
PANEL 301 
BH SUIT FUlW vlv - FUU FLOW 
PANEL 302 
e -  - 
CTR SUIT FLOU vlv - NU mxlw 
4 I PRIM CAB TEMP vlv - COLD (W) . 
SEC CAB TMP V ~ V  - COOL* (C9))- 
2 E 
- a PANEL 304 
'% - 
DRNK 820 SUPPLY vlv - OFF (CU) 
PANEL 305 
FOOD PREP COLD H20 vlv - re1 
FOOD PREP HOT H20 vlv - re1 
PANEL 306 
- 
ut E: w MSN TMR - S.7013 J 
EVNT l'MR RSET - UP (center) 
4 EVNT THR STP.~ -  s f - - p  J' 
EVNT TMR KIN - center 
EWE l?IR SEC - center 
HSN TMR-NR - center 
HSN TMR HIN - center 
WN RIR SEC - center 
h6C FORM q06  (JUN 67) 
( T r i n ~  froni page oil solid crop n~arks; back page on dash crop marks .) 
PANEL 325 
--
CAB PRESS RELF vlv (NI) - -Y 
)I CAB PRESS RELF V ~ V  (LH) - IKXS€&SL!Y- o,-,,,~,- 
PRIM GLY TO RW vlv - BYPASS (pull) 
PANEL 326 
REPRESS PKG vlv - Q'L 0 6 ,  :- 
SM 02 SUPPLY vlv - 0:: &=-- . 
SURGE TI( 02 vlv - OX ~ i = r .  
GLY RSVR I N  vlv - W E N  CCcisco 2' 
GLY RSVR BYPASS vlv - C Z X E X ( ~ ? E E ~  '- . 
GLY RSVR WT vlv - 6SE-i C .  . 
PANEL 350 
C02 CSTR PIVERT vlv - both (center) 
PANEL 351 
EUdK REG vlv (2) - Cecs~c--t, Y' 
HZOfGLY TK PRESS REG vlv - %Xii CfF 
H2O/GLY TK -PKESS RELF vlv - WH 
PlER CAB PRESS vlv - OFF 
CAB REPRESS vlv - OFF (CCW) 
- 
WASTE TK SERVICING vlv - CLOSE 
PRESS RELF vlv - 2 
POT TK I N  vlv - OPEN 
WASTE TK I N  vlv - AUTO 
PANEL 375 
SURGE TK PRESS RELF vlv - open (CW) 
PANEL 376 
PLVC - NORMAL (up) 
(Trim front page on solid crop marks; back page on dash crop maiks.) 
PANEL 377 
GLY TO RAD SEC vlv - BYPASS (CCW) 
PANEL 378 
PRIN GLY ACClM vlv - open (CCW) 
PANEL 339 
PRIM ACCUEI FILL vlv - OFF (CW) 
PANEL 380 
d 02 DEMAND REG vlv - S Z f I  OFF d 
SUIT TEST V ~ V  - OFF J- x S U I T ~ ~ T V ~ V - C ~ ~ ) ~ , , , ~ - ~  1 
PANEL 601 
REPRESS 02 vlv - close 
o PANEL 382 I .  
h 
PANEL 602 
01 
0 
PI REPRESS 02 RELF V ~ V  - OPEN (CW) 
\ 
6 '8  
\ 
m 
4) 
PRESS EQUAL vlv - CLOSE 
ACTB HNDL sel - stow/check locked 
SUIT HT EXCH PRIM GLY V ~ V  - FLOY (CCU) 
SUIT FLOW MLF V ~ V  - OFF 
PRIM GLY EV.4P IN TMP vlv - KIN (CCW) 
SUIT HT EXCH SEC GLY vlv - FLOW (CCW) 
$ SEC EVAP 820 CONT vlv - m. 06- ( ~ c c l ~ )  * 
0 O, P R ~  NU 1120 WKP V ~ V  - 066 CCC-) i . 
H20 ACCUM V ~ V =  (2) - RMTE (CCW) \ Y, m 
" PANEL 600 
EMER 02 vlv - close 
(Tri~n front page on solid crop marks; back page on dash crop marks .) 
SIDE HATCH 
CAB PRESS DUNP vlv - close (CW) 
GEAR BOX s e l  - LATCH 
ACTR wDLE s e l  - IE!LATCH 
IaCK PIN REL KNOB - LOCK 
LOCK PIN ind - f lush 
GN2 VLV PAYDLE - outboard 
BPC JETT KNOB - toward BPC JETT 
* - last momentary position before l i f t o f f .  
YSC FORM 2206 (JUN 67) 
3 s  D- Dormant Operations Phase Procedures 
A. Transfer Pot H 2 0  from CM drinking gun 
B. Main Bus B Checkout 
C . Closing Bus Tie Procedure 
D. Additional Utilization of CM Lioh Canisters 
E . Fi r s t  CSM Activation ('1M Only) 
F. IN t o  CSM Power Transfer 
G. Transfez of IM Power t c  &%in B 
H. Batt A Charge Procedure 
I. Second CSM Activation fo r  TIN (using IM Pur) 
J. Charge of Batt E Following Batt A Charge 
K. CX H@ Transfer to IH Procedure 
* TRANSFER POT. H20 FROM M 
A. Turn off the following valves: 
Repress Pkg 
Emergency Cabin Press 
Direct O2 
Demand Reg. 
Water Accumulator 
SM Supply 
B. Turn on the following valves: 
Main Regulators 
Water & Glycol tanks pressure inlet  6 outlet both 
C. Turn surge tank on & cycle H20 a s  necessary 
MAIN BUS B CHECKOUT 
MDC 3 
-
MDC 5 
-
RHEB 250 
RHEB 275 
MDC 5 
-
MDC 3 
-
MDC 5 
RHEB 275 
RHEB 250 
MDC 5 
-
DC Indicators SW - Bat Bus B 
Battery Charger B a t  B Chg - Closed 
EPS Sensor Signal MNB - Closed 
B a t  B Pwr Entry/Postlanding CB - Closed 
(Verify Battery Bus B voltage okay with zero current) 
Main Bus B Bat Bus B CB - Close 
Main Bus Tie B a t  B/C - B a t  B/C 
(Verify no change i n  bat tery voltage o r  current) 
DC Indicators SW - Hain Bus B 
(Verify good bus voltage) 
Main Bus Tie B a t  B/C - Off 
Main Bus B Bat Bus B CB - Open 
B a t  B Pwr Entry/Postlanding CB - Open 
Battery Charger Bat B Chg - Open 
EPS Sensor Signal MNB - Ope3 
c. CLOSING BUS TIE PROCEDURE 
Pnl 250 
250 
275 
2 75 
MDC 5 
cb Bat t  Chg B a t t  A Charge - Closed 
cb Batt  Chg Bat B Charge - Closed 
cb EPS Sensor Signal MNA - Closed 
cb EPS Sensor Signal MNB - Closed 
cb Batt  A Pwr Entry/Post Ldg - Closed 
cb B a t t  B Pwr Entry/Post Ldg - Closed 
cb Main A B a t  Bus A - Closed 
cb Main B Batt  Bus B - Closed 
Read Bat Bus Voltage 
Main Bus Tie A/C - Bat A/C 
Read Main A Volts & B a t t  A Cur. 
Main Bus Tie B/C - Bat B/C 
Read Main B Volts & Bat t  B Cur. 
To reconfigure reverse procedure except: 
Main Bus Tie A/C - Batt A/C 
Main Bus T i e  B/C - B a t t  B/C 
~ '~ roce r lu re  has been aevelopc.3 t o  pennit eas ie r  crew rigging f o r  the 
.fresh CM LiOH cartridges wher. i t  i s  time t o  change (estimai;ed time 
GET K1:OO h r s ) .  Uptaping and rebagging can be avoided by using the 
f ollowine : 
1. Cut a piece of t a p  approximately 3 f e e t  long. 
2. I&ke k b e l t  around the sides a t  the top of the new CM cartridge 
with st icky side out. 
3. Cut 4 pieces approximately 2" square from mi EVA cue c a d .  Eknd 
each squaA i n  half t o  fom a 90' angle. These squares w i l l  be used as 
corner supports when attaching the cartridgesin series .  
4. Remove plug from old cartridge bypass and i n s e ~ t  same plug in*bottom 
bypass of pew cartridge. 
5. Arrange i n  ser ies  with top of oew cartridge on bottom'. of old 
cartridge. 
6. Put corner supports on s t icky fape so tha t  they overlap both 
cartridges. 
7. Make suff ic iept  wraps of tape around cartridges to  s e a l  and hold 
t- together. 
8. Repeat 1-7 t o  r i g  the other unit .  
Panel 4 
Panel 5 
Panel 3 
E. FIRST CSM ACTIVATION (TM ONLY) 
Telcom Gp 1 - A21 (OFF) 
The following cb's closed: 
ECS Press Group 1 MN B 
ECS Press Group 2 Mh B 
ECS Temp MN B 
ECS Sec Loop Xducer MN b 
ECS Rad ~ o n t l / ~ t r s  MN B 
Bat R'ly Bus Bat B 
Omr C w r ~  Brrr 8 CW6 
Inverter  Control 1 
Inverter  Control 2 
EPS Sensor Signal AC 1 
EPS Sensor Signal MN B 
EPS Sensor Uuit M Bus 1 
Waste and Pot HcC MN B 
Instruments Ess. MN B 
Transponder - Prim 
Pwr Amp - Prim (verify) 
Pwr Amp - High 
A?ode Voice - Off 
Power Sce - Norm 
PMP - Norm 
S-Band Ant - Omni D 
(voice) 
(Off) 
(off)  
Omni B 
Panel 225 cb F l t  Bus Mn B - Close (Open) 
CTE MN B - Close (Open) 
Panel 250 cb BATC  at C ~ ~ / E D S  2 - close  (open) 
cb BATE Pwr ~ n t r y / ~ o s t  Lndg - Close (open) 
Panel 275 cb Main B B a t  Bus B - Close (Open) 
cb Inverter  Pwr 2 MN B - Close (open) 
Panel 250 cb Bat B Pwr ~ n t r y / P o s t  Lndg - Close 
MD3 3 AC Inverter  2 - MN B 
AC Inverter  2Bus  1 -OD? (up) (Off) 
3 AC Inverter  AC Bus 1 - Reset (Then CTB) 
m3 Up TIM - (CMD Reset (then o f f )  
Select Best OMNI 
Panel 101 
The following onboars r -2 !.clrts a re  required: 
Batt ': l'oltage 
Pyro B a t  A Voltage 
Pyro Bat B Voltage 
Sus He Press 
CM RCS Injector  Temps 
Positions Sf, SD, GA, b 8, 6L. / 4 0  
Bat Manifold Press 
Posit icn 4 A 
Bac kout 
Panel ; 
Panel 250 
Pwr Amg - O f f  
h.ansponder - O f f  
AC Inverter 2 - O f f  
cb  at B Pur ~ntry /Pos t  ~ n d g  - Open 
Reconf igure a l l  other switches and breakers a s  configured 
prior t o  t h i s  procedure a s  noted i n  red. 
Fe TO CSM P8lEH TPMSFER 
ASSUME ALL DES BATTERIES ON-LINE AND NO ASCENT bATTENES ON-LINB 
LM .. ' CB (11 and 16) - ASC ECA - CLCGZ (2) 
BATT 6 N0RE.I FEED - 0 1  
BATT 1, 2 3, m3 4 - QFF/RESET 
CSM CONNECT LL-;I/CS~.I 'JT'JT~BIL.TS~~L 
CB - LEI PWR-1 MN E - CLOSE . 
CB - LM RJR-2 hIH B - CLOSE . 
CB BATT B RIR E:TRY/FQST m m d  - CLOSE 
CB EPS SEPTSOH.SIGNAL MAIN B - CLOSE 
CB MAIN B BaTT BUS B -' CLOSE 
.VERIFY WpT BUS VOLTAGE 
LE(I FWR SW - CSE.1 
CB MAIN B B4TT BUS B - OPEh' 
CB BATT B PWB ES~TRY/FOST LAT?iT' u J?G - OPEN 
VEPJEY bWN BUS B VOLTAGE 
LM BATT 1, 2, .3, and 4 - HI VOLT - 9N 
% - 
NOTES : 
1. CZRCUIT BREAKER PROTECTION LIMITS CURRENT TO 15 NPS 
2. ~M/CSEI IJMBXLIC-AL IS "h3~" AND MAIN BUS VDLrF4GE MAY BE 
MXV1!lDRkD BY SFLECTING MAW B 
ASSIRES *.ALL DESCENT B A m B  ON-LINE MID ASCENT BATTERY 6 @N 
4. 
BORMAL FEm 
CSM C ~ 6 6  LM BR 2 - OPEN 
~ ~ 7 4  LM PWR 1 - OPEN 
EQS Srukou S l6UAC Cb ml)dU B - bpld 
LM C B ~ I ~ )  ES : AT FEED PIE (2) - OPEN 
BAT 1 iIV - OFFIRESET 
BAT 2 LV - OFF RESET THEN OX 
BAT 2 W - OFF F3SET THEN ON 
.. BAT 1 HV - ON 
/ 
~~(16) EPS: BAT FEED TIE (2) - CWSE 
G TRANSFER OF LM POWER TO MAIN B 
LM CB (11 & 16) ASC ECA - Close 
ASC E M  Cntl - Close 
B a t t  5 & 6 Norm Feed - On 
Batts  1 & 3 - Off/Reset 
Wait 30 Min. 
Batt 2 & 4 - OffIReset 
CSK Open a l l  C B ' s  on Hain B l i s t e d  on Fig. 3.1, Fl ight  
Data F i l e  (Bus D i s t .  Matrix) 
Connect LM/CSM Umbilicals 
LM b-r - 1 MNB CB - Close (MDC 5) 
LM i?wr - 2 MNB CB - Close (MDC 5) 
Batt B Pwr Entry/Post Landing CB - Close 
Batt Chg Batt B Chg CB - Close (MDC-5) 
Main B - Batt Bus B CB - Close 
M n  Bus Tie - Batt B/C 
Verify Main B Voltage by: 
(A) EPS Sensor Signal Hain B CB - Close (MDC 5) 
(B) DC Indicator - Main B 
Lt4 Pwr SW - CSM (MDC 2) 
Main Bus Tie Batt B/C - O f f  
Batt B Pur Entry/Post Landing CB - Open (Pnl 250) 
IML' H t r  Main B CB - Close (MDC 5) 
EPS Sensor Signal Main B CB - Open (MDC 5) 
IM B a t t  1, 2, 3, 4 - H I  Volt - On 
4 C(:!l'T A CHARGE 
PANEL 2% 
CHARGE 
CHARGE START 
- TERMINATION 
PANEL 275 
C B  L M I E R m  PWR 2 MAIN B - CIX)SE OIEN 
PANEL 5 
C B  BAT RELAY BUS BAT A 
C B  EPS S N S C R  UNIT AC BUS 2 
CB E P S  SENSOR SIGNAL AC-2 
- CLOSE O r n i l  
- C M S E  OPEN 
- CLOSE OPEN 
C B  BA=Y CHARGER MN B - CJASE OPEN 
C B  BATTERY CHARGER AC FWR - CLOSE OPEN 
C B  BATCEXY CHARGER BAT A CHG 
C B  INVEEi!i!ER CONTROL 2 
- CJASE OPEN 
- CII)SE OPEN 
C B  Ik' ?XCEB CONTROL 3 - C W .  OPEN 
sw MAIN BUS TIE BAT A/C - OFF -- 
CW BAT CHAR= - AC-2 AC-1 
PAWL 3 
SW AC arflmm 2 
sw (65) I ~ R T E R  2 AC BUS 2 
-MNB 
- ON (UP) ow 
SW (67) AC BUS 2 REXZT - RE= (CENTER) OFF 
SW DC IISDICATOR S E L  - BAT CHARGER MN-B 
W C X T  CHARGER CURRENT AM) V O L T A a  TO MSFN EVERY 10 Ml3WES FOR F I R S T  1/2 
HOUR: !CHEN ONCE EVERY 30 MRWEXi. (MSFN WILL CALL) 
MIR CHAR(3E !EEKRWTION - DO BELOW FIRST THEN GO M PREVIOUS MCKDUP 
PRrJCEDURE . 
PANEL 5 
SW M4IN BUS TIE SAT B/C 
PANEL 250 
PANEL 5 
CB BAl!'I!EZY C I I A R W  BAT B CHG 
CHARCrE 
C H A R a  START !PmMINATION 
- om 
- O F F  
- ON (ZIP) 
- om 
- OPEN 
DATA PASS USING LM POWER 
1. Same procedure a s  passed up f o r  l a s t  CSM data  pass 
except : 
Page 1 
Pwr Amp - Low 
Page 2 
Pnl 275 
Delete cb Main B Bat B - Close 
Attached is the proposed procedure t o  obtain a second hack of CSM 
data u t i l iz ing.  
1. LM Pwr t o  Main Bus B 
2. AC Bus 1 
3. Inverter  2 
4. Goldstone 210' si te 
5. Low Power 
c\O BATTERY C9RRGE.E B4T A CHG - OPEN 
cb  EAT?.L.E'.: C!+RECLF. LE*T Y. CNG - CLQSE 
- OFF (DW) 
- €3 
\L 3 
-- -
s'4 BATTERY CHhkGE. - OFF 
s w  4 x i  K T - .  '~N\~E.C:TEC -- OFF 
QNL 250 
--- 
c b  BRT R f ) k R  E ~ T ~ Y / B ~ ' G ~ L I C ~ E \ ' ~ \ ~ ? !  - OPEN 
cb BAT E PWR ENTRY /PO'JTLL?:D\NG - 0 ~ 6 . ~  
K. CM H20 TRANSFER TO LM PBDCEDURE CQ 9-J 
1. Pressurize H20 tanlis per  procetlure used f o r  dr inking 
gun H20. 
2. Remove plug from por t  on waste tank serv ic ing  panel. 
3. I n s t a l l  H,O adapter  assembly i n  port .  
L 
4. Connect'urine dump hose t o  H20 adapter  assembly. 
5 .  Connect PLSS t o  ur ine  dump hose. 
6 .  Open waste tank serv ic ing  v l v  u n t i l  PLSS is f u l l  
(per s i g h t  g lass )  then c lose  waste tank servicix,g 
v l v  and disconnect PLSS. 
7. Transfer H20  from PLSS t o  LM H20 tanks per  procedure 
used t o  empty PLSS tanks or ig ina l ly .  

COPY IN& CM PAIE 
INSTALL LIOH CANISTERS, STOW ORDEAL 
EMS MNA & MNB - OPEX 
PNL 8 F M O D  
PNL 5 INTERIOR 131s r?EHOSTAT TO 
U B 1 0 0  F r n O D  
BATT A ENTRY & PL CB 
W? B ENTRY & PL CB 
BATT C ENTHY & P L  CB 
CB RUT CEEG BATT A CHRG 
CB BATT CHRG BA!M! B CHRG 
BATT RELAY BUS RATT A & B 
MAIN 3US T I E S  ( 2 )  
FX'S SENSQR S I G  MNA MNB 
MNA BATP C CB 
I N S T  RJR CNTL CB 3 & 4 
ESS P I S T  PWR MNB CB 
PRIM DJAP H20 CNTL VLV 
SES BVAP H20 CNTL VLV 
CM F Z S  PREHEAT 
C&W MNB CB 
EPS SEIYSOR UNIT IC BUS A&E 
MAIN BUS A&B 
E I - 5 + 0 5  
EARTH TEmATOR AGS ALIGN 
- 'IXED 
FLOOD 
- F r n D  
- CLOSED 
- cmsm 
- C m T D  
- CLOSE 
- C m E  
- cmm 
- ON (UP) 
- C U E  
- c m  
- OPEN 
- CIOSED 
- AUTO (cw) 
- AUTO (cw) 
TO TO E 1-5 STEP 35 
- C m E D  
- 1 
- C r n E  
- RES~/CENTER 
XI-?+ 00 
MCC 7 
MANEOVER TO SEP AlTITLJDE 
E I - 4 + 4 0  
PERFORM PYRO &;TT CHECK S T E P  39 E 1-6 
PNL 8 
-
ALL C M S E D  EXCEPT 
D l 3  UUAGE MNA & &WB - OFEN 
CM RCS HTR flu & MNB - OPEN 
SMRCS HTRS C MB - OPEN 
SM RCS HTRS D MNA - OPEN 
SMS (2) - O P B i  
SPS GAUGING (4) - OFEN 
SPS P dc Y (4)  - OPEN 
FIX"? BAG ( 3 )  - OBEN 
Em (3)  - OPEN 
PL VENT/FIE/PL - OPEN 
CM RCS ACTIVATION S T E P  41 S 1-6 
E I - 4 + 3 0  
IN CONFIGURED FOR CMRCS HOT ??IRE 
G/N IMU HTR MXB - c m m  
ROT CNTL FWFt NORMAL (2) - AC/E 
S C S  X G I C  PWR 2/3 - ON 
RCS COMMAND - ON 
CM RCS CHCCK S T E P  4 E 2-1 WITH EXCEFTION O F  F O m W I N G :  
MAY ATT SW TO ACCEL CMD V I C E  M I N  IMP 
DELETE S T E P S  : RCB TRANS - SM 
MAN ATT ( 3 )  - EWTE CMD 
S/C CONT - CMC XITO 
IOCK RHC ' S 
SECS PYRO (2) - .4HEI 
IM +X 0.3 FT/SEC 
CM/SM S E P  ( 2 )  - ON (UP) 
IN -X o .5 FP/SEC 
SECS E R O  (2) - SAFE 
SECS WIG (2) - O F F  (DOWN) 
IM P I T C I i  ?1P TO ACQUIRE SM AND PHCMlOGRAPH 
(L! USE ACA FOR ALL ROTA!PIONS) 
91-3+00 
LN STAEUI MANEWER TO "MOON VIEW" ATIIITUDE 
G/N CMHJ!CER MNB - C E E I ]  
V37E 06E PRO (HOLD UNTIL ISKY BWS) 
EI-2+30 
CB ESS R?ST HNA - CIlXSED 
CB JIM WTR NNA - CIDSED 
CB GIN CO- w - CmE1) 
CB IM. W H  i - OPEN 
C B l X P W R 2  - OPEN 
CB MNB BRIT BUS E - CILSED 
llmEamRjEi1,2, 3 - c m  
RUT REIAY BUS BATT A%B CB 
I T i  COrJTROL 1-2 & 3 CB'S 
A C I N V E R T E R l  
? U : I N V A C 9 U s 1  
A C I N V A C E U S 2  
EPS SENSOR SIG AC 1 & 2 
E P S ~ O R U N I T A C l & 2  
WWHNA 
A C I N v A C B u S 1 & 2  
- C m E 9  
- c u m  
-HNA 
- ON (UP) 
- ON (UP) 
- c m m  
- C i n c l s n  
- cmm 
- RESET (CWR) 
PNL 223 
FIE BUS MNA & MNB - C l U E D  
PNL 4 
-
TEIECOM GROUP 1 - A C 1  
TEIECOM GROUP 2 - A C 2  
S-BAND NORM XPONDER - PRIM 
PWR SCE - NORM 
PWRPMP - NORM 
UFI%L CMD RESET - RESm THE3 NORV 
UP TM - ACCEPT 
PNL 275 
FIE AND P.L.  W A  & MNB - C m  
CONF'IGLrRE FQR COMM ON PNL 6, 9 & 10 
I W  MNA & B - CIOSED 
OPTICS MNA & E - CTX36ED 
G & N P W I i A C l  - CIAXXD 
G & N A J R A C 2  - C m  
wi m SW - z - 2  
PERFOLY C K  Pam UP - C; 2-2 
T A W  WlJ, C E K  INCfiaIENT LTDATZ (CO~PLEI'E BY ~1-2+l5) 
STATE VEC, 2 IIEFSPXTS : ENTRY TARGEZ, ~ 6 6  
PERFOIiM yaJ POWER UP - G 2-1 
PEXFORM OIrIlICS PGWER UP - G 2-3 
PNL 229 
CB TIMERS EWA 
SET MISSION TIMER 
CSM 
V 4 1  N20 
R P Y 
- -- (FROM IN ATIIITUDE) 
V ~ O N ~ O ~ I A T I M ~ M D O N V T E W A B G I E S ,  
SET REf;SMMA!L' AITD DRIFT FTAGS 
V3'iX 'j2E GPTICN 1 
COARSE A K G N  
h m  ON FCXIN 
IXMANEUVER TO SUN ATTITUDE: MARK CIN SUN 
TORQUE ( ~ r n  93) 
I&! MANEWER TO =ISON ATTITUIE ( W ~ H  GIMBAL m ~ )  
IM MAX DB, ATT HOLD 
CB MAIN A BATT BUS -d- - CIrOSED 
CB MAIN B BATT C - CIxlsED 
EI-i+30 
PROCEED W I T H  CIDSEOUT AND HATCH INSTALTAWION; C E E E  Iid HATCH 
c m  m4E' VLV 
PERFORM UTCH DECAL 
El nrrsrJ.:L VENT VLV - C M / ~  DEmA P 
SUFFE TANK - ON 
HAIN R E S  (2) - OPEN 
EMEX CABIN RIGS - B@TH 
S U I T  D E W  REGS - BMlH 
WMER AND GLYCOL TAM( REIGS ZNLEL' AND OIPTLEX' - BOTH 
ECS TFWSDUCERS PERSS GROC'P I & 2 MNA & MNB (4) - CLOSED 
ECS GLYCOL RMPS 1 - AC-1 
INCRWE CABIN PRESS TO 5.5 RIA USING DIRECT O2 
VENT TUli iL TO 3.0 t o  3.5 AP 
VERIFY U.1-CM DEEI'A P - POSITIVE AND NOT DECREASING FOR 1-0 
ECS TRANSDUCERS TEMP MNA & MNB - CLOSED 
EI-&+20 
BMAC NO. 1 RJR - W A R M U P  
WITH CIWJGES 
1. DELETE STEP 1 
2. S I G  COND DRI BIAS PWR - ON 
BMAG RJR 1 - ON 
SUIT C O M P ~ S O R  2 - A/C 1 
S/C CONTROL - SCS 
MAN ATT SWITCHES (AS G a I R E D )  
PERFORM GDC A1;ISN 
ROT CNTL PWR DIRECT 1 & 2 - MNA/MNB 
E I - 1 + 0 0  
-!37E: - 4 7 ~  
SICS PYRO ASM (2) - UP/ON 
CSM/IM FINAL SEP (2) - W/ON 
SECS PYRO ARM (2) - SAFE 
PRO OOE 
CONFIGURE FOR SINGLF: RING 
IW'ZUWR T3 ENTRY ATTITUDE 
E I - 5 5  MINS 
SMTANT STAR CHECK 
PARK OPTICS 90' SHAFT 
OPTICS POWER OFF 
STOW OPTICS 
PERFORM EM3 C E C K  STEP 32 El4 
I N I T N Z E  J3MS S T E P  2 E2-1 
E I - 4 5  hENS 
ENTRY PAD & STATE VECTOR 
MANRTVER TO MOON  CHECK'^ ATTITUDE (36' w m  P I )  
VERIFY SURGE TANK & &PRESS PKG ON 
CB ECS COW SYS WASTE wATER/URIIE INCT HTPRS (2) - CUXXD 
SUIT COMPRESSOR 2 - OFF 
E I - 7 0  
E W  NO. 2 FWR - ON 
FDAIm - BOTH 
SECS IM3IC (2) - ON (UP) 
ACTIVATE PRIMARY EVAPORATOR 
GO TO m R Y  CHECKLIST E 2-2 ( ~ 6 1 )  
E I - 1 9  P61 
E I - 3  (MOON SEX') 
-
CHECK IMU AND G E  ATT - I N T ~  C H E C ~ S T  E 2-5 
HORIZON CHECK 
BEEIN BLACKOUT 

GNC APOLLO 13 
POST MISSION REPOELT 
Prepared By: 
GNC Apollo 13 Post-Mission Report 
1. SMRCS - Prior to  5954 GET, the only SMRCS anomaly was the Quad D 
P/T rat io  instrumentation. T h i s  readout had, fo r  some period of time 
af ter  T M ,  remained a t  f u l l  scale high. It subsequently indicated cor- 
rectly and the problem was attributed t o  inabi l i ty  of the transducer 
to  follow the changes during the high usage period around T M .  
Concurrent with the loss of the MNB and AC-2 busses the auto coi ls  
selected to  MNB l o s t  the i r  enable power. The rates  caused by the venting 
resulted i n  a great many thruster commands but with reduced thruster 
authority. During th i s  period, the crew used direct  RCS from RHC 2 t o  
ass i s t  i n  vehicle control. 
Shortly a f t e r  the power loss, single j e t  control was available using B 
je ts  for  Yaw control and Quad C f o r  R o l l  and Pitch. The Quad D fuel  
and oxidizer manifold pressures had decreased several PSI. The crew u s  
requested to  activate the HE valves on Quad D. The manifold pressures 
returned t o  norm1 values confirming that  the HE isolation valves had been 
closed by the shock of the 02 tank rdpture. 
Subsequently, the crew reported continued trouble damping the vehicle rates. 
T h i s  was because the 9AP had B/C r o l l  selected and the crew had turned off 
thruster 81. With this configuration f Yaw, -Pitch and -Roil was the only 
coutrol available. There was a t  this time no indication of Quad C propellant 
usage forcing the conclusion that  either the fuel  and oxidizer primary 
propellant isolation valves were closed or  that  Quad C was inoperable because 
of damage. Since both the propellant valves and the3.r talkback indicators 
required MNB power, the anomaly was l e f t  open. The crew subsequently selected 
B/D r o l l  i n  the DAP and selected MNA on the RCS j e t  selects t o  regain auto 
control. Figures 1 through 4 show the SMRCS propellant usage on th is  fl ight.  
2. CMRCS - The CMRCS performed normally duriug this mission with no anomalies 
noted. 
Because of the t h e m 1  conditionr; existing up t o  the time of SM jettison, the 
instrumented RCS injectors were below the mini- temperature f o r  operation 
and required 20 minutes pre-heat. After heating was completed, the je t s  
were hot fired in accel command with the crew reporting t h a t d l  je t s  fired. 
With the long time lapse between the hot f i r e  and LM jettison, the 
injector temps wero again checked a t  approximately EX-2hrs. A t  this readout, 
2 temps were found to be below the 28' l imit  and it was requested that 
the appropriate je ts  be f i red prior to  LM jettison. The spcecraf t  was in 
an att i tude with a high middle gi'mbal angle and the LM hatch was closed. 
Since the control direction of the Yaw jets  could possibly aggravate the 
platform middle gimbal angle, it was decided t o  forego the f i r ing  and accept 
the s l ight  possibilixy of a j e t  problem. 
3. SPS - There were no SPS anomalies during this flight.  Figure 5 i s  a 
plot of the propellant tank surface temperatures and shows an i r terest ing 
but uexpltined r i se  i n  the temperature sensor located i n  SMBU 3. There 
is no da t i  i a c a t i n g  damage to  the SPS as a resul t  of the 02 tank fracture. 
4. G&N System - The G&N System exhibited adequate performance throughout 
the mission. The entire G&N System, including the IMU heaters was powered 
down a t  58t17 and powered up again a hours prior to  EI. The IMU heaters 
and CMC were brought on a t  EI-3& hours. The C K  was powered fo r  2 hours 
and the IMU for  1 hour prior t o  entry without coolant flow. A t  the t i m e  
the coolant pumps were brought on the stable member was 129.6'~ and aub- 
sequently cooled by .3%. The highest c o o l a t  temperature encountered 
was 60%, therefore, the IIU heaters never approached the teinperature ( 7 5 ' ~ )  
where they would be off of the time. The entry time l ine  was more than 
adequate i n  terms of Wl cooling. 
Iner t ia l  Parameters - The IMU PIPA bias i n  the Z - a x i s  was ebserved t o  be 
2 
slightly high prior to  TLI. (.GO5 ft/sec ). We chose not to  update the bias 
PRE-TLI, because it was reflecting some components of acceleration due to  
booster venting and its effects would not be significant i n  monitoring TLI. 
Measurements of a l l  three PIPA biases post TLI showed much better consistency. 
The Z-pipa, a f te r  TLI, exhibited the null  bias phenomenon, that is2it did 
not show any drif t .  When the platform was powered up for  entry, the Z 
PIPA bias shifted from i t s  previous measured value. The bias of -.0547 
2 ft/sec was updated i n  the C X  a t  EI-45 minutes. Table 1 is a history of 
the PIPA bias measurements taken throughout the mission. 
Fcur measurements of gyro d r i f t  were obtained. A t  32G3, on the basis of 
three measurements, the values fo r  a l l  three gyro d r i f t s  were updated in the 
CMC. One data point was available a f te r  the update. It shows that we 
essentially nulled the d r i f t  rates i n  the Y and Z axes by ~pdating, but 
accomplished no improvement i n  the X axis. This bias representsd -1.1 
MERU error i n  the X axis, so no further updates were required. (The 
mission rule c r i te r ia  is 3 MERU af te r  an update has been attempted.) 
Table 2 is  a compilation of the gyro data obtained. 
Optics-Shaft Oscillations - The optics CDU shaft telemetry a t  40 hours 
GET showed oscfllations from 0 to  .6 degrees. We asked the crew to  compare 
Noun 91 (shaft and trunnion q l e s )  t o  the mechanical counters on the optics. 
The oscillation was evident from both sources and occurred I n  the OFTICS ZERO 
made only. The problem was no constraint t o  the optics function. However, 
we recommended that  the optics be powered down when not i n  use t o  preclude 
physical wear. T h i s  same problem occurred on Apollo 12. Post f l igh t  
analysis on Apollo 12 showed a transformer i n  the OPTICS ZERD feedback loop 
t o  be the most l ikely cause of the failure. 
5. SCS - The SCS performed nomidly.  However, we observe that  whan 
the BMAG #1 package was powered up a t  EI-1+20, it took longer (90 sec) 
for  the yaw gyro to  output nulled rates  than the other two axes. This 
particular gyro apparently took longer t o  spin up than the other two axes. 
During the entry power up sequence, the crew readouts shored that  Main Bus A 
was loaded by 2 amperes. Our plan was t o  keep that bus isolated un t i l  LM 
power was to  be disconnectea. It was found that our checklist had not 
included isolating SCS power from Main A, so we requested that the crew turn 
off the SCS 2/3 Logic Power switch, which cut the power drain on Main A 
i n  half. 
6 .  EW - Several ENS bias t e s t s  were conducted. A s  a result, we biased 
2 the EN VC used for  NC-2 by -34 ft/sec . Comparing the EMS and G&N 
subsequent to  KC-2 showed an EMS % error of 3.9. The t e s t  results and 
comparisons are given i n  Tables 3 and 4. 
7. PTC - Two attempts a t  PTC in i t ia t ion  were aborted. The FTC attempt a t  
8 hours was aborted because it was begun under single j e t  r o l l  control and 
accomplished a t  an incorrect r o l l  rate. After discussing both points with 
the crew, PTC was reinit iated successfully. A t  32+22, another attempt a t  
ini t ia t ing PTC was unsuccessful. For some unexplained reason, the minus 
r o l l  je ts  f i red i n  opposition to  the desired r o l l  rotation 13 seconds 
af ter  init iation, Our investigation through playbacks and delogs reaffirmed 
that the procedure had been correctly executed and that  the G&N should 
not have f i red the minus r o l l  jets. The G&N rates i n  r o l l  prior t o  the 
f i r ing  showed a slight increase :~O/sec )  that  was not reflected i n  the 
SCS rates. However, t h i s  should not have caused a j e t  f ir ing. No anomalous 
operation of the RCS dap, clintrol systems, or  W, was exhibited prior 
or subsequent to  this occurrence. FTC was restarted with no problem. 
8. Control Systems Operations42 Tank Rupture - I n  order t o  determine i f  
the control systems might have contributed to  the 02 tank rupture we 
constructed a sequence of events from playback data, delogs, and chart 
recorder information. Generally the control systems performed as  would be 
expected under the conditions prevaiiing on the vehicle buses. (No Main 
Bus B, no AC-2, no Quad C,) Table 5 i s  the event sequence. 
9. E&ry Timeline - The entry timeline was developed by the White Team and 
reviewed by a l l  teams. From the GNC standpoint, it was an exercise i n  off 
nominal operation i n  terms of G&N warm-up time and BMAG warmup and operation 
i n  an attempt to  help conserve battery energy. Systems problems encountered 
and mission action taken have been included i n  th i s  report. Section I1 
will provide a more detailed evaluation and conclusions that  can be derived 
from pre-entry operations data. 
TABLE 1 
PIPA BIASES 
AFOLLO 13 
Loaded Values 
Time (GET) 
00922+42 
009556.39 
01.~32~56 
01+41940 
02927C10 
3+52+56 
5-11%20 
&18+10 
6+51+50 
&u46t12 
w344-05 
llc04t52 
13toWl 
lb22 
TABLF, 2 
-
TORQUE CMD - bIERU (GYRO DRIFT) 
GET X Y z tt 
32M3t-- Updated A l l  Three Axes 
TABLE 3 - M A  V(; BIAS TEST ReSULTS 
PRE TLI +0.008 FT/SEC~ 
POST TLI to.010 FT/SEC~ 
1OiQ5 +o. 018 FT/SEC~ 
2~ co. 015 FT/SEC~ 
TABLE L - G/N - EMS COMPARISON 
BUj PRO? om LOFT EC-NUIL A VC A VCR 4VCM AVA ERR SYS (PAD) . ( P B ~  DRIFT ( p a )  (RESIDUAL) (PVC~YCR) 
TLI SIVB - - - 10Q6.9 -3.0 1W9.9 iOW6.9 0.03 
MCC2 SPS 23.2 4.32 0.34 18.5 -3.8 22.3 23.2 3.9 
TABLE 5 
SEQUENCE !" EYElES - 02 TANK RUPTURE 
CTE 55+51+2l Auto Roll maneuver t o  acquire the come%. 
55653-19 Four occurances of mise  on the pitch and 
5*53+23 yaw Auto TVC Cmd parameters CH3582 and CH3583. 
5%53+37 The O-graph trace i n d i c a t e  both parameters 
55+53+41 to be i n  phase and of w r l y  equal magnitude. 
l k i m m  deflection was equal to 1.9 C vdc, 
peak t o  peak a d  occurred at 554-5337, max 
voltage for  the other three instances was 1.2 
wdc, peak t o  peak. 
55t5&54 Event (fhrpture) occurred uhich resulM i n  a -pitch, 
-yaw rotational rate  of 0.8% a& C. ~ O / S  
respectively. Telemetry sync vas intennittent 
for  two seconds and then lock& in with apparent 
lcss  of CTE time. 
Approximately four seconds of continuous f i r ing  
from C3 & A3 thruster and three seconds of 
continuous f i r ing  from D3 & 83 thruster. 
These apparent f i r ings of pitch & yaw 
thrusters were overlaping but not simultaneous. 
All other thrusters appeared normal during this 
period of time. The +roll  thrusters dl & C 1  
fired for  about 1.5 sec. 
55+56+20 Another burst of je t  f i r ings i n  all three control 
axes commariding -pitch, -yaw and -roll, with the 
expected response from the rate  and atti tude error sources. 
5%57+42 Main 9 and AC2 dropped off the l ine  and as a result the 
SCS telemetry data was lost .  Thruster C3 began 
o s c i l l ~ t i n g  (Quad C inoperative) and C4, D3, 34, 83, 
C 1 &  A2 went t o  zero indicating the Bus B loss. 
The above timeline summarizes the c r i t i ca l  events froc the standpoint of 
the control system except for  the Pipa 120 vdc supply which oscillated 
to a low of +lo9 vdc during the l a t e r  art of the same tw minutes but 
recovered af te r  BC2 and HNB drogyed 3 .f the line and the crew had trane- 
f e d  some non-critical loads off of MNA. 
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S P S  O X 1 3 1 Z E R  STORAGE 
TANK TEMPERATURE 
APOLLO 13 
g g s  SA 23 7 7  OX SUMP TNK. 
- 
--- S A  2 3 7 %  9 X  STOR. TNK. 
S A  23  79 F U  SL'MP TNK. 
+++ Cis Z3So FU 5TeR. Tb\K. 
TIME C T E  
-. -- ,.,.. .-.. 
F/6 ulzs 5 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
Housrw. Tu& 77058 
IN REPLY REFER TO: 7 0 - ~ ~ 4 6 - 6 7  
MNORANDUM TO:  pal pal lo 13 Flight  Director 
FROM : ~ ~ 4 / ~ p a l l o  13 TEIMlT Team 
SUBJECT : Apallo 13 Past Missian Repart 
Attached i s  the Apolla 13, Phase I ' J X W  Past Mission Repart. Any 
questians cancerning t h i s  repar t  m a y  be directed t a  Jack Knight, 
extens ian 4576. 
William L. Peters 
Enclosure 
~ ~ 4 6  : JKnight: dh 
T W  
Apollc l3 Past Mission Report 
I. MISSION SYSTEMS CHRO1TOU)GY 
A. Prelaunch events were nominal; the IM was on in ternal  power at 
L/O -30 minutes and PCM was terminated a t  L/O -10 minutes. The I M  was 
launched with three known anomalies: (I) a leaking ascent #2 O2 tank 
valve, (2) a c i rcu i t  breaker (RCS A/B-2 QUAD 1) mechanically maintained 
closed, and (3) an apparent heat leak i n  the Supercri t ical  Helium ( sH~)  
system. The f i r s t  two anomalies were of a minor nature, expected t o  
cause no problems, but the th i rd  wmld necessitate a procedura/flight 
plan change t o  obtain a crew readout during the TLC entry. 
B. Launch and TDB were successfull$ accomplished with switchover 
t o  I M  pawer occurring about 3:46 GET. IM heater current was ent i re ly  
nominal and remained so throughout the nominal partion of translunar 
coast. From several readings 3f ~ / C M  AP, the ~ ~ / ~ u n n e l  leak r a t e  was 
determined t o  be approximately 0.014 lb/hr at 5 psia. The IM was 
entered at 55:00 GET, 4 hours ea r l i e r  than mig ina l ly  scheduled, t a  read 
the SHe pressure as well as perfom the nominal TLC functions. IM power 
was on for  about 12 minutes. 
C. Immediately a f t e r  exit ing the IM, the CSM 02 tank anomaly 
occurred. The IM HTR current went t o  a steady reading of 1.3 amps a t  
56:00 GET. The Main Bus B voltage remained abaut 3 . 9 1 ~  and the IN HTR 
current went t o  1.4-1.5 amps. A t  56:36 GET, Main Bus B was 0 vol ts  and 
the IM HTR current was 0. Relays 4 ~ 3  and 4 ~ 4  had pr=ibably opened. By 
57:44 GET, we were on IM internal  power. IM data was received at 57:57 
GET. The IM was eventually powered u2 t o  a current level  of 45-50 amps. 
After an assessment of the  possible trajectory plans, one was selected 
which culminated i n  landing a t  approximately 142:45 GET. The inmediate 
concern was the t o t a l  I M  l ifet ime available, and it became a p ~ a r e n t  that  
to  s t re tch the I M  l i fet ime for  a 142-hour CfET entry, the IM must be 
powered down. ( ~ v e n  i f  the H20 r a t e  decreased t o  the expected 5.0 lbs/hr, 
corresponding to  the i n i t i a l  power level, t h i s  would only allow for  a 
lifetime $6 approximately 1 2 6 : ~  GET.) This resulted in the following 
c~nsumable requirements based on the 59:00 GET status: 
(1) The current profile must be reduced to  an average of 24 emps 
or  less  for the remainder of the mission. 
(2) m e  water usage rate  must be reduced t o  an average of 3.5 
lbs/hr (corresponding t o  about 17 amps a t  the existing external heat l?ad). 
(3) The oxggen available w a s  more than adequate since the 
average usage rate  was about Q-23 lbs/hr. Ini t ia l ly ,  however, a usage 
ra te  of 0.6 lbs/hr w a s  noted which was la te r  attributed t o  pressuriza- 
t ion af the ascent #2 02 tank thmugh its leaking valve. 
(4) The LiOH from the LM alone was inadequate for the remainder 
of the mission. The I M  had a t o t a l  of 2 primary cartridges and 3 second- 
ary cartridges for an estimated t o t a l  C02 removal capability of approxi- 
mately 53 hours. This was based on nominal r i s e  rates  and allowing the 
C02 level t o  build ho a 15 mmHg level. Sane method of using the CSM 
cartridges was necessary. 
Pawer w a s  gradually reduced t o  35-40 amps tub 60:40 GET. It was 
decided t a  make a DPS burn a t  61:29 GET which would place the spacecraft 
on a free return trajectory and then reduce the power level t o  approxi- 
mately 27 amps i n  order to keep the FGNS up u n t i l  a second DPS burn a t  
79:52 GET was completed. We would then pwer the spacecraft down to  a 
minimum of l i f e  support equipaent, comnunications IM, and ASA, IXU and 
RCS heaters. The estimated power and H20 consumption for  th i s  configura- 
t ion was approximately 17 amps and 2.7 lbs/hr, respectively, which woulc 
stretch IN lifetime t o  165:OO (AMP-HRS) and 155:OO ( ~ ~ 0 )  (IET. The f u l l  
power-down resulted i n  an actual power level of about 12 amps. The 
water usage ra te  finally decwed to  2.5 - 2.8 lbs/hr. The f u l l  power 
down included turn-off of RCS and MA heaters and a l l  displays except the 
CWEA. A workable procedure for  use of CSM LiOH cartridges with the IM 
su i t  loop was developed and implemented, thereby alleviating that 
potential problem. 
D. During the remainder of the return, the IM was powered up fo r  
two MCC burns and the f i n a l  pre-entry maneuvers. Additionally, power 
was provided fo r  the  CSM battery charge, IMU and RCS heater i n i t i a l  
activation loads and certain other equipments. Since the low power 
levels were necessary fo r  consumabies management, no attempt was made 
t a  maintain a minimum cabin temperature level, resul t ing i n  uncomfortably 
low temperatures (about 45-50'~). A suggestion t o  place the SUIT !J!EMl? 
control valve t o  FULL HOT was implemented bl;t had no e f fec t  except t o  
further lower the temp a t  the low power level .  We suggested the crew 
might don t he i r  PGA's fo r  warmth, but t h i s  was rejected a t  the Mission 
Control Center. The I M  was powered up about 2 hours ea r l i e r  than 
planned pr io r  t a  re-entry t o  provide some warmth. The usable consumable 
s ta tus  a t  IM jet t ison (141:30 GET) was: 
(1) EPS-189.6 A-H ( l ifet ime t o  146:OO GET) 
(2) H20 - 28.2 lbs  (lifetime t o  147:06 GET) 
(3) O2 - 28.5 lbs  (lifetime t o  265330 GET) 
(4) LiOH - 37 hrs  (IM/PLSS cartridges) 
11. SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE 
A. - The ECS performed nominally throughout the mission. The 
i n i t i a l  high water usage ra tes  were a t t r ibutable  t o  the cooling of the 
ent i re  s t ructural  mass i n  contact with the  glycol loop as  well as  the 
normally powered equipment. Approximately 6 hours were required fo r  
t h i s  s t ructural  cmling,  a f t e r  which only the online equipment plus 
metaRolic and LiOH-C02 reaction heat contributed t o  water usage. The 
usage r a t e  decayed from an i n i t i a l  high of 7.7 lbs/hr i n  a powered up 
configuration t o  2.5 - 2.8 lbs/hr i n  a powered down configuration (12.5 
amps). -411 dripking water was taken i n i t i a l l y  from the C%. The IM 
ascent tanks were selected a t  128:09 GET since the Hz0 AP measurement 
was becoming e r r a t i c  ( ~ e s c e n t  O2 quantity was 5.5$), and we wanted t o  
use some remaining descent H20 fo r  crew consumption. 
The primary LiOH cartridge was used u n t i l  the C02 PP level  reached 
14.9 mmHg (approximately 85:25 GET) a t  which point the secondary (PTSS- 
type) cartridge was selected. While on these I M  cartridges, the CDP.'s 
hsses were canfigured with the return (red) conneci;sr capped and the 
exhaust (blue) connector taped i n  the tuilnel so as t o  exhaust i n t ~  the 
(34. During t h i s  time, a procedure was developed and uplinked t o  the crew 
f a r  cc~nstruction 3f an adapter t a  use CSM cartridges with the IM s u i t  
fan. The CSM cartridges were selected when the 0 2  PP resched 7.5 m& 
(about 34:5: GET) and the secondary cartridge was removed. See 
enc l~su re  1 for  adapter cxs t ruc t i on  and subsequent h ~ s e  location. The 
l z c a t i m  3f these c a r t r i d ~ z s  in  r e l a t i ~ n  t o  the t o t a l  s u i t  loop flow was 
the same as a I M  cartridge. Tm 3ther CSM cartridges were added about 
20 hours l a t e r  i n  ser ies  w i t h  the or iginal  c3nstructi3n and lasted u n t i l  
the end of the mission. 
Average oxygen uswe  r a t e  remained a t  about 0.23 lbs/hr throughout 
the mission. 
There were a few small i r regu la r i t i e s  noted during the mission: 
(1) 58:30 - 60:04 GET and 64.:00 - 65:20 GET - During these 
periods the ascent #2 O2 tank was used fo r  the 02 supply since the 
shutoff valve allowed significant  l e u a g e  (0.15 lb/hr with a A P  of 
53 p s i  and a manifold pressure of 957 psia)  in to  the tank. This was 
driving the pressure abave the o f f i c i a l  redline value (875 psia) 
although that  was l a t e r  confirmed by SPAN t o  be invalid under the exist-  
ing conditions. After f i n a l  shutoff of the ascent #2 02 valve, the 
pressure rose to  953 psia  (descent regulator pressure) and stabilized. 
(2) 94:00 GET - The I M  descent O2 tank quantity decayed for  
7.5 minutes a t  a ra te  of about 8.5 lbs/hr. Associated with t h i s  was 
the reconfiguration of the IN s u i t  loop a f t e r  ins ta l la t ion ~f the CSM 
cartridge adapter. The most l ikely  cause is that  the pressure drop 
across these car-ridges caused a decrease i n  sensed pressure t o  the 
demand regulators which caused thein t o  cycle open u n t i l  the sensed 
pressure returned t o  4.74 psia.  The cabin pressure rose t o  4.94 and 
remained there, further substantiating t h i s  hypothesis. 
(3)  94:52 GET - An abnormal fan noise was reported by the crew. 
They indicated they f i r s t  n ~ t e d  it i n  connection with Ins ta l la t ion of 
the CSM LiOH cartridges. This was most l ikely  c ~ u s e d  by the increased 
loop resistance.  No significant  degradation i n  water sepa-ator perfarm- 
ance was noted although the rpn did decay sli.ght'iy. 
(4) 118:33 GMI - Tlle SUIT IDOP RELIEF valve cycled t o  AUTO 
positian. When queried, the crew reported that  one of the ECS hoses 
had inadvertently dislodged the valve. This occurred several times 
l a t e r  and the valve was returned t o  CLOSE each time. 
(5) 118:35 GET - Water Separator speed decayed t o  1900 and theil 
rose t o  i t s  norrinalvalue. A possible explanation i s  t h ~ . t  he WATER SEP 
SEL valve handle was inadvertently moved from the prelauncl~ PULL:SEP 2 
t o  the FUSHrSEP 1 pasit ion.  No other anomalies of t h i s  type were 
observed . 
B. EFS - The EFS perfarmed nominally altliough two descent ba t t e r i es  
(3 and 4) tended t o  take the rllajority of the load since the cross t ies  
were opened between 60:34 and 63:40 GET and between 78:16 and &:00 GET, 
and there was a 4: 1 C~R/IMP bus power s p l i t  u n t i l  82: 30 GET. After 
82:30 GET, sharing was noninal u n t i l  the Ascent battery(s)  were onllne. 
I n i t i a l  p~wer  levels  of 28 - 50 amps were maintained u n t i l  about 83:3(1 GET. 
when a 12.5 amp average was reached. 
A BATTERY MALFUNCTION indication appeared on descent bat tery  2 a t  
99:51 GET. It appeared t o  be caused by a bat tery  c e l l  overtemperature 
or  a temperatvre switch instrumentation problem. A l l  voltages and 
currents were normal but the battery was disconr,ected t o  allow cooling 
even though no changes o r  ef fects  on the  glycoltem2erature were noted. 
The baCtery open c i r cu i t  voltage returned t o  31.9 vol ts  10 minutes a f t e r  
it was disconnected, which i s  nominal battery performance. The bat tery  
was reco1;nected a f t e r  one how and a.1 overtemperature sensor f a i l u r e  was 
.tssmed. This f a i l u r e  could have be9n caused by e i the r  an actual  bi- 
metal l ic  switch fa i lu re  o r  water vapor condensing i n  the battery and 
causing a low resistance path between the wires leading t o  the switch. 
This l a t t e r  is  possible due t o  the very low temperatiires a t  which the 
bat ter ies  were operating. This indication l a t e r  becme e r r a t i c  causing 
several master alarms. 
A t  112:05 GET the IH power was connected to  the CSH w i t h  battery 6 
onlire and the ASC ECA CONT circuit  breakers open. The CSM battery 
charging began and drew about 8 amps. From t h i s  time un t i l  f u l l  switch- 
over t o  CS# internal power (lb:00 GET), the IH was connected t o  the CSM 
M A I N  BZLS B although power vas not used continually. 
Battery 6 w a s  bmught online a t  1.11: 57 GGT and Bat 5 at 133:30 GET. 
Battery 3 was discannected a t  139:l6 GET vi th 394 amp-hours expended 
since it was cantributing less than 1.0 amps. Had the mission progressed 
further and tke other batteries reached the same state  sf charge, Bat 3 
wauld have resumed its share 3f the load u n t i l  depletLn. 
C. I N S ~ T P ! I O K / P Y I ~ O  - These systems performed nami?lally except: 
(1) G R ~ ~ X ,  RCS T B  AIU - ! h e  pressure switch indicated the 
thruster was an froin the i n i t i a l  RCS f i re  and remained failed throughout 
the mission. 
(2j -2U, BILT 2 MAL - 'Ihe bi-metallic overtemperature switch 
fcdled clased at 99:51. The switch became intermittent causing several 
master alarms atui resulted in the opening of the onbomii MASTER ALdM 
circuit breaker un t i l  the l a t t e r  part of the missicn. 
(3) GWb01~ and GIDb2V, CAI, 85$ and CAL ls, respectively, 
were observed t3 sh i f t  up one FCM count prelaunck and thmughout the 
mission. The pmblem was apparently n the c a l i b r a t i ~ n  circuit  since 
fia other pxra;teters vere apgerently sffected. 
C&W AIR - 
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PRELAUNCH 
A l l  prelaunch IM CON'I'ROL data w a s  nominal. The SHe pressure rise rate 
was approximately 8 psi /hr  which gave a T-10 minute (time at which IM 
data w a s  ended) readout of  356 psia. 
rn ENTRY 
( 5 0 : ~  - 55: 50 GE~!) 
Due t o  the  e r r a t i c  behavior noticed i n  S9e loading d u r i r i  CDM!, it vas  
decided t o  obtain an ontoard readout of SEe pressure duricg IN entr;. 
A number of a l ternat ives  were agreed upon depending upon the  value of 
t n i s  readout: ( I )  If t h e  SHe precsure w a s  less than 770 ps ia  and 
greater  than 660 psia  (nominal -715 psia) ,  no fur ther  ac t ion would be 
required. (2) If the  SHe pressure w a s  higher than 770 psia  but less 
than 800 psia, a second onkoard readout wodd te requested two to three 
hours later t o  ensure t h a t  an excessively high rise rate did not exis t .  
(3)  If the pressure w a s  greater  than 800 psia, 'IF! would be turned on 
periodical ly over the  next few hours allowing the  ground t o  compute an 
accurate rise rate and extrapolate the  Sf! pressure to PDI igni t ion  at  
103 hr. GE2. (4) I f  the predicted rise rate a t  PDI w a s  equal t o  o r  
greater  than 1800 psia,  it w a s  proposed th6t  a shor t  duration DPS burn 
( 5  sec) be performed with a subsequent vent of the SHe tank. 
To encompass these procedures, the time f o r  IM entry  %as moved forward 
t o  55:00 GFT such t h a t  the  crew s leep period would not be disturbed. 
The crew, however, offered t o  en te r  the  IM ear ly  and perform the  SHe 
readout as w e l l  as the  normal IM entry  procedures. The crew entered the 
IM shor t ly  a f t e r  54:00 GFT and immediately powered up t h e  onboard 
readout of SHe pressure per the procedure sent  up from the ground. The 
onboard readout w a s  cycling between 710 and 720 psia  corresponding to a 
nominal rise rate of 6.5 psia/hr from launch (pre-launch was approximately 
6 psi/hr).  After the SHe readout, the crew continued with the  remaider  
of the  IM entry procedures. 
CSM ANOMALY 
(55:50 - 57: 57 GET) 
&mediately following the  CSM problem and the resul tant  degradation 
of CSM e l e c t r i c a l  power, the IM heater current  became s t a t i c  at  1.3 
amps. Shortly thereafter ,  the current  went to zero when the  CMmain 
Euss B l o s t  complete power. A t  this time, it vas decided t h a t  t o t a l  I24 
console manninz w a s  required. The I S  w a s  without heater current  f o r  
the next hour and one-half. Current was restored v ia  IM power up at 
57: 37 GFT when tine crew re-entered the I&¶ as a contingency backup to 
t h e i r  return t o  e a r t h  and l i fe  support systems. 
IM POWER UP 
(57:57 - 61:OO GET) 
U.1 TM w a s  received at  57:5'i GET wKth a l l  systems and temperatures 
nominal. The crew, using a 2 hour contingency checkl is t  began powering 
up those eptcme which w e r e  deemd of highest pr ior i ty .  Upon powering 
up the II;C and IMU, they performed a successi'ul docked alignment with 
t h e  CSM. Next, the  crew attempted t o  assume a t t i t u d e  control,  however, 
the ATCA-TGNS C/B had not been closed. Upon closing t h i s  C/B, FGNS 
a t t i t u d e  control  k e c e  avai la t le .  ~ u c -  minutes later, at  58:35 GGT 
an RCS TCP switch (A~u) fa i l ed  closed and remained closed throughout 
the mission. This w a s  not an unexpec+ed fa i lure ,  as there had been 
similar  f a i lu res  on a l l  I&! missions t o  date. The only e f f e c t  of t h i s  
f a i lu re  w a s  t o  compromise the RCS CW failed-off indicat ion for  that 
jet. 
Planning a t  t h i s  point centered on a re turn  t o  ea r th  prof i le  using the  
U4 DPS + RCS. To accomplish t h i s  objective, a DPS burn of 40 f t / sec  
was scheduled a t  61: 30 I;ET a s  MCC-3. This would place the  vehicles on 
a free-return t r a jec to ry  with a landing time of lE ,hours GGT. 
MCC-3 - DPS 1 
(61:oo - 6 2 : ~  GET) 
Once the  plan fo r  perfomling. MCC-3 with the DPS had been established, 
the remainder of the  2 hour co~t ingency checklist  was completed. This 
included pressurizing the DPS and trimning the  GDA's. 
A t  61:14 GET, the DPS burn checklist  using PGNS guidance was completed. 
The remaining 15 minutes was used by t h e  crew i n  maneuvering t o  the 
burn a t t i t u d e  (via the  TTCA) and performing f i n a l  checkout procedums. 
The 40 f t /sec burn a t  61:29:48 was preceded by 10 seconds of ullage. 
The th rus t  p ro f i l e  w a s  5 seconds at  12.6 percent and 27 sec at  40 
percent which repuired manual t h r o t t l i n g  by the crew. The burn was 
nominal except f o r  the  large amount of ve r t i ca l  (+ - X) jet f i r i n g s  
throughout the burn. The reason f o r  these f ' irings w a s  due t o  ~ i o t  
disabling the  U-V j e t s  via an extended verb ( ~ 6 5 )  cal led  out i n  the 
checklist .  Following the  burn, I24 propellant consumables were: DPS 
Av available - 1973 ft /sec . RCS quantlty 86 percent; 73 percent useable 
(average of A and B systems). 
POST MCC-3 TLC 
(G:OO - 78:00 GET) 
Following MCC-3, the  IN was p a r t i a l l y  powered down i n  an attempt t o  
conserve e l e c t r i c a l  energy and w a t e r .  The IMU and LGC were l e f t  i n  
the  operate mode f o r  FTC a t t i t u d e  control  and zs a reference f o r  the  
next DPS burn; R+2. Since t h i s  power down included the  disabling of 
the DSKY caution l igh t s ,  a revision w a s  sent  t o  the crew which had them 
close one ~ / D o c K / C O M P N T  C/B. 
A manual FTC mde was agreed upon which had the  crew ro ta te  i n  yaw by 
90' every hour and maintain e t t i t u d e  hold the remainder of the  time. 
However, the  LGC IMP logic i n  the docked mode uses a + 1.4' deadband 
- 
and i n  t h i s  mode RCS usage w a s  very high, approximately 1 percent per  
hour. Based on simulation runs, a procedure w a s  passed the  crew 
which, v ia  a software load, the docked deadband was increased t o  + 5'. 
- 
I n  addition, a l l  +X j e t s  (downward f i r i n g )  were disabled since the  plume 
def lec tors  were nul l i fy ing t h e i r  effect ive th rus t  a l so  causing increased 
RCS usage. 
A t  73 hrs.  GGT, the RR antenna w a s  designated automatically t o  the Am 
posi t icn  (283O, 0') f o r  the  purposes of a P52 platform re-alignment. 
However, it was determined t h a t  with a successful sun check, the  P52 
alignment would not be necessary. A t  73:30, the crew maneuvered t o  
the desired a t t i tude  and completed a successful sun check. A t  74:30, 
the  crew maneuvered t o  the  burn a t t i t u d e  f o r  FC+2 t o  be performed a t  
approximately 73328. The PC+2 t o  be performed by the  DPS would shorten 
the landing time from 155 GET t o  lk GET. 
A revised 2 hour ac t ivat ior  checklist  was passed t o  the crew a t  75:30 
GFT, which included a rezommenda-tiion t h a t  the DPS 110. 1 Reg SCV be 
closed 10 seconds p r io r  t o  termination of the impending DPS burn. This 
procedure was requested t o  prevent freezing of the f u e l  ( i n  the  f u e l  
t o  helium heat exchanger) i n  tine event of a regulator  lock-up a t  shut- 
down due t o  the large ullage volume. 
I n  addition, a number of mission ru les  w e r e  passed t o  the  crew which 
concerned t h e  PC+2 DPS burn. These ru les  w e r e  kased on t i g h t  limits 
(i.e. ,  shutdown the  lu rn  f o r  any apparent anoualies) since the vehicles 
were already on a free-return trajectory.  Those mission rules were: 
Shutdown the 3PS for: 
1. Thrust L 77 percent (onboard) 
2. m i n e  i n l e t s  ~ 1 6 0  ps ia  (onboard) 
3. AP between f u  and ox irdets >25 psia  (ground ca l lou t  only) 
4. Rates 710°/sec and/or a t t i t u d e  e r r o r s  710' 
5. LGC warning, GDA warning o r  CES DC Fail 
6 .  ISS warning with a program alarm 
I n  addition, it w a s  agreed, t h a t  if a premature shutdown occurred, the  
engine would be reignited i f  shutdown w a s  not due to  any of the reasons 
stated above. 
A t  LOS, a s  the IM went tehind the  moon, RCS Quantity was 70 percent with 
57 percent usable (average of systems A and B). 
PC+2 - DPS 2 
(78:00 - 79:30 GEEC) 
Hi-bit r a t e  data was received from the IM a t  78:00 GGT as the crew 
performd the steps i n  t h e  revised checklist .  The power up was nominal 
and the  burn was s e t  up i n  the  auto PGNS ( ~ 4 0 )  mode. The crew maneuvered 
the IM t o  the f i n d  burn a t t i t u d e  a t  79:17 GGP and a "GO" was given fo r  
the burn. TIC occurred a t  79:27: 38 GET with 12.6 percent th rus t  f o r  
5 sec, 40 percent fo r  2 1  seconds and 235 sec a t  maximum thrus t ,  which 
the crew backed up manually. A t  ignit ion,  the r o l l  GDA drove t o  
approximately - 2', a d e l t a  of. - 1.9 from i t s  pre-ignition value. 
This event was unexpected since the ground f e l t  t h a t  t h e  G M  se t t ings  
a t  the end of MCC-3 with i t s  40 percent th rus t  compliance would 
provide the  optimum GDA alignment. The maximum e r r o r  seen during 
0 0 the  tu rn  w a s  7 i n  the  r o l l  ax i s  with rates never exceeding 1 /set. 
The descent NO. 1 REG SOV was closed on t i m e  and the engine went 
in to  a blowdown mode or' operation f o r  the  last few seconds of the  
851 f t / sec  burn. 
Consumalles a t  the  end of DPS-2 were: 
DPS AV capabil i ty - 1190 ft /sec (nominal) ; 834 f t / sec  (blowdown). 
RCS quanity - 63 percent to ta l ;  50 percent usable (average of A and B 
systems). 
POST PC+2 TEC 
(79:30 - 104:OO GET) 
The LM was p a r t i a l l y  powered down except f o r  the ENS and RCS systems 
following the PC+2 DPS burn. These systems were l e f t  enabled i n  an 
attempt t o  es tabl ish  an automatic PTC. The procedure used was one 
designed t o  obtain an optimum FTC k i t h  a ~inimum of RCS usage. The 
objective of t h i s  procedure w a s  to use PCNS minimum impulse (small 
RCS usage) t o  obtain the  PrC at t i tude .  iIaving obtained the a t t i t u d e  
with a small ra te ,  a 15  minute l i m i t  cycle within the a t t i t u d e  dead- 
band would ensure a r a t e  small enough t o  ensure a good FTC. However, 
the  procedure proved t o  be very time consuming for two reasons. F i r s t ,  
the  minimum impulse mode i n  the  docked configuration was very slow 
due t o  the  small moment arm used i n  the pi tch and r o l l  axes. Second, 
compounding the  problem was the cross-coupling i n  the FDAI due t o  the 
large yaw angle (outer gimbal). When the  crew attempted t o  ro l l ,  the  
commands would cross-couple in to  pitch. Once recognizing the  problem, 
the crew zeroed the yaw angle and attempted t o  go t o  a t t i tude  i n  the 
pi tch =d r o l l  axes. Via t h i s  uethod, a gross PTC a t t i t u d e  was reached 
and ETC was begun. With FTC established, the LGC and IMU were powered 
down t o  conserve consumables. The t o t a l  power down configuration l e f t  
heater current on the  IMU only. The AGS and RCS heaters were turned 
o f f .  The a t t i tude  Direct Control CB, however, was l e f t  i n  t o  provide 
RCS capabil i ty v ia  the secondary co i l s .  
During t h i s  phase, planning began f o r  a 7.9 f t / sec  MCC-5 maneuver 
scheduled fo r  103:30 GET. The decision was made t o  perform t h i s  
maneuver with the DPS a t  12.6 percent thrus t  since an RCS burn of 
t h i s  magnitude would exceed the impingement constraint  on the  RCS 
plume deflectors (40 secs).  It was further  decided t o  do the  burn 
with the GDA's disabled and with an AGS body ax i s  reference using 
the TTCA t o  control  a t t i t u d e  i n  p i tch  and r o l l .  Calculations were 
made t o  determine the  a f fec t s  of GDA m i s t r i m  since the previous DPS 
burn had established engine compliance a t  FTP and MCC-5 was planned 
f o r  12.6 percent. The calculat ions revealed very low angular accelere- 
t i o n  could be expected, therefore the  decision t o  leave the GDA's 
disabled durir!g MCC-5 was upheld. The burn was planned i n  blowdown 
since the crew did not have time t o  open an3 close DSC REG 1 during 
the  short burn (14 secs). 
Also, during the  pre-burn planning, a discrepancy arose between FIDO 
and CONTROL over the required burn time fo r  a 7.9 f t / sec  burn. This 
was resolved with the use of the  high-speed analog char t  recorder 
which indicated t h a t  engine buildup (from 0 t o  12.6 percent thrus t )  
was slower than CONTROL had thought it $0 be. Once t h i s  was resolved, 
it was agree5 t h a t  the  crew would shut the burn down on t i m e ,  one 
second e a r l i e r  than the calculated burn time so- t o  prevent tm 
overbunl. Shutting down ea r ly  would leave the  crew with a +X residual  
which would not violate impingement constraints.  An overburn with a 
resul tant  -X t r i m  could have exceeded u . . A ~  15 sec impingement constraint  
on the  CSM. 
The SHe pressure now began t o  show the a f fec t s  of PC+2 (DPS 2).  The 
coast r i s e  r a t e  calculated between MCC-3 (DPS 1) and F€!+2 (DPS 2) had 
been 10 psi/hr.  Now, a f t e r  R+2 (DPS 2) the SHe was exhibit ing an 
average r i s e  r a t e  of 33 psi/hr.  With t h i s  rise r a t e  the  lower l i m i t  
on the SHe burst  d isc  (1881 p s i )  was predicted t o  be reached a t  
approximately 107 h r s .  GET. According t o  SPAN, the  h i s t o r y  of bu r s t  
d i s c s  of t he  same l o t  ruptured i n  test at pressures  of 1900 + 20 psia .  
- 
A t  t h i s  time, work was begun on a procedure t o  e s t a b l i s h  FCC a f t e r  
MCC-5 u t i l i z i n g  the AGS. The question addressed was whether t he  burn 
and subsequent PTC mode should be accomplished before o r  a f t e r  t h e  
predicted time of  SHe bur s t  d i sc  rupture.  It was feared t h a t  t h e  SHe 
vent would perturb t h e  PTC. SPAN, however, indicated t h a t  no impulsive 
AV would he imparted through the  t h r u s t  n u l l i f i e d  SHe vent.  Therefore, 
it was decided t o  perform MCC-5 on schedule. 
There was a l so  some concern over the  cool  down r a t e  of t he  descent 
stage with r e su l t an t  f reezing of LM descent water. To obta in  some 
idea of the  cool  down ra t e ,  the  crew was requested t o  obta in  DPS f u e l  
and oxid izer  temperature readouts every f i v e  hours. These readouts 
indicated a steady temperature of 65' + 2' Gver a twenty-three hour 
- 
period. From these  readouts,  SPAN concluded t h a t  t he re  was nc, danger 
i n  f reez ing  descent water. 
MCC-5 - DPS 3 
(104:00 t o  106:00 GET) 
LM power-up f o r  MCC-5 was begun at  104:36 using a n  updated 30-minute 
contingency checkl i s t .  Af te r  t he  RCS quads ha? reached 120°F', t h e  
crew stopped the  F T C  mode. The AGS was then powered up with t h e  ASA 
temperature ve r i f i ed  t o  be a t  7 0 ' ~  before going t o  AGS operate.  Five 
minutes was allowed f o r  gyro spin-up before t h e  AGS wzs body-axis 
aligned. The crew then maneuvered t o  burii a t t i t u d e  and performed 
another AGS body a x i s  a l i g n  a t  105 : l l  GET. The ground then advised 
the crew t h a t  they  could s t a r t  t he  t u r n  ear ly .  DPS i g n i t i o n  occurred 
a t  105:18:32 GET. The burn was nominal with the  crew having no t rouble  
keeping e r r o r s  and r a t e s  nulled. The 7.9 f t / s ec  burn was performed 
a t  12.6 percent t h r o t t l e  and l a s t e d  13.8 seconds (from s t r i p  char t ) .  
The crew then  nul led the  +X r e s idua l  t o  t h e  desired AV l e s s  t h e  
uncompensated AGS accelerometer b i a s  noted p r i o r  t o  t he  burn 
(- .2 f t / s ec ) .  
Following the burn, the crew maneuvered t o  FTC a t t i t u d e  via the  TTCA 
i n  AGS PLSD and nulled r a t e s  i n  p i tch  and r o l i .  Once the  ra tes  were 
nulled ( < .05O/sec), the crew applied 12 pulses i n  yaw t o  es tab l i sh  
ITC. After establishing FTC, the  crew went t o  l o  b i t  r a t e  TM. 
However, the ground's l a s t  look a t  a t t i t u d e  data on high b i t  r a t e  did 
not agree with the desired a t t i tude  and the crew was asked t o  go back 
t o  high b i t  r a t e  data. A t  t h i s  time, it became apparent t h a t  the  RTCC 
was incorrect ly processing .ZGS body angles. The ground then disre-  
garded the improper readout and observed FTC i n  the  FDA1 reference 
system t o  be established. IEI po-der down was in i t i a t ed .  RCS 
remaining a f t e r  MCC-5 and FTC inf i ia te  was 55.5 percent t o t a l ;  k 
percent usable (average of A and B systems). 
POST MCC-5 - TEC 
(106:oo - 1 3 3 0 0  GET) 
After completion of MCC-5 and subsequent IM power-down a t  106:02 GET, 
emphasis was placed on a contingency method of re l ieving the  SHe tank 
pressure i n  the  event the burst  disc f a i l e ?  t o  operate. The t i m e  of 
implementing t h i s  procedure was based on the  tank f r a c t ~ w e  mechanics 
pressure/temperature limit, 2200 psia, and the transducer upper l i m i t  
of 2000 psia. The pressure selected fo r  implementing the  contingency 
vent procedure was 2000 psia.  The method of accomplishing t h i s  vent 
operation was discussed a t  -eat length by SPAN and CONTROL personnel. 
I n  order t o  maintain DPS burn capabil i ty,  SPAN recommended a multi- 
s tep  vent t o  prevent freezing the f u e l  i n  the fuel/helium heat 
exchmger. Freezing of the  f u e l  would prevent fur ther  DPS burns. 
SPA11 -maintained t h a t  the vent would have t o  be accomplished i n  a 
posit ive "g" envirollment. This point was contested by CONTROL as any 
acceleration could seriously a f fec t  the  trajectory.  The reason f o r  
maintaining the posi t ive "g" acceleration, according t o  SPAN, was t h a t  
i n  one ground test, a vent valve was closed by a high AP across the  
valve and could net be reopened. 
I n  order t o  preclude perturbation of the t ra jec tory ,  a l t e ra t ion  of 
FTC, and t o  conserve consumables, CONTROL proposed a single vent 
procedure using only the  f u e l  *rent valve without pos i t i ve  accelera-  
t i on .  I n  case the  DPS vent d id  not succeed with the  f u e l  vent valve, 
a pos i t ive  acce lera t ion  could be s e t  up and the  vent completed using 
the  oxid izer  vent vr l ve  . 
!The S5.e bur s t  d i sc  ruptured a t  approximately 108:54, vent ing the  
remaining 27.5 pounds of helium overboard. The pressure a t  t i m e  of 
d i sc  rupture was approximately 1940 ps ia ,  which was above t h e  
predicted rupture range. The venting required P.pproximately 4 minutes 
t o  vent t o  helow 100 ps ia .  A t o t a l  of 10.5 minutes was reqcired t o  
vent t o  zero.'  The venting imparted a propulsive force t o  t he  vehicle  
such t h a t  t he  FTC yaw (0 .3~ / sec )  was stopped, reversed, and a yaw 
r a t e  s e t  up such t h a t  t he  crew reported two revolut ions of  t he  space- 
c r a f t  occurred i n  3 minutes, 50 seconds. This was an unexpected 
event a s  t h e  SHe overboard vent i s  t h r u s t  nu l l i f i ed ,  and SPAN s t a t ed  
t h a t  the  vent would impart l e s s  than  0.003 f t / s e c  ve loc i ty  t c  the  
vehicle.  
A t  129:50 GFT, the  MCC-7 and en t ry  sequence check l i s t s  were f ina l ized ,  
read up t o  t h e  crew, and were awaiting ac t iva t ion  f o r  EI-6 hours 
(approximately 136: 30 GET). A t  t h i s  t ime ,  t h e  MCC-7 check l i s t s  
provided f o r  e i t h e r  a DFS o r  RCS burn, depending on the  AV required. 
An RCS burn was decided at 132:32 GET when the  AV was ca lcu la ted  t o  
be 2.8 f t / sec .  
MCC-7 - RCS 1 
(133:00 - 137:hO GET! 
C ~ r i n g  a discussion with thc  crew a t  133:19 GET, t he  crew reported 
t h a t  the  FTC mode had degraded considerably such thaf  t he  sun was 
behind the  engine b e l l  and no sun ever  came i n  the  windows. Because 
of t h i s ,  they  were very cold. Therefore, t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  of getting 
out  of PTC e a r l y  and powering up was discussed so the  crew could 
warm up. CONTROL had no r e a s ~ n  not t o  power up e a r l y  as long as 
su f f i c i en t  power and water was ava i lab le .  Power-up was begun a t  
133:24 GET (about 3 hours ea r ly ) .  
Firs t  effects of the power-up vere noted i n  the RCS QUAD and ASA 
temperatures beginning t o  rise. The IX;C was powered up and IMU 
turn-on vas complete at 133:38 GEZ. A t  133:45, the RCS QUAD 
t e m p e r a t a s  vere all above 120' and a 'GO" w a s  given fo r  the crev 
to  stop PLIC. Prior to nulling the FTC rates, RCS system A and B both 
indicated E5 percent total quantity remaining. Tbe FTC rates were 
nuiled a t  &33:49. By 133:57, the ASA was up to operating tempera- 
tare (120') and a "GO" *= given the crev to start AGS activation. 
PC;IYE was init ial ized at 134:16 and the PIPA bias looked good. After 
some discussion, it w a s  decided to do a P52 i n  the IK and a docked 
alignment for the CSM, rather t h n  doing the P52 for the CSH minR 
the IH to maneuver t o  the desired attitudes. 
A t  134:37 the optioa 1 was started. Marks vere taken on the sun 
and moon. -2 resulted i n  large torquing 6ngles  vhich vere 
torqued out a t  135:04:35. Tht: crev reported a good IMJ s l igment  at 
135:16. A t  t h i s  time all m u k i n g  was along the l i ne  of perfoming 
the KC-7 b u m  under PQJS control in ~ 4 1 .  This seemed reasonable 
since the KXS was powered up and aligned; however, this thkk icg  
was not reflected i n  the procedure for  the burr vhich had been 
passed up t o  the  crev. The pmcedure the cnew had, called fo r  the 
burn tc be i n  AGS using T l U  for  a t t i tude control and the PGNS i n  a 
monitor mode. The c z v  also expressed a desire to  use PQJS f o r  the 
burn vhich we concurred vith. The crev was asked to  perform an 
AGS to FGNS alignment so the AGS would have the best possib1e ali&n- 
ment i n  the  event it had to  be used fo r  the maneuver. The aligmwnt 
was perr'omd a t  137:06. The crev maneuvered the vehicle t o  mughly 
the WC-7 burn att i tude i n  PGNS minimum impulse and then wen3 to AIITO 
to  perform the f i na l  auto maneuver t o  the burn att i tude.  This resulted 
i n  an excessive use of RCS propellant so the crev was requested to go 
back t o  the minimum impulse mode which they did. For an unexplained 
reason the PGNS error needles w e r e  not zeroed at the  burn att i tude,  
causing some concern over the validity of the FGNS. A t  137:15 a 
recomiendation was made t o  use the AGS for  the MCC-7 burn since It 
was already reflected i n  the crew's checklist  and they had success- 
fu l ly  used it before. The crew selected AGS, went t o  pulse and then 
maneuvered t o  the burn a t t i tude  via the 'll'CA a t  137:26. A t  137:39:48 
the MCC-7 burn was  performed using the  +X TRANS O/R button. The AV 
was + 3.1 fps. RCS quantity remaining a f t e r  MCC-7 was 40 percent 
t o t a l ;  27 percent usable (average of A and B systems). 
Immediately a f t e r  the  MCC-7 burn, the crew s ta r t ed  the  maneuver t o  
t h e  service module je t t i son a t t i tude .  This maneuver was accomplished 
using AGS pulse mode via the 'ITCA. A t  137:57, the je t t i son a t t i t u d e  
was achieved =d ENS minimum impulse was selected. A t  137: 58, the 
comma~d module RCS hot f ire w a s  performed s ~ ~ c c e s s f u l l y  and then the 
AGS pulse mode was again eo1eci;ed at 139:01. The service module 
je t t i son maneuver s t a r t ed  at  138:02 using the +X TRANS O/R button f o r  
+ 0.5 fps. The service nodule w a s  then jettisoned and the !PI'CA w a s  
used t o  command a -X t rans la t ion  of -0.5 fps. Immediately, the crew 
pitched t o  visually ecquire the service module f o r  photography. The 
AGS Attitude Control switches w e r e  placed to MODE CONTROL and deadband 
maximum for  maintaining t h e  a t t i t u d e  f o r  picture taking. A l l  a t t i t u d e  
naneuvers a f t e r  service module je t t i son were performed with the ACA 
since the 'ITCA would not produce the desired e f f e c t s  now t h a t  the 
service module was gone. An RCS redline t o  terminate photo takiag was 
previously established a t  25 percent which was not approached during 
the picture tsking. The photo a c t i v i t y  w a s  terminated at 138: 1 4  and 
a maneuver back t o  the service module je t t i son a t t i t u d e  w a s  s tarted.  
A t  138:19, the  j e t t i son  a t t i tude  was achieved. A t  t h i s  ti=, the 
systems i n  the command module were s t a r t i n g  to  be pow3red up. I'he 
IN DAP was loaded t o  r e f l e c t  a f i c t i c i o u s  CM weight of 9050 pounds 
a t  138: 20. MIT simulations showed t h i s  t o  bk the  optimum DAP load 
f o r  the IM/CM configuration. A t  138: 52, a PGNS minimum impulse was 
selected f o r  maneuvers to perform the CM IMU alignment check. The 
DAP had been loaded to  use RCS system B when i n  the  minimum impulse 
mode and consequently mre RCS system B propellant w a s  being used 
than expected. A t  140: 33, PGNS r a t e  co-d a t t i t u d e  hold was 
selected which slowed the usage i n  RCS system B. A t  140:39, PGNS 
minimum impulse was again selec Led. 
A t  140: 47, the crew was advised to expect a RCS Cartioz l i g h t  since 
the RCS syskm B helium pressure w a s  approaching the l i m i t  of 1700 
psi .  
A t  140: 50, ENS r a t e  command a t t i t u d e  hold was again selected. The 
RCS Caution l i g h t  was reported by the  crew a t  140 :p .  The crew 
reported an excellent  CM IMU a l i g m n t  at  140:53 and immediately 
s tar ted  the  a t t i tude  maneuver t o  the  IM j e t t i son  a t t i tude .  A t  
140:56, AGS pulse mode was selected aw then r igh t  back to PGNS 
minimum impulse at  1b:57. The crew was r e q ~ e s t e d  to change the  DAP 
load to 30021 at  141:00 t o  start using RCS syst.2m A f o r  the  minimum 
impulse f i r ings .  A t  the  time the DIP w a s  changed there was appmxi- 
mately 10 percent d e l t a  between RCS system A and B propellant 
quanti t ies .  The IN j e t t i son  a t t i t u d e  w a s  reached at  141: 02 and at  
141:03 AGS, a t t i t u d e  hold, wide deadband w a s  selected. The a t t i t u d e  
w a s  off  by approximately 100 degrees i n  roll. The desired a t t i t u d e  
was 135 degrees but the ac tual  w a s  235 degrees. J e t t i s o n  occurred 
a t  t h i s  a t t i tude .  
A t  141:18 an e a r l y  go f o r  IN j e t t i son  was passed up t o  the  crev. A t  
141: 30, IM je t t i son occurred. The separation w a s  very s t a b l e  and the 
sensed velocity w a s  X axis  -0.75 f p s  and Y ax i s  -0.25 fps. The RCS 
quanti t ies  remaining at je t t i son w e r e  RCS system A 31 percent and RCS 
system B 21 percent f o r  an average tot-?l of 26 percent (13 percent 
usable). The IN was very stable within the AGS 5 degree deadband 
u n t i l  f i n a l  IX)S at  lk: 38. 


TV was planned during Maals R- 1 pass. A t  1 : 35: 39 GET the USE 
mode reset  command was transm4tted to tenninste the DSE dump, and 
allow the RT to be received on the FM downlink. k e n  the TU was 
not received at HCC,KLLA and Houston TV were queried about a 
possible MSFN problem. HILB subsequently reported tha t  the FH 
downlink was not being dounlinked from the CSM. The crev confirmsd 
the S-band mode switch uas i n  the TV ,psition, and then selected 
transmit on the TV camera. The 'N picture was received shortly 
af ter  the !lV camera transmit mode was selected. 
The erroneous report from MII$ indicated that the FM carr ier  was 
not on, when i n  fact,  it was only the video portion of the FM 
modulation that was missing. 
2. Madrid Uplink Anomalg 
During the TLC phase, omni antenna switching is  acc~mplished v ia  
INCO c o d s .  To provide MCC the most telemetry data during each 
PTC revolution, the antenna switching command is  executed just 
before WE% uplink threshold is reached; i.e., just  before tw-ray 
lock is lost .  A t  a GEl! of 47:00:00 with MAD uplinking, the omni 
command was not received on the first connnand attempt. Before a 
second attempt could be executed, HBD had turned off the uplink 
c o d  subcarrier (76 H~z) to attempt reacquisition. It uas 
necessary t o  change MAD t o  a Mode 3 (command only) uplink t o  gain 
enough ~ i i n k  margin to accoIllplish the omni switch. This dropping 
of the uplink subcarrier occurred on three separate occasions. In 
previous missions during the Pn: coast phase, the ISEN sites have 
always assisted INCO i n  his omni witching by leaving the command 
uplink subcarrier on a f t e r  tw-way lock i s  lost .  If two-way lock 
is los t ,  t h i s  delay in turning off the command uplink has, in most 
cases, allowed INCO another try or  tw at getting h i s  c o d  i n b  
the spacecraft. INCO requested NEWIRK to have MAD WBrnBnt a 
short delay, but NETKIRK declined. This delay in dropping the up- 
link is not a documented procedure. 
It is recamended that  a NOD procedure be written which advises the 
s i t e  to delay dropping the uplink subcarriers, if two-way lock is 
l o s t  during PTC onmi switching. INCO uill follow-up this i t e m  with 
FSD. 
3. Hinh Gain Antenna Anomaly 
The second activation of the CSM High Gain Antenna (HGA) for  
television at 55:03:00 GET was three hours earlier than scheduled 
in the Flight Plan. The. CSM atti tude was roll 290.0 O, pitch 94.p, 
and yaw 44.20. 
The crew attempted unsuccessfully to acquire on the HGA. The ground 
passed HGA angles of pitch f 5' and yau +23'7O for  this attitude. On 
this attempt, the crew stated that the antenna would drive off in 
HGA yaw from +270° to Oo, and i n  HGA pitch From +6O to +90°. The 
condition was true for both primary and secondary HGA serrro elec- 
tronics, and for both Auto and Reacq track modes. The crew con- 
firmed a l l  HGA circuit breakers were closai. The onboard HG6 angle 
readout meters were checked for a possible readout m r ,  but lhe 
readouts were correct. The antenna w o U  not lock up; i.e., switch 
from wide to narrow beam width. A maneuver to the P!CC attitade was 
prescribed, and as the me~leuver was initiated, the IEA locked up ir= 
Reacq and Narrow beamwidth, and worked correctly unti l  t&e CSH power 
problem occurred. No definite reason for the apparent failure has 
been concluded. Purther investigation of this item u i J l  continue. 
. CSM~M Low Power Communications Confitarmtion 
To comply u i th  the need to conserve a l l  possible electrical power 
on both vehicles after the power anomaly, the normal configmation 
of the conrmunications system on the C S l  and U4 uaa changed in the 
following uay and w i t h  the foIlouing ampere saving: 
a. The following CSM c o d c a t i o n s  systsms were powered down as 
soon as possible after the oxygen anomaly. The CSH e e d  
in th is  c o d c a t i o n  configuration until pover was turned off 
at 58:OO:OO. 
(1: DSE off (1.6 amps). 
(3) 7MF-AM A and B off ( -4 amps) 
(4) S-3and Pouer Amplifier to  off when LH camn active (4.0 amps), 
5 Operated CSM i n  LBR and Down Voice Backup after the Power 
Amnlifier turned off in order t o  maintain voice and data 
under the reduced power situation. 
b. The IM was operated in the following low power and high power 
modes during the r d e r  of th?, mission: 
Low Power k d e  Iiinh Power W e  
(1) Power Amplifiers (2.57 amps) OFF ON 
(2) Voice (0 emps) DoW VOICE ~ / b  IOBWbL VOICE 
Low Power Mode Hkh Power Mode 
3 B i o W  (0 amps) ON/OFF ON 
(4) Prim S-Band Transmitter/ 
Ezceiver (1.29 amps) 011 
(5) PCM (0.39 amps) LBR HBR 
(7) DUA (.05 amps) ON AS REQUIRED ON AS REQUIRED 
(8 )  PMP (-15 amps) ON ON 
The following L!! e q u i p n t  was not powered up during the mission: 
(1 ) S-Band Ant2nna Heaters 
(2) CDR Audio Panel 
(3) Onboard Communications Displays 
(4) Steerable Antenna 
(5) Secondary Transmitter Receiver 
(6 )  Tape Recorder (and a l l  AC) 
The high power mode was utilized only when HEIR data was required, 
and d e n  better voice was required f o r  extended voice conversa- 
tions. The high power mode vas ini t ia ted fo r  the rPmninder of 
LM lifetime commencing a t  132:00:00 GET, because sufficient LM 
pwer and cooling remained. 
c. Changes in the nominal Cormnand Module comunications system 
configuration for  reentry were a s  follows: 
(1 ) DSE Off (1.6 amps) 
(2) VHF off (.21 amps) 
(3) S-Band Primary Power Amplifier* (high 4.0 amps) (LOW 1.5 
amps) 
*It was cycled between Iiigh, I n w ,  and Off as required 
during the phase. 
5. SIVB llJ/LM Downlink Interference 
The first procedure separated the IU and LM downlinks by offsetting 
the N frequency a minus 144 KHZ from center carr ier  frequency, and 
the LM frequency a plus 14.4 KHZ from center frequency. This worked 
we l l ,  with the exception that  RTCC "Data Selectn reported that  the 
LMtracking data was unusable because of the frequency offset. 
The second procedure attempted to offset  the IU dovnlink from its 
center frequency, and then maintain the LM at center frequency. This 
was accomplished by turning the LM transponder off (for 5 minutes) 
and readjusting the N dovnlink to 57 RHZ off center frequency. After 
the IU frequency was offset, the LM transponder was turned back on 
and the MSEN locked up the LM downli.uk at center frequency. RTCC 
reported that  the LM tracking data was usable a t  this t h e .  It was 
l a t e r  discovered that  the RTCC personnel could have manuaYy entered 
inputs t o  the computer to correct for  the frequency off set. 
Since the RTCC personnel have the capability t o  correct f o r  the 
frequency offset, then the first procedure discussed above (item 
No. 5) can be utilized. However, it is  recommended tha t  the 
Booster personnel investigate the possibil i ty of maintaining the 
capability to  command off the IU transponder at any time prior to 
SlVB impact with the moon. 
6. Entry Conrmunications Anomaly 
A t  1110:16:00 GET, the CSM c o d c a t i o n s  system was activated. The 
power amplifier low power mode was  commanded at 140: 18: 30 GBX and 
HSK locked on the low b i t  rate telemetry and normal voice. A t  
140: 20: 10 GEX, the varying of signal stmngth readings from -1 21 
to -138 d b  at HSK i n i t i a l l y  led us to believe that the power amplifier 
was not on. Also, at this time the CSM currant appeared low a s  com- 
pared to predicted loads w i t h  the power amplifier i n  the high power 
mode. The crew selected Power Amp Low and verified the %d.k back" 
gray which was normal for the power nmnlifier opera- in the high o r  
low power modes. !Che LM antenna look angle display (ULD) indicated 
the HSK to LM look angle t o  be direct3y on the IN minus X axis. CSM 
antenna patterns i n  the L@XM docked configuration indicated antenna 
gains to be from -1 2 to -1 8 db below normal (reference 0 db onmi) at 
this attitude. Power a q l i f i e r  gains a re  t13  db and +?9 db respectively 
fo r  low and high power modes. Solid l a w  b i t  r a t e  telemetry and voice 
were maintained from 1@:27:13 GET until 140:55:20 GEI,  at which time 
HBR telemetry was obtained with a -109 dbm downlink signal strsngth 
at HSK. This signal strength ua >nnal for  a 0 db ami and the power 
amplifier in the high powr W e .  Therefore, the conrmunications problem 
discussed above was a e  resu l t  of LM being in a position between the 
CM and the ground station. 
7. LM Look Awle Display Deficiency 
The LM Look Angle Display (NSK 1475) did not operate according to 
requirements submitted prior to Apollo 11. The error i s  that  the 
display does not operate when low b i t  ra te  telemetry is  being 
received. Since the majority of the mission was LM active with 
LBR data, the communications operation was compromised. This error 
was discovered during simulations but rather than cause major RTCC 
reprogramhg, the error was accepted for  t h i s  mission. 
However, the LM Look Angle Display must be programmed t o  operate 
i n  LBR data prior to the Apollo 14 mission. 
8. RTCC Interfsce Deficiency 
Manual (MED) inputs to the CLAD and LAD displays must be made by 
~~Ccmputer Dynamics1' in the RTCC area. The Comm SSR personnel must 
coordinate these MED inputs with llComputer Dynamicsl1 on the RTCC 
Dynamics loop. However, the FIDO Officer also coordinates with 
WComputer Dynamicsw on t h i s  loop. There have been instances when 
it was very d i f f icu l t  t o  coordinate these inputs with 11Computer 
Dynamics. 1' 
This problem will be investigated to determine i f  alternate personuel 
in the RTCC area can be uti l ized f o r  cnnmnmications display coordi- 
nation, and if an alternate loop can be uti l ized fo r  t h i s  coordination. 
Three areas fo r  improvement in the simulations of c o d c a t i o n  
systems and procedures are  a s  follows: 
a. A number of attempted c o d c a t i o n s  fai lures  have been incorrectly 
simulated such as an attempt to fail  the ent i re  U S 3  downlink 
but fail ing .to inhibi t  the crews downlink voice. These mistakes 
provide INCO negative training in resolving conmnvlications 
anomalies as  well a s  causing the Flight Director to lose some 
confiience in INCO. 
b. The wide spacing of simulations has apparently wasted more time 
than it has saved. So much time elapsed between each sbda- 
tion that many hours were required to prepare fo r  each one. 
Additional ti- was wasted i n  preparing f o r  an April mission by 
simulating with data fo r  a March mission. 
c. INCOls c o d s ,  when executed, apparently require some rea l  
time monitoring v ia  high speed printer to be properly received 
by the spacecraft; i.e., CMS, LMS, or math mdel. It has be- 
come necessary to execute commands an unreasonably large number 
of times to effect  the proper spacecraft response. 
10. Recommendations 
a. MILA TV Durin~: Rev 1 
Do not attempt TV u n t i l  a f t e r  TLI. 
b. Madrid Uplink Anomaly 
INCO will recommend a Network Operations Directive (NOD) 
procedure which advises the MSFN s i t e  to delay dropping tbe 
uplink subcmriers i f  two-way lock i s  l o s t  during PTC omni 
switching. 
c. High Gain Antenna Anomaly 
No recommendation at th i s  time. 
d. cSM/LM Low Power Communications Configuration 
No recommendation. 
Since the RTCC personnel have the capability to correct fo r  
the frequency offset, then the first procedure discussed above 
(1tem No. 5) can be utilized. However, it i s  recommended that 
the Booster personnel investigate the possibil i ty of nvlintajning 
the capability to command off tho N tramponder at any time 
prior to SNB impact w i t h  the moon. 
g. LM Look Aanle Disulas Deficiencg 
It is recommended that  the RTCC be programed so that this 
display w i l l  operate when LM LBR data is being received. 
h. RTCC Interface Deficiency 
INCO will make an investigation to determine if alternate 
personnel in the RTCC area can be utilized f o r  communications 
display coordination, and if an alternate loop can be utilized 
for  this coordination. 
INCO will ass i s t  simulations in resolving errors in the proper 
3inuJ.ation of conmnmiccrtions systems anomalies. If a conmnurications 
anomaly is incorrectly simulated, INW recommends the anomaly 
be ramved immediately, rather than continue throughout the 
rimulation with unacceptable conmunicationa. 
It i s  recommended that aimulation commence wi th .  trajectory data 
for the mission to be flown, and continue with a frequency to 
provido and maintain a reaeonable mission readiness posture. 
It i s  recommended that simulations personnel better familiarize 
themselves with all commnnd functions, and more closely monitor 
all cammanding during simulations. 

APPENDIX J 
a. ?!Re a - ~ t  FCCH fo r  Apollo - vas the b;.zic document dated 
Etptemter 10, 1969, through Revision C dated April 1, 1970. During 
Apollo 13, the FCOH procedurally worked very well. 
b. Just p r i ~ r  t o  t.he mission, a reqczst --s made by the CSM Branch touse  
z presently exist ing capability sf the PCM/GS MCS t o  suppress b i t s  
and increase the granularity 3f the  s t r i p  chart recorder pen deflections. 
Informa! talks w i t h  PcM/GS personnel. ve-ified the capability of the  
DAB t o  perform the desired functions, and a memo was drafted from FCD 
t3  E D  f ~ r u ~ a l l y  requesting the i r  support. 
Prgcedures U ~ L - e  not available t o  accomplish real-time request-. f o r  
bit suppression and the following interim approach was taken. 
(1.) The data user p r~vided  the Procedures Officer b i t  suppression 
informat ion. 
(2  .) The Procedures Officer relayed the informatian t o  CCATS TM 
who had only the ;jackup PCM/GS configured f o r  b i t  suppression data 
processing. The prime PC- remained i n  its original  configuration. 
(3.) The Procedures Officer verif  ied the  MCS were returned t o  the 
normal confi-&,ration subsequent t o  HSD s u b - f o m t  changes. 
2, SIMULATIrnS 
The following i s  an example of a comunication f a i l u r e  which was 
simulated incorrectly. During as ascent s imla t ion ,  the  CSM 1.@4 sub- 
c a r r i e ~  was los t ,  rest13.ting i n  the loss of a l l  telemetry from the CSM. 
W i n g  th i s  time WC s t i l l  had two-way voice ~ 5 t h  the CSM. The 
proceciure fo r  restoring data was exercised, and data was f ina l ly  
restored when the auxil iary P W  power SUFI-ly was selected and the FM 
transmitter ms activated. However, i n  checking with the  NEW s i t e ,  
it was reported t ha t  the data was being received on the P M  downlink. 
This did not make any sense, and evea twl ly  "SIMNETWORK" called t o  
resilrt that  a- - % t e m p t  had been made t o  simula+.e a fa i l ed  antenna 
and although the E M  data was inhibited, the  CSM voice w a s  inadver- 
t e n t u  l e t  ttlrough . 
ISP 3- -
Preliminary copies of the  Instrumentation Support Plan (ISP) w e r e  
d is t r ibuted t o  Fl ight  Controllers p r io r  t.0 the  start of Apollo 1 3  
simulations . Included was the  Commw-: 1.a: ions Plan f ~ r  e ch phase 
of the  mission from prelaunch t o  entry. Simulations provided the  
information necessary t o  update and correct  s t a t i o n  configurations, 
uplink and downlink communications modes, Data Storage miipment 
(DSE) dump req~lrements , and TV support requirements. The f i n a l  issue 
of the  Instrument S.upport Plan was d is t r ibuted approximately three weeks 
p r io r  t o  f l i g h t .  
The Instrumentation Support Plan was followed, u n t i l  it became 
ref-essary t o  change site configurations based on the  changes t o  t h e  
Flight  Plan, due t o  the  spacecraft oxygen anomaly. This occurred approxi- 
mately 57: 58: 00 in to  the  f l i ~ h t .  Subseqcent site configurations were 
hacdled i n  real time via  SCM1s and were coordinated by "PROCEDURES", 
"TRACK", and "TIC". 
4. CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT PROBLEW 
TIME: T -w:18:00 
PRSBLEM: Building 45 reported a l l  video l ines  had been lost. 
The problem was reported t o  NETWORK and service was returned 
mmentarily. The trouble uas a t t r ibu ted  t o  a blown c i r c u i t  
breaker. After a reset uas accomplished, no fur ther  losses 
w e r e  experienced. 
TIME: 00:20:00 GET 
PROBIAQ: The next s t a t i o n  contact table ,  EKl503, was noted t o  be 
0 d t s p b y  ing keyhole i n f o n a t  ion, ref lec t ing a 15 keyhole 
a t  30 foot s ites . S i t e  modifications b ~ v e  reduced t h i s  
figure t o  approxirmtely eO. 
TIME: ~ 9 :  43:30 GET 
PROBLEM: A query m s  made by the  "NEWOIM c ~ . O L I E R "  t o  "P-", 
a s  t o  a requirement levied by "GUIDANCE", t o  recover TLI 
data by rerouting the  ARIA a i r c r a f t  t o  a near3y site fo r  
5-2 
t ransfer  and subsequent playback. 
RESOLUTION: "FLIGHT" determined that  the TLI data was not required on 
such a p r io r i ty  basis and the  request. was deleted. 
TIME: 10: 30: 00 GET 
PROBLE2k An on-site problem a t  HSK caused c o m n d  computer faul t ing 
on several occasions prelaunch and during mission support. 
RESOLUTION: FoLlowing a nominal handover from GDS t c  HSK at 11 hours 
GET, GDS was maintained a s  the backup s i t e  vice GWM u n t i l  
just  pr5ar t o  C-DS's LOS a t  approximtely 13:30:00 GET. 
This proved t o  be a sound iiecision, because a subsequent 
fau l t  of the c o m n d  computer a t  HSK, a t  11: 56: 00, resulted 
i n  a timely and coordinated handover t o  GD6 f o r  c c m n d  
support. 
TIME: l7:00:00 GET 
PROBLEM. In preparing fo r  an ear ly  s i t e  handover, it was noted t ha t  
exist ing documentation did not define the necessary coordi- 
nztion e f for t s  f o r  detemining the necsssity of the handover. 
TIME: 19:36:00 GET 
PRBLF& While a n a l ~ g  chart recorders are being recalibrated, a l l  
PCM ground s ta t ion data is inhibited f o r  approximately 
20 minutes. For Apollo 13  a l l  chart recorders, events, 
and meters were affected during t h i s  calibration. 
TIME: 2 9 : ~ :  oo GET 
PROBLEM: It was necessary t o  run a n  addit ional  delog request f o r  the 
same data in  order t o  provide a second c ~ p y  t o  the Systems 
Engineers . 
TIME: 35: 20: 00 GEX 
PROBLEM: An addit ional  copy of a format 30 playback was requested by 
TIME: 48: 12: 00 GET 
PROBLEM: Tle Procedures Officer c o r n  be heard on FD and/or GOSS 
CONF loops i n  Building 45. 
RESOLUTIOIi: The problem was relayed t o  the Comrmrnications Controller, 
his trouble shooting revealed tkt a leed on a relay card 
fo r  the  AFD Conf Loop was pinched under a mounting screw, 
and a grounded c i r cu i t  was causing cross talk on the FD 
loop. The AFD conf 103p was brought down f o r  mai~+enance, 
f o r  approxim'iely an hour, while the  caxd was replaced. 
TIME: '1: 39: 00 GGT 
PROBLEM. &ta recorded on mgnetic tapes at  the remote s i t e s  were 
being shipped back t o  wC e a r l i e r  than the Flight  Control- 
l e r s  had a n t i c i p t e d .  Pr ic r  t o  Apollo ?2 and 1 3  missions, 
the Iietwork Operations Directives and its supplements 
were circulated through the FCD branches f o r  review and 
comment. For both missicns, tfie documents reflected a 
24-hour return time f o r  most magnetic tape data with 
a few exceptions; e.g., 48-hour return of LM tapes from 
LO1 thrwgh TEI. No comments were made t o  extend the  
period of titre t h a t  data Would be retained on site, and 
therefore, the  documents were printed reflectir,g the  24 
hour c r i t e r i a  . 
TIME: 56:25:00 GEZ 
PROBLEM: Spacecraft prsblems indicated a possible deviation from 
the normal Instrumentation Support Plan i n  order t o  provide 
support f o r  both the CSM and LM i n  the area of voice, corrmand, 
and telemetry . 
RFSOLUTION: "PR-" coordinated w i t h  "TRAM" and "NETWORK" t~ w ~ r k  
on a s i t e  configuration i f  it became necessary f o r  the  crew 
t o  ingress the LM and power up the  I&¶ systems. "TIC" was 
contac+xd t o  coordinate the telemetry formats .*ecessary t o  
provide support f o r  both vehicles. I24 "powerup" occurred at  
approximately 57: 58:00 GEZf and the network provided the 
necessary support. 
TME: 56:30:00 GET 
PRO=% Trends were indicating t ha t  it may be necessary to power 
down S/C systems in order to save power and conwmanhles. 
RESOLUTION: When it becameevident that the crev uould power doun 
spacecraft aystenns, "PIIIDCEUIRBn provided to "HEPU)RKn 
the requirement t o  call up the Parks 2101 antam in  
order to provide the support necessary +Q maintain 
telemetry and commamications i n  a "power dounff configuratbn. 
The Parks 2101 antenna provided fUl sugport within 24 hours 
and contimred its wrt throughout the mission. 
5. REEOIMENDA'IIONS 
a. Flinht Controllers Operations Handbook 
Some of the FCOH procedures to be modified for  Apollo 14 d subsequant 
missions are as follows: 
1. Addition of a procedure for  approval of the use of electrically 
powered equipment in  the bEC, such as tape recorders, typewriters, etc. 
2. Establish a procedure for  mkdtting real-time call-ups or  changes 
to the Universal Plct s (rubber plots). 
3. Change a procedure to request delogs from Cfmputer Supemisor vice 
Computer TM. This will afford a more efficisnt control of the RTCC, and will 
expedite the return of data t o  the Flight Controllers. D/!W channels nmibers 
for  the delog are no huger needed and this raphement w i l l  be deletad. 
4. Add an eqlma+don of the numbers on the display request PBIla for  
inclusion inb SOP 2.13 (channel attach or MSK d i e  requeat failure). 
5. Develop an SOP which will provide instructions and the method used 
to expand the approprjate wired DAC cards. 
6. Add to an existing SOP, the procedures necessary to  coordinate 
s i t e  handovers. 
7. Addition of a procedure to prform analog s t r i p  chart recorder 
calibrations. 
b. Simulations 
It is understandable that a mistake cau be d e ,  but the mistake s h d d  
be corrected as soon as possible so the simiktim can continue without 
providing negative training. In the case s i tea  i.n the abuve simulaticms 
section (section 2), the data should have been restored imediately, and 
the simulated failure at&zted at a l a t e r  tim during tine simulation. 
Another pcint t o  b? mi'? is bhatmalfunztions procedures are utilized 
accordirg t o  what r a i l -de  exist. In other words, a dilYerent procedure 
may be util ized fo r  &staring data, as apposed t o  restaring of both voice 
and data. The~fore,  the failures should be -ed very carefully so 
the appropriate procedures can be exercised. 
The INCO is s t i l l  not able t o  exercise his crnrm~nd functions adequately 
during the simulations. The majority of the problems ieem t o  be attributed 
t o  a lack of monitoring of the camnand sequences by the simulation persarael. 
The sinnilatians persannel must becam? familiar with the spacecraft Puactions 
t h a t  are accanplished as a result  elf sending each camand; i.e., Salvo 11, 
USB Mode Reset, etc. This is the anly way that  c m d i n g  during simulations 
can be made similiar t o  real-time missions camamlhg, and therefore, pro- 
vide positive training. 
One of the major problems during simulatians is the simulation a9 space- 
craf t  loss of voice, and data, due t o  lclw signal strengths. 1% ie u d e r -  
stood at this time that the simulations perscamel have no way of varying 
signal strength. Therefare, the data and voice must be cut off when a 
certain signal strength is reached. Under these circumstances, data and 
voice are very good at me instance, and cunpletely gone the next. Wben 
this happens, there is very l i t t l e  the RE0 and PR- CIWICER can 
do t o  solve the problem sincc K C  camot talk t o  the crew at all, and 
usually has los t  crmmvld capabil i tyto the spacecraft. Since t h i s  is not 
representative of the way t h i x s  happen during a mission, the simulatioas 
persame1 should at least  simulate the varying signal strengths, and Impending 
loss of voice, and data, by switching tbe da& off and on several times, 
before cutt- it off entirely. Thiu at leas t  gives the MCO am3 
P R m  CFFICER time t o  do such t h i n e  as recom~ending af s new antenna, 
cammding of "LEE1', caamnding of "Dn VOICE BU", e t c  . 
, t6 
c. Chronolo3icaL Listings Of Significant Problems 
Reference the above l i s t i n g  of problems 
(1) TIME: 00:20:00 GET 
RECOMMENMTION: Update the display t o  include the current keyhole 
data. 
(2) TIME: 17:00:00 GET 
REC-TION: A procedure wi l l  be written defining a single point 
of contact f a r  all s i t e  handovers. This procedure 
w i l l  prevent "Data Select" f r an  possibly losing 
continuity i n  tracking data, and interference with 
l'mcO's" and " ~ C E ' S ' ~  c m a s n g .  
(3)  TIME: 19:36:00 GET 
RECOMMEND!-TION: It i s  understood tha t  for Apollo 14 and subsequent 
missions, that  the capability w i l l  ex i s t  t o  calibrate 
the chart recorders individually. This possible 
f l ex ib i l i t y  w i l l  have t o  be investigated. Em FCOH 
procedure w i l l  be written defining huw these cal i -  
brations w i l l  be accanplished. 
(4 TIME: 29:00:00 GET 
RECOMMENXTION: Delog requests fcrms were modified i n  real-time t o  
include a query t o  the originator of the request as 
t o  the number of copies Se needed. 
( 5  TR43: 35:20:00 GET 
RECO&Q43NMlTON: Through proper coordination with mC and HOU W, 
subseq~ent Farnrat 30 requests provided t o  the Systems 
Engineers, an additional copy of the data, by u t i l i z ing  
the chart recorder i n  the Houston IM area. 
(6 m: 51:39:00 
R E C O ~ T I O N :  It is recomnrended tha t  fo r  future missions the Flight 
Controllers review the NOD and i t s  supplemnts t o  in- 
sure data is retained on site an adequate length & tim 
t o  m e t  playback requirements. I)w'ing Apollo 13  an 
IS1 was traxxnitted t o  the remote sites i n s t r u c t i x  
them t o  re ta in  all data fo r  72 hourc. As 
no playbacks were required from the s i t e s  post- 
missian, a l l  data was shipp5d at splashdarn. 
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All ac t iv i t ies  through TLI followed the f l ight  plan. Over CRO at 2:25 
the crew reported an 02 High Flow l ight  and tke O2 Flow gage pegged a t  
2:20. This is  a nominal occurrence with the Waste Stowage Vent valve open. 
A note w i l l  be added t o  future f l ight  plans and checklists s o  the crew can 
expect the l ight. .  
While performing Q-:/LY Pressure Equilization, the crew did not reopen the 
Waste Stowage Vent valve. When asked, they replied that they preferred 
t o  wait un t i l  the completion of the SIVB Evasive Maneuver t o  open tihe valve. 
The FA0 and =OM rearranged the purge schedule t o  allow the nominal 8 
hour purge. 
After IEI Ejection, the crew wanted t o  delay the SIVB yaw manew,er un t i l  
they had-maneuvered t o  see the SIVB. This was not as planned and the 
SIVB maneuvers were delayed. There was no rea l  imgact on the flight plan. 
The P23 at 6 : ~  started on time. Flight Plan Support had checked each 
s ta r  and the att i tudes i n  the f l ight  plan were correct. G&C reported tha t  
the RCS w a s  z 2 3  lbs. above nominal so the crew was allowed t o  mark on all 
five stars. 
During th i s  sh i f t ,  copies of the f l ight  plan deletions were passed to  the 
Flight Directm, Mission Director, and CAFCOM. 
0 6 : ~  - 1 4 : q  (~ indsey)  
'. 
The P23 w a s  complete6 j.1 44 minutes as scheduled i n  the f l ight  plan. 
Att?.tude deviations frob the nominal were 0 . 5 ~  or less. RCS consumption 
was nominal ( 23 lbs  . ) . 
Earth weather photography was started a t  7:17:47, prior t o  establishing 
PTC. Pn: was started a t  7:30; however, immediate diff icul t ies  were en- 
countered and PIC was stopped then reestablished a t  8:32. The difficul- 
t i e s  with the first Pn: were part ia l ly  a resuJt of an apparent misunder- 
standing over an update furnished the crew. They were asked t o  disable 
quads A and B for PTC and t o  use ,02999 i n  the DAP for rate  during spin-up. 
In the future, the update should be clearly stated to  disable quads "x" 
and "Y" for  ra te  damping and the crew checklist should contain an entry t c 1  
use .03750 i n  the DAP t o  establish a t  0.3O/sec rate. 
A t  9:24 an update was furnished the crew t o  reset  CMC b i t s  which would 
prevent a CDU f a i l  notification. The procedure was required as a resu l t  
of doing a V37E 16 seconds a f te r  the optics switch was se t  t o  zero during 
=3. 
The eleventh and l a s t  frame of Earth Weather photography was taken at U:l5. 
Additional questions were generated by Marshall Space Flight Center for  
the launch vehicle debriefing at 25:OO. 
The new launch vehicle d-ebriefing questions were read t o  the crew with the 
f l igh t  plan update so the crew would have time t o  think about their answers. 
The ;:rew was unable t o  provide a radiation readPing per the post-sleep check- 
list. They had l e f t  their  PNl's i n  the i r  su i t s  when they packedthe stlits 
away. The CMP wanted t o  perform a donning and f i t  check with his s u i t  and 
agreed t o  remove h i s  PRD and supply the reading then. 
A s  the updated estimates of the SIVB impact were available, the FA0 plotted 
them on a map t o  determine the trend  an^ t o  t r y  t o  obtain an early idea of 
where the photos might f i t  i n  the timeline. Also, W and the lSE  were 
asked t o  l i s t  the p r io r i t i e s  of ac t iv i t i es  that  might interfere v i th  SIVB 
impact photos. 
There were sorae discllssions with the scient is ts  on comet Bennett photos. 
Flight Plan Support obtained information on the comet ' s position and calcu- 
la ted a PTC r o l l  angle and shaft and trunion angles for the photos. 
During the sh i f t ,  a meet ix  was held t o  disc~lss the l i s t  of f l ight  plan 
deletions. The l is t  came through the meeting unchanged. A CSM Solo Book 
and the f l i gh t  plan bootstrap pages were marked with the changes. Work 
was also s tar ted on a f l i g h t  plan t o  enter the J.H at 55:W GET t o  check 
the SHe pressure. 
2 events were n o ~ i n a l  with the TV transmission continued t o  31:Ol. 
TlAU P23 following the midcourse was accomplished without difficulty.  
Immediately following the P23,,the spacecraft w a s  maneuvered t o  PIC pitcll 
and yaw and a r o l l  angle compat'ible wit'n pointing the opticr a t  comet 
Bennett, The crew reported tha t  sun shafting into the optics was so  
bad they could not see anything. Data previously generated by Flight 
Plan Sqpor t  indicated there was no att i tude,  outside gimble lock, whcr,: 
the sun was not a potential  problem. The decision was made t o  postpone 
further attempts t o  photograph the comet ur l i . i l  TEC. 
Because of the plans to  enter the M early, the N was resci~ectuled. 
Discussions with NETNORK resulteil in  rescheduling the longlines for the 
ear l ier  TV. A t  32:48 a f l ight  plan update was pssed  t o  tne crew deleting 
the small segments of the solo phase and bootstrap phase t o  relieve the 
t ight  timeline. 
A t  33:20 FTC (es.t;ablished less  than an hour earlier) became uastable and 
had t o  be reestablished. No one seemed t o  know any reason for the un- 
stable condition. 
The predicted SIVB impact coordinates had stabilized at ap2roximately 
2010tS, 28050'~. After looking a t  the possible revolutions in whir.h 
top0 photop 2hs of the impact area could be performed, the *ices were 
narrowed t o  either Rev 27 or 28. 
The MCC-3 burn was scrubbed and a f i n r l  plan for enterrng the IM 3 horns 
early was completed. This glan allowed the crew t o  check the SHe pressure 
when they first entered the IM and also allowed ldditional time, if required, 
for l a t e r  checks without affscting the crews rest  period starting at 61:oo. 
The f l ight  plan changes for entering the fM earlywere read t o  the crew 
a t  47:45. 
A procedure t o  determine the optimum r o l l  angle far photographing the 
comet Bennett was read t o  the crew. The attempt fai led because the PTC 
coning angle !!ad become too large and the comet WIS aluays occulted by 
the Ul. Several attempts were made to  deterdne a time when the atti tude 
wou7.8 be ciose t o  90° pitch and O0 yaw but with ao success. 
The detailed procedural changes t o  the checklist for the SHe checkout were 
read t o  the crew a t  50:26. The crew asked i f  they could enter the Wi 
earl ier  than planned so the checlrout would be colpla,te before the TV show. 
The crew entered the I24 a t  $:25. The SHe presswe was nominal and no 
further checks were required. 
TV was tragsmitted during LM familiarization f r ~ m  55:i7 t o  55:47. A t  
55:55:04 the crew reported an AC Main B undervolt condition. lhey la te r  
reported hearing a loud bang about the time of the undervolt. A t  56:09 
the crew reported observing a venting condition visibls out window one. 
By 56:23 the crew had been told t o  perform a part ia l  emergency power down 
an?. open-circuit fue l  ce l l s  1 and 3. By this  time we were already down 
70 pounds on RCS and Flight Plan Support had beguu looking at reducing 
planned orbi ta l  act ivi t ies .  This type of activity ceased when the reactants 
were shut off t o  fuel  c e l l  3 a t  56:s and fuel  c e l l  1 at 57:17. A t  57:37 
the crew was instructed t o  proceed into the IN and power up per checklist 
ACT 1 (ste? 3), 4CT I1 (omit step l ) ,  ACT 12, ACT 13 (step 11, Denmud Regs 
to  cabin, ACT 25 (steps 1, 2, & ?), and ACT 37. By 58:40 the CSM was 
completely powered dovn and the I24 was in  control using PCNS pulse, 
Contingency activation procedures for the 2-hour prep docked DPS burn 
were begun a t  60:30. Ihe burn was scheduled for dnd accomplished at 61:30 
under PGNS control. A t  62:49 the spacecraft was mneuvered t o  PFC atti tude 
(LH + X axis pointed south) and a modifieC ITC procedure implemnted (change 
IM pi lo t  yaw 90' every hour). A proposed vark/rest cycle through 102 hours 
was passed t o  the crew. 
A procedure f c r  improving the 02 circulation i n  the CSM using the CDR's 
IN hoses w a  passed t o  the crew. 
!The type of mJ eignment for  the PC+2 burn was discussed. It was de- 
cided t o  perform a sun check to  verify the present alignment and if the 
sun check fa i led  then to  perform an alignment using the earth and the 
sun. It was decided that  regardless of how the sun check went t o  perform 
a star check xnen the spacecraft went into the moon's shadow. 
The P52 sun check procedure was passed t o  the crew and performed success- 
fully. 'Ihe sun was about one diameter f'rom the center of the AOT. The 
good alignment c r i t e r i a  was passed. A procedure t o  widen the IN deadband 
to  5' t o  reduce RCS consumption was re& t o  the crew. 
The DPS burn proce&~res using the PGNS was read t o  the crew at 'i5:OO. 
The procedures were up&ted t o  include closing the DES HE REGS at 10 seconds 
prior t o  predicted ergine cutoff. 
Data were gathered from both the Cape and Houston simulators on IT4 KHS 
PTC. The ryns made were to  verify KIT'S procedure using an auto maneuver 
t o  Pn: attitude, 20 t o  25 pounds of RCS were required. The simulator 
instructdrs sl ightly revised the procedure to  base the rate  damping on 
rates, not time. Also, we found that on the simulator it was cheaper 
to  set  up PrC: by using PGNS Pulse instead of an auto maneuver t a  att.ii..udr:. 
The auto maneuver required. a much longer time to  dampen rates a t  PTC 
attitude, wasting time and fuel. 
After the successful PC+2 burn, the procedures were coordinated with 
COPFPROL and then read t o  the crew. It required much rare time for the 
crew t o  se t  up Pn: than it required i n  the simulator. Pulse mode did 
not work. We l s t e r  guessed that pulse did n ~ t  work because it could 
not overcome t!,e CSM venting and the LV sublimator venting, Crass- 
coupling in  all three axes made it very diff icul t  for the crew to  maneu- 
ver t o  attitude. After PIX was established, the crew powered d m  the 
. The FA0 snd INCO provided ir procedure using visual and audible cues 
t o  aid the crew with omni svitching. 
PTC did not stay stable long. We requested that the crew call. out the 
Lm) angles when the earth and the moon passed through the CDR's window. 
This was done a d  it was possible t o  ce t  a rough idea of how PIC was 
doing by plott ing the I F D  angles. 
The FA0 worked with the Guidance Officer, COHl!ROL and t k  Flight Dynamics 
Officer to  prcvide a rough no corn procedure for a nidcourse. Ihe pro- 
cedure ras read t o  the crcw. Work w a s  also st.arted cn the detailed pro- 
cedures for  KC-5. 
A t  86:12, the FA0 requested SPAN t o  coordinate stowae transfer lists 
for  IM jettlson: We eontinned to  track PI'C divergence by plctting the 
crew's report cr. the LVD angles of the eartin and moon. Half-cone angles 
of up t o  40° were reported t o  FLIGHT. A t  90:00, the FA0 se t  up a w e t -  
ing between FCSD and FOD personnel t o  work out AGS PTC procedures. 
A t  31:00, a rough draft of the proposed I24 alignment procedure for the 
next midcourse was passed to  M r .  North for simulator developent. A t  
91:40, the draft AGS PTC procedure was also given to  Mr. North for simu- 
la tor  verification. M r .  O'Neill and Mr.  Holloway of the Flight Planning 
Branch were requested t o  attend meetings t o  work out MCC and entry pro- 
cedures. 
The crew asl-ed i f  it was possible t o  use the PISS condensate bags for  
wine  collection in  zero-g since the bags were designed for 1/6-g 
water ccllection. Confirmation tha t  the bag could be used was received 
From the subcontractor. A procedure was passed t o  the crev that  avoided 
leakage f'rm the bag, 
A C02 C&W occurred and a procedure for  using the CSI( LiCW cancisters 
for removal was read t o  the crew. 
The crew was briefed on delayillg HCC-5 t o  a t l r  as close as possible 
t o  the predicted SHe vent. This was t o  allow Pl!C t o  be restarted as 
soon as the SHe had vented and t o  avoid possible restar ts  due t o  
the vent. 
The crew received a procedure for  checking Main Bs B. Approximately 
10 minutes of telemetry was dounlinked while the CSLI was powered up. 
Hain  Bus E was good. 
A t  9: 50, there was a IN battery malfunction light. A"pmcedure was 
read t o  the crew t o  check the malfunction. The battery was good; a 
sensor had fai led and caused the malfunction light. 
Aeopy of the preliminary entry procedures was received and reviewed. 
With G-KCDO, we verified that  the sun would be a t  the top of the detent 
two f ie ld  of view a t  the MCC-5. 
A work/rest cycle w s s  planned and read t o  the crew after  MCC-5. After 
the 0 incident, it was very hard t o  determine who vas sleeping and 2 
who was not. Only one crewman generally was on the loop and CDR would 
always seem t o  be awake. The work/rest cycles were devised t o  put t h e  
crewman with the longest awake time t o  bed. We intended also t o  have 
the IMP or the CDR aweke at a l l  times. It is impossible t o  accurately 
determine who was axake when. 
The FA0 plotted the ETC a f te r  MCC-5 using the crew call-outs of the LPD 
angles for the earth and the moon. The AGS FTC procerlure was used t o  
establish FCC and the XTC appeared t o  be f a i r l y  stable u n t i l  the SHe 
burst disk blew. The SHe vent caused the Pl'C t o  reverse i n  IM yaw and 
caused the ra te  t o  increase. The FA0 requested SPAN t o  determille any 
res t r ic t ions  on %C rates.  They replied that ,  structurally, we were 
constrained t o  35 /second. There were no thermal constraints due t o  rate.  
A meeting was held a t  2 a.m. with SPAN, Bldg. 45 people, C(IBJTROL, G&C, 
EECOM and backup crewmembers t o  discuss the proposed entry timeline. 
Mr. Lindsey attended the meeting. 
As a resul t  cf the entry meeting and l a t e r  discussions o f t h i s  meeting 
with the Flight Director, MCC-7 was moved back 1 hour from EI-4 t o  EI-5 
hours. GUlDO was requesied io i'urrtish skate vrctors, lElSMW"s, etc. ,  
for  the s imdator  entry runs scheduled that  morning. 
A t  110:53, IM t o  CSM power transfer and CSM battery charge procedures 
were read t o  t h e  crew. A t  111:30, the FA0 f'urnished the mRO Officer 
preliminary entry stowage data. 
The crew reported a t  118:19 that  the CSM was too cold t o  sleep i n  and 
tha t  the CMP was res t ing i n  the IN. 
The crew was briefed on She plan for  entry. The ground recommended tha t  
the crew perfom I24 je t t ison unsuited t o  avoid consuming additional CM 
power. The entry stowage l ist  for  the CM and.INwas updated. 
The crew asked i f  it was possible t o  stow the black and white W i n  ~6 
location rather than A7. The stowage people reported that  t h i s  camera 
was too large for ~ 6 .  
A procedure for powering the CM from the LM for another look a t  CM tclem- 
et ry  was read t o  the  crew. The CM was powered from the IM for  approximateljr 
10 minutes and TM received. After the telemetrydata were received, the 
Battery A recharge was restarted. 
Froccdures for taking photos of the SM were read t o  the crew. The crew 
reported a t  125:45 tha t  both vehicles had been stowed according t a  the 
updated stowage l i s t  except for two Hasselblads, the probe and the 
drogue. They reported tha t  the CM windows were coated with ice  and they 
f e l t  that  they would be unable t o  use the windows for photography of the 
SM. 
The CSM and I24 entry procedurts were read t o  the crew ffom approximately 
126:15 t o  129:30. 
Copies of the combined CSM entry procedures and IH procedures were passed 
out and the Flight Director reviewed them with the entire s h i f t .  Recov- 
ery requested tha t  the S-Band Power Prmplifier be on after blackout u n t i l  
the CMwas on the mains. The FAO, =COW and I E O  wrote the change t o  
the procedures and the change was read t o  the crew. Stars and shaft and 
trunion angles were checked for  the SH separation att i tude and the data 
given t o  FIZGHT and CAPCOM. 
The crew urn cold end could not sleep. Several ideas were discussed on 
how t o  heat up the IM cabin. Since there was a 100 percent margin on a l l  
consmables except RCS, the crew was told t o  paver up the IN. A t  134:30, 
a IN alignment was performed, using the moon and sun. MCC-7 was burned 
using AGS control with PGNS i n  ~ 4 1  and follow-up. The SM separation 
occurred a t  138:02 and the IM/cM was maneuvered t o  an att i tude t o  photo- 
graph the SM. 
138:00 - 143:00 (Lindsey) 
CM powerup was begun a t  140:09: 55. Required uplinks were delayed t o  
140:40 because of diff icul ty  maintaining lock v i th  the spacecraft. 
After starting P52, the crew reported they were unable t o  recognize the 
first s ta r  called bemuse of many particles surrcunding the spacecraft. 
CAFCOM recommended using the brightest stars i n  the f ie ld of view per 
information furnished by Flight Plan Support. m e  P52 was ccynpleted 
with no fb-ther problems. 
A t  141:09, the crew reported they were a t  IN jettison att i tude and were 
closing out the IN. The spacecraft was not at the angles copied by the 
FA0 during the air-grow2 update. By the time the angles were verified 
with CMS support and then with the Guidance Officer, the %was already 
closed out. The trench decided that  the actual angles (9 out i n  ro l l )  
were satisfactory. During future missions, the FA0 should receive copies 
of a l l  pads passed t o  the crew. 
The remainder of I M  jett ison and entry went according to  the updated 
procedures 'and those chutes sure were beautiful! 
General Conclusions 
Since th5.s crew and several past crews have reported the 02 High Flow 
light and the 0, flow gauge pegged prior t o  TLS, the note w i l l  be made 
i n  the f l ight  pzan and the checklist. 
With the co?.fssion on the PTC quads resulting from how the quads t o  be 
disabled where called to  the crew, the quads for PLY: should be stated 
clearly t o  the crew. The PTC rate  w i l l  be clearly indicated i n  the 
crew' s checklist. 
To avoid confuion for the FA0 on pad data that, t o  date, the FA0 had 
t o  copy while L S ~  data was read t o  the crew, the FA0 should receive a copy 
of a l l  pads t o  enaLle him t o  follow the crew procedures and respond quickly 
t o  errors the FAO observes. 
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
Memorandum 
TO : FC/Apollo 13 Flight Director A :  fiPR 2 2 1q70 
In reply refer to: 
FROM : DD /chief, Medical Operat ions Division DD-70-M-68 
SUBJECT: Apollc 13 Anomalies 
The ettached comments on the Apollo 13 anomalies of medical 
concern are forwarded per your request. 
Enclosure 
DD: JFZieg1schmid:rch 4-22-70 
Bwy U.S. Savingr Bmd~ Rcguldy on tbc P a y d  Savings PIan 
ANOMALIES OF MEDICAL CONCERN WRING THE APOLLO 13 FLIG~T 
From the medical point of view, the  f i r s t  two days of the ApoLlo 13 
f l i gh t  were completely routine. The bioanedical data were excellent i n  
quhlity, and a l l  p1;siological parameters were within the expected 
ranges. Daily crew s ta tus  reports indicated t ha t  the  crew was obtaining 
an adequate amount of sleep and they reported they had not taken any 
medications. The in f l igh t  radiation dosage of 46: 44 hours GET was 260 
mads and was exactly as  predicted prefl ight .  In  addition, the onboard 
television pictures suggested that  the crewmen were healthy and were 
adapting successfully t o  the weightless condition. 
On April 13, 1970, a t  55:54:54 hours GET, a telemetry dropout, 
1 second i n  duration, was observed on the  s t r i p  chart recorder located 
i n  the Life Systems Staff Support doom. Prior  t o  t h i s  event, the  heart  
and respirat ion ra tes  of the crewmen were the  following: CDR - heart 
r a t e  = 68 bests  mln and respfrat ion r a t e  = 18 breaths/min; CMP - 
heart  r a t e  = 65 beats/min and respirat ion r a t e  = 15 breaths/min; 
IMP - heart r a t e  = 72 beats/min and respirat ion r a t e  = 12 breaths/min. 
Immediately a f t e r  the  in f l igh t  emergency, each crewman's heart r a tc  
increased t o  well over 100 beats/min. In  addition t o  the crew's verbal 
comments, t h i s  increase i n  crew heart r a t e s  i s  the  only objective medical 
finding tha t  indjcated an in f l igh t  emergency. The heart r a tes  were well  
within normal l imi ts  and may be interpreted t o  signify s t r e s s ,  excitement, 
increased workload, or any combination of these. 
These biomedical s t r i p  chart records have proved useful t o  the  
accident investigation team i n  corroborating telemetry data from non- 
medical sources i n  establishing the exact time of the accident. 
After declarat ion of t h e  abort  aode, t he re  were severa l  deviat ions 
from the  establ ished procedures and approved f l i g h t  requirements t h a t  
caused fu r the r  anomalies. I n  some cases t hese  a n m a l i e s  degraded the  
l e v e l  of medical support t h e  F l igh t  Surgeons were eb l e  t o  render ',he 
crew during the  emergency abor t  p r o f i l e .  A de ta i l ed  discussion of each 
anomaly of medical concern is  presented below. 
a. Increased concentration of cmbon dioxlde i n  t he  spacecraf t  
atmosphere - The decis ion t o  l i v e  on t h e  LEI ECS r a i s e d  immediate concern 
about increased i;O l eve l s  following t h e  u t i l i z a t i o n  of t h e  two primary 2 
and th ree  secondary l i thium hydroxide can i s t e r s .  It was apparent t h a t  
some means of estimating t h e  l i fe- t ime of t h e  CO scrubber was necessary. 2 
Cur immediate s t e p  was t o  increase  t h e  l i m i t s  of Cop buildup from 7.6 mm 
t o  15  nrm. This was done using t h e  first  LM primary can i s t e r .  The r a t iona le  
fo r  t h i s  decision was as  follows: (11 an acute  emergency s t ~ t ?  exis ted  
and a new 2.rocedure t o  u t l l i z e  t h e  CM can i s t e r s  was needed- ?.ow long 
t h i s  would take was not known. (2) The physiological  e f f e c t s  of increased 
carbon dioxide concentration ,=e well-known and r ead i ly  recognized with 
proper monitoring; (3 ) t he  biomedical da t a  wou1.d r e f l e c t  dangerous concen- 
t r a t i o n s  of carbon dioxide and serve a s  a backup t o  t he  onboard pC02 
sensor which is  subject  t o  some e r ro r .  
This decision t o  allow the  carbon dioxide p a r t i a l  pressure t o  increase 
above 7.6 mm Hg under t h i s  emergency condition did not involve v io l a t ion  
of any ae rmed ica l  mission r u l e .  I n  a c t u a l i t y ,  t h e  pCO was above 7.6 m Hg 2 
f o r  only a 4-hour per iod (81 : 30-85 : 30 GET) . Use of the  CM l i thium hydroxide 
can i s t e r s  within the  LM maintained the  carbon dioxide p a r t i a l  pressure we l l  
below 1 mm Hg f o r  t he  remainder of t he  f l i g h t .  
b. :,ass of biomedical da t a  - The CM was canpletely powered down 
and t h i s  eliminated t h e  simultaneous bionedical  monitarrng capabi l i ty .  We 
were l imi ted  t o  1 E!%:lrom one crewman a t  a tfme i n  t he  LM. This requi res  
1.2 watts of power; tflerefore,  it was planned t o  r e t a i n  bicrmedical 
da ta  during the  powered down mode i n  t he  LM. This was c r i t i c a l  f o r  
assessment of t he  physical  conditfon of t h e  crew esd the  concentration of 
C02. Even these  da t a  were l a t e r  s ac r i f i ced  i n  an attempt t o  improve t h e  
air-to-ground ~omnunications.  Communication was f u r t h e r  compromised 
by the  crew's decis ion t o  el iminate  t h e  hot  microphone b y m t c h i n g  
t h e  biomed switch t o  t he  "on" p o s i t i o ~ . .  This would normally have given 
a biomedical parameter t o  noni tor  - but  t h e  CDR had completely removed 
h i s  biohkrness and sensors.  
c .  Deletion of Crew Sta tus  Reports - The crew s t a t u s  repor t s  were 
very infrequent and it was d i f f i c u l t  t o  adequately assess  t h e  t r u e  
physiological e f f e c t s  of inaiaquate  s leep ,  s t r e s s  of t h e  environment 
&id the  emergency sftuat, ion. A t  b e s t ,  we estimated the  crew s l e p t  
t h e  fol loglng : CDR - 11 hrs  ; CMP - 1 3  h r s  ; and IMP - 1 8  h r s  . This i s  
very inadequate but  ce r t a in ly  not unexpected under t h e  emergency 
s i tua t ion .and  t h e  extremely re4uce6 cabin temperatwes. 
Bo personal rs3.iation dosimeter readouts were t ransmit ted a f t e r  
46: 44 GET. I.Iajor s o l a r  f l a r e  a c t i v l t y  c l a s s i f i e d  a s  a 2B (br ight  flare 
was reported a t  81:10 GET. Fortunately no p a r t i c l e s  impinged upall t h e  
IN during t h i s  event. Since the  shielding proper t ies  of t h e  IM a r e  l e s s  
than the  Chi, any p a r t i c u l a t e  s o l a r  f l a r e  event i s  m c h  more c r i t i c a l  
during U4 occupancy. 
On two occasions durfng t h e  aBort phase of t h e  f l l g h t ,  i n f l i g h t  
medications were taken by the  crev without consultation. On one ot3er 
occasion, cedications were prescribed by the Flight Surgeor, but were 
s o t  taken as  directed because the  crew did not understand tLe message 
es relayed t o  then. 
2 .  Fotable Water Shortage - As soon a s  the c r i t i c a l i t y  of the  
quantity of onboard xater  w a s  established, the  Flight  Surgecn made a 
survey of ail ~ o t e n t i a l i y  po;able water sources within the  CM and IN. 
Ic acidftior. t o  tk,e 13 counCs of survival water i n  the CSI.!, there vere 
16 pounds of P U S  water thEt .:odd Ee used by the crew i f  required. 
3.e F S S  water is chenically pure, but not steri1.e. ?ionetheless, it 
uas cnnsZdered poteble under emergency conditions. 
32 seweral occasions during the abort f l i g h t  ~ ~ P S P ,  che crew 
queri.:d the  XCC about +,he necessity f o r  rat ioniag -,@table water and 
usfr,g the  "excess" ;'or c c x l i r ~  of the  spacecraft systens. It was 
recommended tha t  the crew maintain adequate f l u i d  iatake , 'I. e. 6 pounds 
per = p?r dw.  Zhese r e c m e ~ d e t i o n s  vere transmitted t o  the  crew but 
still t5ey did not drink enough ~ a t e r .  The CM potable water was used 
u n t i l  depleted a t  a3out 125 GET. U=l hscent water was then consumed 
fbr the reoaining l-7 hours of the  mission. 
e. !?educed Cabin Tenpera?ures - After the (24 uas powered down 
the U-.! wzs c o ~ f i g w e d  for  nfr.imum power uswe ,  the cebin temperatures 
of both spacecraft decreased rapidly. The temperatures s tabi l ized at 
epproximtely 38% i n  f3e C!4 and S ~ O F  i n  the U4. The crew reported t h a t  
they were u n c ~ x f ~ r t a b l e  ar-dthat tila extrene cold prevented adequate 
sleep. :xiey donned the spare constant wear garments, but did not 
e l ec t  t o  wear t h e i r  FGA's or use the  blankets stowed i n  the CM survival 
k i t .  
A nore complete evaluation of the medical anomalies during the 
Apollo 13 mission w i l l  be made following the medical debriefing of the 
crev. 
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Prelaunch throuqh TLI phase 
Prelaunch jimsphere bal loon releases went as scheduled, and no CM land 
landings were predicted f o r  any Mode I launch aborts. Weather i n  the Cape 
area was acceptable f o r  recovery opera ti ons ; however, a t  approximately L-8: 30, 
i t  was brought t o  our a t ten t i on  tha t  winds greater than 25 knots were forecast 
on the 72' launch azimuth groundtrack between 45% and 60W a t  launch time. 
F l i g h t  and Retro were alerted, and i t  was determined t h a t  aborts i r i t i a t e d  
between 6 + 30 and 8 + 10 would land i n  t h i s  area. A t  L-2:30, 16-foot swel ls 
were being predicted i n  por t ions o f  the launch abort area; and t o  our surprise, 
the F l i g h t  Director  indicated he might consider delaying the launch t o  a greater 
azimuth t o  avoid the bad weather. 
Recovery he1 icopters a t  the launch s i t e  reported receiv ing a s ignal  
(possibly an LVTH frequency) on t h e i r  e lec t ron ic  search equipment a t  approxi- 
mately T - 30 mins. The bearings were t o  the launch pa4 and dur ing launch the 
bearings pointed t o  the launch vehicle/spacecraft u n t i l  LOS. Had an abort  
occurred, i t  i s  possible and l i k e l y  t h a t  some confusion and delay would have 
resul ted i n  locat ing  the CM i f  we had t o  r e l y  s t r i c t l y  on an e lec t ron ic  search. 
Launch was on time, and shor t l y  a f t e r  inser t ion,  ta rget  points 2-1, 3-1, 
3-4, and 4-4 were v e r i f i e d  using the LM ephemeris. There was no s i g n i f i c a n t  
change from premission, and Retro and the DOD recovery forces were no t i f i ed .  
A f te r  TLI, recovery ships and a i r c r a f t  not  required f o r  subsequent support were 
released. 
TLI throuqh CSH anomaly 
The Translunar Abort Sumnary messages fo r  aborts between T + 8 t o  T + 60 
were prepared and sent t o  recovery forces a t  12/04002. Fixed time o f  abort  
TPts  through T + 60 hours were prepared and furnished recovery forces a t  12/07152. 
A t  12/14002, we were advised of a possible storm i n  the South Pac i f i c  t ha t  
might be passing through the T + 25 and T + 35 landing area a t  time o f  scheduled 
landing. This was confirmed about an hour l a te r ,  and by 12/18302 the T + 35 hour 
abort landing po in t  was moved from 165% t o  155%. The T + 25 hour abort was not  
changed, since i t  was already 24-hour GET, and the crew was i n  a sleep period. 
Network reported a t  12/21512 tha t  transmissions from the LRD e lec t ron ics  
lab were causing interference w i t h  the video and was making i t  unreadable. We 
confirmed tha t  transmissions were being made and requested tha t  they be terminated. 
S imi la r  problems had been encountered dur ing Apol lo 12, but  discussions w i t h  FSD/ 
LRD personnel were supposed t o  have resolved the problem. 
A t  13/0730Z, ta rge t  po in ts  f o r  the LOI-5 and PC+2 aborts were approved and 
furnished the recovery forces. We were advised a t  13/1130Z tha t  the t rop i ca l  
storm "Helen" was moving slower than prev iously  predicted and might make the 
T + 45 and T + 60 landing points  unacceptable. A subsequent sate1 1 i t e  p i c tu re  
confirmed th i s ,  and the T + 60 TP was moved t o  153% from 165% a t  13/1551Z--too 
l a t e  t o  change the T + 45 abort  TP. 
CSM anomaly throuqh ent ry  
A f te r  the problem w i t h  the CSM, Retro asked us t o  look a t  moving the T + 
60 hour abort  TP back t o  i t s  o r i g i n a l  point .  Since we had no information t o  
ind icate the weather might improve there, we recomnended against doing so. 
Retro, a t  14/0536Z, passed us four  ta rge t  points  t o  evaluate f o r  possible 
use. They were located on o r  near the HPL, the AOL, the EPL, and the IOL, w i t h  
landings a t  142 hours, 133 hours, 137 hours, and 152 hours, respect ively.  These 
were passed t o  Weather f o r  evaluat ion and t o  the DOD t o  determine i f  merchant o r  
other  ships were i n  these areas t o  be ca l l ed  upon f o r  possible assistance. 
Shor t l y  thereaf ter  (a t  14/05552), three o r  four  add i t iona l  points  were brought 
i n  by the F l i g h t  Dynarcics SSR. These were a lso  passed t o  Weather, and the DOD 
was asked t o  provide shipping information f o r  a band o f  l a t i t udes  around the 
world and centered a t  22OS. The State Department was a lso  passed a l l  the above 
points,  should t h e i r  assistance be required i n  working w i t h  fo re ign  governments. 
By 14/08102, a burn had been schedu:ed f o r  14/08QZ to  p u ~  the spacecraft on a 
free-return t ra jec to ry  w i t h  a iD a t  60-OlE, 20-37s. NASA Rer ,very representatives 
assigned as advisors t o  r e c o ~ z r y  forces i n  Hawaii, Germany, and V i rg in ia ,  as we l l  
as on the PRS, were alerte.' t o  the problems and kept advised o f  the s i tuat ions.  
By 14/13272, Retro informed us tha t  they wzre considering three options t o  
re turn  t o  the South Pac i f i c  i n  range o f  the PRS. Two were quick returns a t  
118 GET, and the t h i r d  was a landing a t  142 + hours. The PRS was sent t o  a 
pos i t i on  t o  be i n  range o f  a l l  three points.  By 14/1402Z, we were informed by 
F l i g h t  t ha t  the landing a t  142 + GET t o  16595 was the most l i k e l y .  
A t  approximately 14/1500Z, CSM EPS informed us he was working on post landing 
power usage and would get back w i t h  us l a t e r .  About 1 hour l a te r ,  he proposed 
t o  us a pre l iminary p lan based on 12 hours post landing power being ava i lab le  a f t e r  
splash. 
DUTY CYCLE 
VHF receiver 50% 
VHF beacon O f f  (use surv iva  1 tad i o) 
Audio center 1, 2, 3 O f f  
Cabin l i g h t s  O f f  
PLV (low mode) 50% 
Flashing 1 i g h t  25% (only i f  landing i n  darkness) 
One upr igh t ing  
We evaluated h i s  proposal and stated tha t  we would p re fe r  the VHF beacon remain 
"on" f o r  3 hours before plugging i n  the surv iva l  radio, s ince we wanted t o  insure 
the beacon was "ontf inmediately a f t e r  main chute deployment and would remain "on1' 
without i n te r rup t i on  u n t i l  the rescue a i r c r a f t  had a reasonable time t o  e lec t ron i -  
ca l  l y  search the recovery area. 
Offers o f  assistance came from many fo re ign  governments. The o f fe rs  included 
the use of a i r c r a i t ,  a i r f i e l d s ,  ships, and assistance i n  contact ing any merchant 
vessel f l y i n g  t h e i r  f lag.  T5e resources o f  the U. S. were o f  course ava i lab le  t o  
us, and the USS America, an .q i r c ra f t  ca r r i e r ,  l e f t  Puerto Rico e a r l i e r  than 
scheduled enroute t o  Rio de Jamerio, should an A t l a n t i c  landing occur, although the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  a t  t h i s  time was low. Near the Indian Ocean TP, the USS Botdelon 
happened t o  be i n  Port  Louis, Hauri t ius. A C-141 a i r c r a f t  was pu t  on standby t o  
f l y  a NASA recovery crane and a NASA Advisor t o  Maur i t ius should they be required. 
I f  a landing had occurred, the Bordelon could have been there a t  time o f  landing 
t o  re t r i eve  the crew and CH. 
Some o f f e r s  from other  governments 1 i s ted  spec i f  i c  ships and a i r c r a f t  and 
t h e i r  locat ions. I n  general, most of  these were c l a s s i f i e d  and w i l l  no t  be 
discussed here. Other data received, Fndicated there were twelve f reeworld merchant 
vessels w i t h i n  500 n. m i .  o f  the IOL TP and two w i t h i n  600 n. mi. o f  the AOL TP. 
Once i t  was f a i r l y  ce r ta in  we were going t o  the HPL, most o f  our a c t i v i t i e s  
were d i rected t o  t h i s  area. Log is t i cs  plans f o r  re tu rn  o f  the crew and data were 
being developed. A1 though the weather f o r  the EOM TP looked good a t  t h i s  time, 
the t rop i ca l  storm "Helen" was s t i l l  i n  t ha t  v ic in i ty ,and i t s  speed and d i r e c t i o n  
were uncertain. Da i ly  weather reconnaisance f l i g h t s  were t t~er :  scheduled t o  keep 
t rack  o f  it. By recovery day, i t  had v i r t u a l l y  d iss ipated and presented no problem. 
A1 though we would normal l y  support the EOM TP w i t h  two HC-130 rescue a i  r c r a f  t 
and a primary recovery ship, two add i t iona l  a i r c r a f t  and one add i t iona l  sh ip  were 
made avai lable. The ex t ra  ship was an experimental minesweeper and would cover the 
I1Constant GI1 TP. The PRS Iwo Jima would cover the GGN and EMS TP. The a i r c r a f t  
were placed along the reentry  groundtrack both up and downrange. 
Information concerning the LM and SH IP's and dispersion area was passed 
t o  NASA Headquarters t o  a l e r t  ships and a i r c r a f t  t ha t  might be i n  the area-of- 
debris reentry 
Since we had had so many o f f e r s  o f  assistance from around the world, we 
began working w i t h  the F l i g h t  Dynamics SSR t o  come up w i t h  a schedule based on 
avai lab le AV when a landing could no longer occur east o f  c e r t a i n  longitudes. 
This was extremely useful  i n  a1 lowing us t o  re lax  our support posture when the 
capab i l i t y  t o  land i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  area no longer existed. This information was 
passed t o  the State Department and 000 fo r  dissemination. 
A t  16608252, the RFO stated they might p re fe r  not t o  do HCC-7 i f  they were 
w i t h i n  1/4 o f  tbe desired f l i g h t  path angle, due t o  the crowded crew t imel ine. 
This meant tha t  the TP may move as much as 50 miles a t  E l - 5  hours. This was 
acceptable t o  us from a ship standpoint. 
EECOH informed us (a t  16/16302) tha t  due t o  low power avai lable, they desired 
t o  tu rn  o f f  S-band a t  E l .  Since the recovery a i r c r a f t  are eqgipped w i t h  S-band 
t rack ing  equipment which can determine i f  the spacecraft has passed by, we f e l t  i t  
advisable t o  have the spacecraft t ransmit S-band t o  narrow down the search area 
should there be an undershoot o r  overshoot i n  case a v isua l  o r  e lec t ron ic  search 
should be required. He concurred and informed us tha t  S-band w o ~ l d  be "on" u n t i l  
main chutes i n  h igh power voice dawnlink mode. 
A t  17/0900, the subject o f  S-band i n  high o r  low power mode dur ing en t ry  was 
discussed w i t h  EELOM and F l i gh t .  It cost  about 3/4 amp-hour t o  have i t  i n  h igh  
power during reentry. A t  the time, t h i s  was about 30 minutes o f  post landing power. 
They were p red i c t i ng  12 amp-hours a f t e r  one upright ing, which calculated t o  about 
6 hours o f  post landing power. There apparently was some discrepancy between the 
power usage o f  various systems and a lso what amount o f  power was avai lab le,  s ince 
l a t e r  ca lcu la t ions  provided f o r  approximately 12 hours o f  post landing power a f t e r  
one upright ing. We were l a t e r  informed tha t  approximately 32 amp-hours were 
avai lable. This would approximate 22 hours a f t e r  one upright ing. We reqdested 
EECOM t o  conf i rm tha t  the crew should go t o  the low power check l i s t  should voltage 
drop below 27.5 vo l ts .  EECOM confirmed the crew was aware. The f i n a l  post landing 
conf igurat ion agreed upon was t o  have VHF receive, recovery beacon, audio centers, 
and PLV (low) "on." 
A t  17/11392, the Constant G p o i n t  was changed from 22.285, 169-08W t o  
22-IOS, 169-3SW. A t  17/17222, we were informed i t  changed t o  21-10s. 167-45W. 
The ship covering the ''Constant GI1 TP was d i  rected t o  proceed t o  the new TP, and 
a i r c r a f t  #3 was relocated. 
Entry throuqh postrecovery 
The f i r s t  reported e lec t ron ic  contact w i t h  the recovery forces was an S-band 
contact received by Samoa Rescue 4 a t  18012. There i s  now some doubt about the 
v a l i d i t y  o f  t h i s  report, hmever. Signals from the VHF recovery beacon were f i r s t  
received by the Recovery, Photo, and Sw im  I hel icopters a t  18032. Splashdown 
occurred a t  18:07:412, as determined by the recovery forces. 
A t  the time of landing, Iwo Jima was located 5 n. m i .  nor th  o f  the predic ted 
ta rge t  point ,  having ar r ived on s t a t i o n  several hours p r i o r  t o  t ha t  time. A l l  
ship-based a i r c r a f t  were on s t a t i o n  20 minutes p r i o r  t o  landing. 
A v isual  s i gh t i ng  repor t  by Recovery was received a t  18032 p r i o r  t o  acqulsi-  
t i o n  o f  recovery beacon signals. Fuel dump and voice contact w i t h  Apol lo 13 was 
noted dur ing descent. No readout o f  l a t i t u d e  and longitude was received from the 
spacecraft. The CM remained i n  Stable I a f te r  landing, w i t h  f l ash ing  l i g h t  
operat ing and i n f l a t i o n  o f  the upr igh t ing  systems occurr ing some 10 minutes subse- 
quent t o  splash. 
A f te r  confirming the i n t e g r i t y  o f  the spacecraft and assurr ing tha t  the crew 
was i n  good condit ion, Recovery attempted t o  snag the main parachutes w i t h  
grappl ing hooks and f l o t a t i o n  p r i o r  t o  t h e i r  s inking. 
Swimner-equipped he1 icopters a r r i ved  on scene a t  18162 and inmediately 
proceeded w i t h  r e t r i e v a l  e f f o r t s .  S w i m  2 deployed swimmers t o  provide f l o t a t i o n  
t o  the spacecraft, whi le  S w i m  1 deployed swimmers t o  the apex cover located up-wind. 
Crew egress occurred a t  18352, fol lowed by a rescue net  r e t r i e v a l  o f  each 
crew member. The crew were onbyard the recovery he1 icopter  by 18422. The CH 
landed a t  21°-38.4'~, 165'-21.7 W, approximately .5 n. m i .  from the TP. The crew 
was on the Iwo Jima a t  18532. 
Command module r e t r i e v a l  took place a t  19362 a t  coordinates 21-39.13, 
165-20.94, wi thout  incident.  bne main parachute and the apex cover were re t r i eved  
by small boat and brought aboard. 
The f l i g h t  crew departed Iwo Jima a t  18/182Oz f o r  American Samoa and 
subsequently by C-141 a i r c r a f t  t o  Hawai i , a r r i v i n g  a t  19/02352. The spacecraft 
and associated equipment a r r i ved  Hawai i aboard the Iwo Jima a t  24/18002, t o  be 
followed by deact ivat ion a t  Hawaii and subsequent shipment t o  NAR, Downey, 
Ca l i fo rn ia ,  on A p r i l  27. 
GMT - GET CONVERSION TABLE 
GET 
( HRTN) 

Recomendat ions 
No recomnendations are  made. Several minor problems tha t  d i d  occur 
a re  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  the report ,  and these areas w i l l  be reviewed and 
the procedures possibly redefined. 
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LAUNCH TO !l!RfuJSIUNAR mJEmm 
COAST To SE'LASH 
02 :35:46,4 
:41:37.1 
02:41:47.1 
03 :06 :oo ,o 
04t01:10.0 
04:18:0005 
not required 
30 :bO :49.0 
Hot required 
6 1 ~ g : k . 8  
79e7z38.3 
105 :18:31 
Not required 
137:39:48 
138:~ :06 
141:30:@ 
142 :40 :47 
142 :54 :45 
Phe Mission Cortrol Center (MCC) and the Manned Space Flight Network 
(MSFN) were placed on mission status fo r  Apollo 13 on March 31, 1970. 
~aunch occurred on April 11, 1970, a t  19:13:00.65 CM?. splash 
occurred on April 17, 1970, a t  18:07:00 W. 
W r a l l  the support provided by the MCC/MSFN was excellent. In the 
face of a near catastrophic fa i lure  onboarZ the CSM, the MSFN personnel 
responded very quickly and professionally and deserve a great deal of' 
credi t  f o r  the successful c a p l e t i o n  of t h i s  Apollo mission. 
Due t o  the C S 4  anomaly, there were many r e a l  time configuration 
changes and some rea l  t ine procedure chanses i n  order t o  support 
this non-nomiel mission. 
Following the accident though SIVB impact on the moon, the procedure 
developed premission t o  track two vehicles with the same uplink and 
dcvnlink frequencies was implemented. However, deviations *re required 
due t o  the manner i n  which the IU/CCS transpom2er responded; these 
deviations w~rkej. and valid tracking data was provided. 
Air - to-grad  voice communications =re considered g o d  t a  excellent 
even though a considerable portion of the missioli was flown on IM 
mini antennas md on low power. The MSFN support of IN backup voice 
vas very good. Tracking data at these low signal levels was exce lhnt  
ard was evec received from uncooled 30' s i t e s  which .as to ta l ly  
unexpected. The qualLty of the support provided made it possible 
for the MCC f l i gh t  controllers t o  operate in the IM low power mode 
throughout the majority of the mission and thus t o  conserve c r i t i c a l  
e lec t r ica l  power on the spacecraft. 
In addition t o  the excellent sup3ort provided by those stations af the 
MSFN planned for  support of' Apollo 13, special mention and a word of 
api~reciation should be given t o  those personnel involved i n  
configuring the Parkes 210' antenna f o r  support of Apollo. During the 
two Parkes view periods, approximately 20$ more valid telemetry data 
was received and good air-to-ground voice was provided. 
1.1 Major System l3oiilems/~onsideratim.s 
1.1.1 MCC 
A. RTCC 
The RTCC provided continuous support f o r  Apollo 3.3 with 
out a single major failure. 
In  general network canmunicatio& was the best 
we have experienced. Ti.le only signif'icar~t problem 
was an unusual number of fai lures  a t  the chmtmmicaticm 
s a t e l l i t e  s ta t ion in Buitrago, main. 
1.2 Procedures 
1.2.1 After !l!LI, IXCO e-ssed a desire t o  maintain the 
retransmit counter a t  3. On future missions INCOts 
desires should become knoun earl:. errough to  be included 
i n  N5tworkt s TLI message. !Be NO11 should re f lec t  the 
f a c t  t ha t  the post-TLI rztransmit set t ing is not 
absolute. 
1.2.2 Based on comments received during the mission a s  well 
8s i n  the MR's it is necessary t o  review the g r o d  
rules that the "Handover" procedures are based upoa. 
There are several significant questions unanswered 
regarding "countdcwn, " announcements, " "absence of 
cmumtn.rcations" e t c  . 
It is recomnended that  the low speed data ra te  of one 
sample per t en  seconds become the s t d a m 3  rate f o r  the 
lunar phases (!l!K!, lunar orbi t  and TEC) of the missions.. 
It was noted that  no sQnificant delays or  queue buildup 
resulted i n  the handling of the one sample per ten second 
data rate by the GSFC CP. The appropriate areas of the 
NOD should be changed t o  ref lect  the above recanmendation 
along with a schtdule of wben the data rate v i l l  change 
from one sample per s ix  seconds t o  one sample per ten 
seconds. 
1.2.4 It was noted tha t  the procedure fo r  coordination of s i t e  
release messages shoula be reviewed. Track was involved 
in many time consuming discussions concerning s i t e  release 
messages during the mission. 
2 00 CONFIGURATION 
The MCC and MEFY configuration a t  launch was as specified in  the 
following paragraphs : 
2.1 MCC HardwEil'e 
Ttie ~ o n f i g ~ a t i o n  f the MCC hardware and equipment was i n  
accordance with AS-508 @I%" Mission Data Packs, p l u  AS-508 
MRR's 001 through 58. 
2.2.1 Hardware 
TIG RTCC configuration was "A" 360/75 MOC (on line) 
with "D" 3a/75 as DSC (aft' line) and "F" 360/75 as 
stat ic  stcadby. 
23.2 Software 
Hssion program version 508-45 w i t h  IiTOS ~ 0 . 2 7  
.The CCATS CP configuration was "A" system on liee vith "B" 
system as standby. 
2.3.2 Software 
CCATS 508 version IV, Release 16 program. 
!Che "A" system was on line with "B" as standby; wideband 
data line GW 58526 was the prime data path between MCC and 
GSFC with GW 58527 as the alternate data path. 
2.4.2 Software 
Systems tape 4 and errata tape 04-2 plus change requests 
1 through 6, 
2 .5.l Data core decom programs were as follows: 
SIC AS-508 LIOO1.0. 7/25/69 
SII ~11001.1 8/15/69 
SIV ~nrool .0 7/25/69 
IU L m 1 . 0  7/25j/69 
m cmol .o 9/10/69 
In Ixow,o . 2/02/70 . 
2.5.2 Data core/ALDs 
Data Core module #3 was the online system wi'& 
rncdule #k as  backup. 
System "B" was the online system vl th  output on 
both prime (GI# 58245) and alternate (GW 5&46) 
wide band circuits.  
System "A" was the standby system with the 
CD? antenna f i e ld  selected as the prime USB axil 
VBF data source fo r  LV data. 
PITSS prqram 508.3.2 Rev 4 was utilized. 
The Remoted Wlemetry Program, NCG 738-2 vlth erreta Tl 
through !El; command program with errata  C1; B O D  
program 738-2; a d  OUCH program 738-2 were used a t  all 
remote s i t e s  which provided high speed cmmrenil/telemetry 
support. 
3.1.1 Summary 
KIlCC systern'perfonnance for this mission was excellent 
with only mincr discrepancies observed i n  the mission 
prpgrm. A single episode of coql~t,.?r faults occurred but 
these had no impact on .mission supp..rt. The performance 
of the RTCC computer controller teams was exceptional 
throughout the mission. 
O& minor software discrepancies were observed in the 
mission program. The R!CCC ab i l i t y  t o  provide f u l l  
mission support was not affected by the discrepancies 
since work-around procedures were developed f o r  the problems 
and a l l  required data was provided. 
3.1.3 Hardware Anomalies 
The single episode'of computer fau l t s  
during this mission occumed during the 
period of two computer, i.e., MOC/DSC operation, and there 
was no interruption t o  mission support. Machine checks 
o c c ~ d  i n  the MOC which was 753. A selectover t o  75A 
which was the DSC was performed inmediately and was 
f o l l m d  by a channel t o  channel. high speed restart 
from 75A t o  75F so that  two computer s u ~ p o r t  was restored. 
This incident occurred a t  a GWT! of 06:37:00 on April 15. 
Operations on 75A as the MOC and 75F as the DSC were 
continued through the recovery of Pgollo 13 f l i gh t  crew, 
and without interruption. 
3.2.1 C C U S  Processor Hardware 
A. During the AS-508 Terminal Count and Mission Suppart, 
four hardware problems were encountered. Suppollt 
was not affected by these problems: 
"c" CP System Instruction faulted a t  02C3Z 
(4/13/70). A t  the time this problem occurred, the 
" C" Cl? was being used as a Standby CP; however, 
it was not required f o r  mission support. This 
problem was isolated t o  a bad cable between the "OLD 
SCU" and the FH-880 Drum on the "C" CP. The "OLD SCU" 
was by-passed by install ing a spare I/O cable between 
the Drum and the Computer Mainframe. 
W W S  6 supported Apollo 13 without any major 
prdblems. The most significant problem i n  this area 
that resulted in a loss  of data was the recycling 
of the CCATS CP. Each recycle resulted i n  a 2 to  5 
minute l o s s  of low speed data. 
1.1.2 Manned Space Flight Network 
Ibe support of ApoUo 13 was the best provided 
by the RSDP system. HSC's command computer problem 
was the only significant prdblem and this problem 
was only significant because of the length of time it 
took t o  resolve the problem. There was no mission 
impact, however, due t o  the intermittent nature of 
the problem sane rearrangement of premission s i t e  
assignments was necessary. HSK finally solved the 
cmmanrl f a u l t  problem by cleaning a l l  contacts a 
connectors and reseating the logic cards i n  chassis 7. 
m5re -re no major problems e n c o u n t e ~  i n  this 
area. Several s i t e s  did lose portions of command 
his tor ies  and this problem is under investigation. 
There =re no major prdblems which impacted mission 
s w o r t .  
mere were no significant anomalies vhich impacted 
mission support. 
E. -~ir/~rouud Cantuunications 
 round Ccmunications were excellent despite the 
fact tha t  most of the mission was conducted with 
out benefit  of the power amplifier on the I24 and 
t ha t  backup voice was the primary mode of operation 
following the accident. 
"B" CP System had an FH-880 Drum parity error 
while the system was being recycled "IX-SYl1c~"dth the 
"A" CP (07382 - 4/13/70). The "B" CrP was being 
used as a Standby CP; however, it was not required 
f o r  mission support a t  that  time. "B" CP was 
released fo r  maintenance testing by UNIVAC Customer 
Engineers. No problem was found and the system 
was reloaded from tape with the CCATS Mission 
Program with no further occurrence of t h i s  problem 
durin~; mission support. 
3) "A" CP System indicated receipt of "~lanks" on the 
1;owspeed Radar "H" Teletype input; however, this 
condition did not exis t  on the "B" CP (standby) (09102 
- 4/14/70). The problem was determined t o  be a 
bad relay on the input CLT 1-14 of the "A" CP. 
The relay was replaced. The "A" CP was "on-Line" 
a t  the time; huuever, no data were lost. 
4). "c" (P System would not load from tape (18102 - 
4/15/70). This pro5l .e~ was found t o  be a bad Printed . 
Circuit (PC) card i n  the D/O (Arithmetic) Register 
which was replaced. 
B. Total 496 down time during AS-508 from commen~ement 
of terminal count t o  splash was 4 hours and 53 minutes. 
However no impact t o  missicn support resulted. 
3.2.2 System Configuration Unit (sCU) 
A. !Bree problems w e r e  encountered with the SCU during 
mission support: . 
1) Cross Point MAP'S taken a t  various times during 
mission support indicated cross points were Closed 
when they should have been Open. An attempt 
was made t o  correct t h i s  problem; however, it was 
unsuccessful. There was no impact t o  mission support. 
2) Unable t o  input "MITE" timing into the "c" CP System 
via the SCU. An alternate path was selected through 
the SCU f o r  the "C" System "MITE" timing interface 
(15452 - 4/11/70). There was no impact t o  mission 
support. 
3) " C" CP System Mission Support configuration (PCC 1 ~ 0 1 )  
was entered in to  the  SCU (09392 - 4/14/70). A "MAP" 
indicated one I/O p a i r  and many Cross Paints were 
closed t ha t  should ,have been Open i n  Matrix 2. It 
was determined t ha t  Matrix 1 had loaded groperly; however, 
Matrix 2 had not loaded properly. An a t=rpt  was made 
t o  reload PCC l C O l  manually with the same results .  
!Phis problem did nut a f fec t  the  On-Line ("A") o r  
the Standby ("B") CP1s. Due t o  t h i s  problem, the 
"c" CP had a minimal configuration capability via 
the SCU and the  "C" CP could provide mission 
support. 
Be All SCU problems remained unresolved a t  mission termination. 
A. Sofiware support was provlded f o r  the AS-508 'Penninal 
Couut and Mission Support' with Release 16 of the CCATS 
 pera at ional  Program (5084.16). 
B. Proczssor r e ~ y c l e s  were required as  a resu l t  of (1) 
the  On-Line and Standby P ' s  .Rre outputting "old" 
(pre-riously receil-ed/transmitt;ed) teletype messages 
(23232 - 4/11/70, 20172 - 4/32/70 and l k l 0 ~  - 4/14/70) 
and (2) Ekecutive Buffer depletions (23362 - 4/13/70 and 
05532 - 4/14/70). These problems were isolated by 
investigation of system f a u l t  dumps. Procedures were 
established t o  prevent t h e i r  recurrence. 
3.3 Command 
3.3.1 The atnount of command ac t i v i t y  during Apollo 13 was considerably 
reduced because of the CSMts power loss. The only s ignif icant  
anomalies t ha t  affected comand were a s  follows: 
A. 'Phe HSK 6 4 2 ~  #1 was e i t he r  "red" o r  "red can su?portl' 
from ~ / 1 6 4 3 ~  through 15/1449~. Because of t he  
in termit t tn t  nature of the problem, the planned pre- 
mission s i t e  assignments had t o  be rearranged. 
Be Twice CRO1s commaad his tor ies  were missing most of 
the commands uplinked. Post mission they found a 
Magnetic 'Pape U n i t  (w) ro l l e r  problem. 
C. During one GDS pass, there m s  no t rans fe r  of CXP words f mm 
the command computer t o  the telemetry computer. The 
problem was caused by a bad Inhibit  Driver card. 
D. There were 123 spacecraft rejects, 18 ground rejects, 
10 los t  executes and 33 Remote Cite invals. These 
' anomalies were caused by the following conditions. 
I) Tfie spacecraft re jects  were due t o  executes 
attempted during periods cf low signal strength; 
however, ' an undetermined nuiber of these executes 
were functionally verified . 
2) The ground rejects were due t o  executes attempted 
when a s i t e  was "unable t o  cononand," thus, the 
command subcarrier was off. 
3) The Remote Site Invals wen? due t o  executes 
attempted while another execute uplink ?;as already 
i n  progress. 
4) Nine of the Lost Executes were due t o  cmunicat ion 
outages a t  the time of the execute request. !i?he 
other los t  execute was due to  a HSK command 
computer f a u l t  . 
3.3.2 A chronological list of command anmalies follows: 
A. April 11, 1970 (F-0 day) 
Time: 20332 
Problem: CRO command history did not show the first 
10 of 12 uplinked cmnnands. 
Impact/~esolution: No impact as CRO provided the 
essent ial  information by an OPN message. Post mission 
C'O identified the cause as a worn pinch ro l le r  
on 1540 magnetic tape unie #2. 
Problem: GDS c o d a  not access the command computer to  
change the Map Wait Period. CAP words were not 
received f o r  twenty uplinked commands a t  12/0010. 
Impact/Resolution: The N. was handed o w r  t o  MIL after 
the scheduled C.SM handover t o  HAW t o  permit CDS t o  work 
on the command computer. A l l  uplinks were verified 
by voice. A bad Inhibit Driver card i n  chassis 13 s lo t  
4 6 ~  was replaced, and GDS was green a t  12/0026. 
B. April 12, 1970 (~+1 day)
Time: ~ 4 4 2  
Problem: HSK' reported command computer red, cannot 
support. 
Impact/~esolution: None, IISK was not i n  acquisition. 
Replaced three cards i n  the command cmputer and 
successfully passed an in t e~face  t e s t  a t  06022. 
Time: 03272 
Problem: GDS no go f o r  comand because of' PA #1 fau l t  . 
Impact/~esolution: Loss of coiand capability, GFS 
switched t o  USB system number 2. GDS had ax arcing 
problen. The problem was resolved by rep.;-zcirg the 
arc detection chassis. 
Time: 07082 
Problem: HSK c a m m ~  computer faulted, unable t o  
recover. 
fmpact,/I?esolution: One command was los t  du ing  the 
fault .  The CSM was hrnded over t o  GDS. Diagnostics indicated 
the problem was i n  Chassis 7. Later, a l l   contact^ and 
connectors on Chassis 7 were cleaneu and the computer was 
declared green a t  15/1449~. HSK did successfully uplink 
two loads t o  the IM a t  approximately 14/1100~. 
Time: 1noz 
Problem: TM magnetic tape unit inoperative. 
Irnpact/~esolut ion: The H-70 command interface was 
delayed f o r  s ix  minutes. A t  18002 the l LTCJ l o s t  control 
and allowed the tape t o  I*-.n away. A de:"dctive " S a r t  
Seq" logic card was rev-laced. 
Problem: MAD telemetry corquter Zaulted, would not 
recover. 
lhpact/~esolution: The CE9's fo r  threc nplinked 
commands were lxt, but; the verificatit.rl was relayed 
by voice. The telemetry computer was reloaded. 
cause of the f au l t  has not beea identified. 
Problem: GE< command canputer had an intermittent 
"GM! Ij:sabledw ~ r i n t o u t  .
linpact/~esolution: Hone, as GYH vas not the active or 
backup site. The memory chassis, A-11 was replaced 
at  dcooz. 
PEoblem: 16 af 18 ccmmuds were miss- from 
CRO's TlTY comand histcry. 
~ 2 a c t / ~ s o l u t i o n :  Ro impact as the essential data 
was recei- by an O M  message. 
Time: 23352 
Problem: Both B's faulted with Recutive BufYer 
depletion. 
~mpact/~solution: Ho significant camam3 impact. However, 
ITICO had to uglink a c o ~ 3 i d ,  a d  thC?'s were recycled 
before GDS could 'lo canfigured t o  computer Mode 1. 
Both B ' s  were core dumped a d  recycled 13 sync. 
D. mil 14, 1970 (Fi3 days) 
Time: 22132 
Problem; r d l l  telemetry computer faulted, cou3  not 
clear upper register. 
~act/Ikso' lut ion:  'Two loads were upllnked t o  the LM, 
using GDS telemetry for  x-rification. Ng problem was 
discoverel. l%e c q r r t e r  was up ard cyclrPg a t  
23092. 
F. April 16, 1970 (F+5 days) 
Ho c a d  problems. 
G. April 17, 1970 (F+6 days) 
No cnnanenA problems. 
A Table I1 
Command load t raasfer  by date and site. 
A l l  up'link executes (excluding load in i t ia tes )  by s i t e  
aad date. 'Ihese uplink requests were executed 
from MCC from liftoff t o  splashdown. 
C. Table IV 
Total loads uplinked. These uplinks are not 
included i n  T a l e  111. In addition, the t o t a l  
number of telemetly rejects  ( 2 ~ )  or data rejects 
(DRJ) received furing the uplink of these loads 
sre noted. The only tvo rlMR's occ.cll.red during $he 
the the CSM was ir low b i t  rate which is c o m c t  
response, tbere =re no data rejects  received dur- this 
mission. 
Total spacecraft m jr -s (SCR) d grcmd rejects (m) . 
Thse  uplink requests are inciuded in tbe total of 
!Cable m. 
E. Table VI 
Total l o s t  executes (LSP) and EiSCC intW requests (RSI) 
for ~Qmmand uplink requests. Tbese I S  and RSI executes 
a m  included i n  Table 111. 
3.3.14 C d  b a d  Operation 
3.3.4.1 A t o t a l  of 326 SLV prelaunch loads, 25 loads per 
site plus one additional load ~.equir& by MIL f o r  
launcl vehicle pad interface, were transmitted 
low speed prior  "to the telminal count. These 
loads *re loadec by each s i t e  duriag the terminal 
count after s i t e  interface. 
3.3.4.2 A total of 102 loads were transferred frrm T-30 
minutes to splashdown. This total included 
GKFLO to all sites plus an extra GETPIL) to MIL 
at T-30 minutes. 
3-3-4.3 No problem was encountered in any load transfer 
during plhs time activity. 
TABLE I1 
The following loads were transferred t o  a l l  sites premission: 
5801 was transferred t o  MJZ. 
6050 was transferred t o  3IIL a t  T-30. 
The following =re transferred post l i f t -of f :  
BDA - 0002 
m-0002 
VAN - 0002 
mu - 1201 
GDS - 1201 
A ril 15 - 1970 
-205 
April 17, 1970 
CRo - 0017 0018 0701 07C2 I212 1213 1402 
April 12, 1970 
GDS - 0004 0 ~ 0 5  1001 5808 
April l3, 1970 
GDS - 0006 1201 
HAW-0006 0007 
ACN - 0007 
MAD - 1201 
1970 
-002 2006 2007 2lol 
2202 2203 11204 2301 2401 
EtAW - 0008 2OCE 2003 2U)l 2202 
2401 
MAD - 2006 2007 2203 2204 2301 
I3SK - 2003 

TABLe IV -- LOADS UPLINKED 
TABU VI- LOST EE~CUTES/RSCC INVALS 
- 
S/C 
REJErn 
GROlJND 
REJECPS 
LOASS 
UPL~WED 
TLI4 RET 
DATA REJ 
TCn!ALS 
30 
2 
ACN 
Irn 
EXECUTES 
- 
HAC ACN GDS 
13 
HEX 
6 
r 
TEX 
BDA 
& I  I 1 5 1  1 1 7 1  I I I 1 I i 0  I I I 33 
BDA G N  
I 0 
VAN 
1 
MAD 
3 
ACN 
GYM 
2 
M I L  
m0 
28 
7 
GDS 
3 
A 
CRO 
7 
BDA 
2 
C M  
C Y I  
G ?  CRO TEX CYI 
GDS 
3 1 
2 
GYM 
22 
3 
VAN 
GYM 
, 
TOTALS 
10 
HAW 
MAD 
35 
6 I 
HAW 
3 
HSK 
1 
18 
M I L  HSK 
4 
MAD 
4 
TEX 
M I L  
VAN TUl?ALS 
123 
3.k Telemetry 
- - -  
-- 3 .k .T The telemetry suppoFx provldeii by the MSFN aad. U ~ S /  
Data Core was excellent. Special mention should be msda 
- - -- -- 
of Parkes support. Approximately 20% more v a l i d  telemetry 
-aata was received-dm-the'-two-Parkes view pericds, than 
was possible from HSK during those same periods. Parkes 
was not called up f o r  support un t i l  84:20 :00 GEE, a f t e r  
the spacecraft contingency. . .. 
3.4.2 The following anomalies were noted during the mission 
-  - . 
a d  l i s t ed  by GM!ll day: 
- .. -. - -. . - -  
A. April ll, 1970 (F-O day) 
- -  . ~ i m e :  19322 - -  - 
Problem: Marginal CSM data was received by CYI  
- .. . 
resulting i n  intermittent CSN and Cb1C data a t  MCC. 
- .  
~ a c t / ~ e s o l u t l o n :  The trouble was attributed by C Y I  
t o  the spacecraft auxiliary Oscillator which was 
- . ----. -- -  
-- causing some extraneous-modulation on the PM dawnlink, 
causing receivers t o  lose lock. C M  was one-way on the 
CSM during th i s  pass. On the next pass, CYI: was two-way, 
---- 
and the s i tuat ion did not reoccur. No other s i t e  saw 
I .. this problem (cYI pass #l was the only one-way s i t e  during 
the mission). 
----- --. . 
B. April 12, 1970 ( ~ + l  day) 
Problem: MlLA telemetry ccrputer faulted during a CSM 
playb ack . 
-. 
--- Impact/&solu~f m i 1 0  -secunds - of playbzck data were 
lost. m e d i a t e  auto r e c o s ~ r y  w s  performed and 
continuation of data processirq &as resumed. MlLA 
nprted  no symptms and th i s  ?.tern is s t i l l  open. 
- . - --. - . -- --.- ----.- ---- 
Time: m z  
--. Rmblem: E X  telemetry Mlmparter had an input GM!l 
fai lure  id i ca t ion .  
J'npac t/Resolution: Negligable  pact because the internal 
- - - - - -  clock toak over the-GMT update-. A printout of "real 
Qa not establfshed'l was received on-site. No 
resolutfon a t  t h i s  time and -the te1eniet:y computer continued 
t o  operate on the in&rnal clock. FC was queried a s  t o  the 
effect  ~f running on the internal clock, and. they stated 
- thnt they d i d  nct notice any difference. 
Time: 20412 
Problem: Loss of sync indication fram MAD due t o  
telemetry computer faul t .  
lhpact/~esolution: 12 seconds of data were lost .  
T I C  handed o w r  t o  GDS f o r  telemetry data processing. Auto 
recovery a t  MAD did not work and a manual recovery 
was performed t o  restore the telemetry computer 
processing. 
Time: 21032 
Prohlem: Loss of sync indicatior from MAD due t o  a 
llelemetry Computer fault .  
Iinpact/~esolution: 10 seconds of data were lost .  
T I C  handed over t o  GDS for  telemetry data processing. 
A auto recovery, a manual recovery, and a reload from 
tape fai led t o  restore operation and the telemetry computer 
was declared red a t  21062. Troub1eshoc;~t;in.g on s i t e  
revealed a defective P.C. Card that would not allow 
the U upper regis ter  t o  clear. Heplacement of the 
defective part  corrected the problem and proper 
operation was restored. 
C. April 13, 1970 (F+2 days) 
Time: 03512 
Problem: GDS 13elemetry computer was unable t o  locate 
FMP 512 on mag tape. 
lhpact/~esolution: There was no data loss; the only 
impact was delay of a tape playback. The tape handler 
heads were cleaned and the ab i l i t y  t o  select Format 512 was 
restored. 
Time: 05402 
Problem: While reconfigwlng GDS from Playback 
configuration 6 RT, TIC has unable t o  replace high speed 
fatmat 512 with Format OO7 via c w u t e r  execute function. 
Tmpact/~esolution: There was no data loss. TIC handed 
aver t o  HSK f o r  rea l  t b e  telemetry data processing. A 
computer r e s t a r t  was performed a t  GDS and prc;=r operation 
was restored. Thls was the resu l t  of the telemetry computer 
selecting the wrong tape handler. 
D. April 14, 1970 ( ~ + 4  days) 
Time: 19582 
Problem: Loss of sync indication from 1AD due t o  a 
Telemetry cmputer.fault. 
lhpact/~esolution: Lost approximately 1 minutes of 
telemetry data. Handed over t o  ACN, but theACN 
data was intennittent due t o  the IM comm configuration. 
After an auto recovery was not successful, a manual 
recovery was performed and proper telemetry computer 
uperation was restored. 
Time: 21392 
Problem: Loss of sync indication from MAD due t o  9 
Telemetry computer fault .  
hpact /~esolut ion:  No impact, since GDS dsta was being 
processed. Auto recovery was performed and operation 
of t e l e ~ e t r y  computer was restored; no explanation was 
given. 
Time: 22112 
. <* 
Problem: Loss of sync indication from MAD due t o  a 
. Telemetry c q t e r  fault .  
~mpact/~esolution: No impact since GDS data was being 
processed by MCC. The telemetry computer could not be 
recovered and the  computer was declared red a t  22122. 
A t  23102 the telemetry computer wes returned t o  mission 
support a f t e r  troubleshooting effor ts  fa i led t o  f ind  any 
prdblems. Subsequent investigatior- of t h i s  problem on April 
15 found a defective printed c i rcu i t  card; and a f t e r  
t h i s  card was replaced, no further telemetry computer f au l t s  
were experienced during the mission. 
E. April 15, 1970 ( ~ + 4  days) 
No telemetry problems mcurred on ' this day. 
F. April 16, 1970 (F+5 days) 
Problem: GYM TIM computer faulted. 
Rnpact/~esolution: This did not cause any impact, 
as data was being processed from GDS. 'Ihe computer 
faulted and auto recovered af ter  three attempts. No 
symptoms were observed. See [03592) entry. 
Time: 03592 (104:46 GET) 
Problem: G'IM 'PIM computer went down and could not 
recover, 
lupact/~esolution: No impact as GDS was the prime site.  
GYM reported the computer red, ancl a t  04062 it was reported 
that b i t  z25 was being s e t  i n  the lower memory bank, causing 
the computer t o  address the wrong instruction. A t  
06052, GYM reported that  the computer could support, but 
was red because of the intermittent problem. 
Problem: Unable t o  turn on telemetry data from ACN via 
computer execute f'unction. 
liupact/~esolution: There was no impact since telemetry 
data was being processed from MAD ai; t h i s  time. The 
problem was caused by a configuration error which was 
made when the station replaced a failed Data Transmission 
 hit (DTU) on ~ e t  6. A t  15182 proper s i t e  configuration 
was restored and telemetry data was turned on via CEF. 
G. April 17, 1970 ( ~ + 6  days) 
110 significant prob'lems were experienced on this day. 
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3.5.1 The ent i re  Apollo Network per f 'omce was outstanding. With 
the many rea l  ti= reconfiguration changes, operating at near 
tbreshold signal sfrengths, and having to  comply with rea l  . 
time procedure chaqes, all s i t e s  responded exceptionally well. 
HSK 642B cmputer was red from prelaunch t o  15/15002. This 
caused a perturbation i n  planning for  A ~ ~ ~ ~ O / A L S E P  coverage 
during times when only three o r  four s i t e s  were i n  view. There 
were very few other on s i t e  equipment failures, all of which 
had l i t t l e  o r  no W c t  on the mission. 
The one problem that caused the greatest loss  of Tracking Data 
was once again YLC/CP recycles. The majority of CP recycles 
we& accomplished to  prevent the CP from outputting old tele- 
type messages. !Total loss  of low speed tracking data was 2 
t o  5 minutes f o r  each recycle. 
3.5.2 A chronological l i s t  of tracking anomalies follows: 
A. April ll, 1 g O  (F-0 day) 
Tinre: ll/19132 - Liftoff 
Problem: VAN CDP declared red. 
~mpact/~esolution: Just  prior to launch, the VAN loaded 
the 507 program i n  the CDP. GSFC CADFISS had lnade several 
attempts t o  pass the VAN high speed tracking data using 
the 508 program all of which failed. After loading the 
507 program, GSFC was b b l e  t o  CADFISS the VAN as the 
GSFC computers were configured fo r  launch. GSFC and VAN 
f e l t  more confident using the 507 program, but st i l l  de- 
W d  the CDP red fo r  launch. Actual data obtained during 
powered f l i g h t  was noisy but did give C and S-Band a "go" 
for  orb i t  solution. FIDO did not elect, however, t o  use 
th i s  VAN C and S-Bad solution fo r  orb i t  determination. 
The low speed data a f t e r  insertion receivsd at  WC was pro- 
cessed but the data did not fit the orbit. Other sources 
orb i t  determination indicated an apogee of 102.5 am and 
perigee of 100.3 nrn whereas VAN data indicated 3+ nm and 
150 nm respectively. 
The problem is  unresolved at th i s  time, 
Problem: CRO bbrk I ranging unit red. 
~mpact/~esolution: For the entire revolution 1 pass, CRO 
ranging data had a verylarge bias, and was unusable. The 
doppler data, however, uas used. A t  21002, prior to  rev 2, 
support, CRO replaced a bad card in the transmitter coder 
uni t  and went green. 
B, A p r i l  12, 1970 ( ~ + 1  day) 
Time: 12/01452 
Problem: HAU doppler data appeared noisy. 
~mpsct/~esolution: No impact as data ybs s t i l l  usable. 
However, a bias  o r  fluctuation of 1 cycle appeared on all 
doppler data from system 1. After switching receivers and 
synthesizers, running WFISSj  and conducting on s i t e  teats, 
the problem was traced t o  a wiring e r m r  i n  the system 1 
range rate gate. The wiring error  prohibited the octal  
numbers 1, 3, 4, and 6 from being output. 
Problem: GDS System 1, P.A, Fault. 
~mpect/~~esolution: No significant impact. When P.A. 
#1 faulted, System 2 was brought up 2-way. System 1 
was only dcwn momentarily. astern I was not declared 
Red. After s i t e  UIS, GDS discovered the ARC detector 
chassis tha t  was i n  use when the,PA fau l t  occurred did 
not have an EZ installed that  made tbe detector less  
sensitive t o  arcing. 2. FU chassis with tFe EI 
modification was installed. N o  2~+,her P.A, fau l t s  were 
experienced. 
Time : ' 12/09032 
R o b k m :  MAD System 2 analogfdigital. converter Red. 
fmpact/~esolution: No impact as ranging 4ata fran 
system 2 was not required. A reference amplifier card i n  
the MKI A/D converter was replaced. The i t e m  was declared 
green after site LOS a t  u / o G ~ ~ z .  
Time: 12/2357 
Problem: HAW Doppler Bias 
~ a c t / ~ e s o l u t i o n :  Impact was a loss of doppler 
data f o r  approximately one minute. The synthesizer 
set t ing was,off by one cycle which caused a doppler 
b ias  of 104 cycles. This probleln uas corrected by 
adjusting the synthesizer. 
C. April 13, 1970 f ~ + 2  days) 
Time: l3/05kZ 
Problem: Lost HSK-X low speed tracking data after WO 
of IU/SIVB. A t  the time of the loss of data, an 
' 
unidentified !JTY indicator was received. 
~mpact/~esolution: No major impact. Low speed 
was los t  f o r  four minutes un t i l  HSK-X put on a new start 
of message header on data. 
Pmblem: Insufficient sites t o  support required data 
sources. (ApoUo, m, SIVB) . 
lmpact/Resolution: ljnpact was a 2 1  aiinutes loss of 
ALSEP data. 'ihe requirements for  support during 
this period were: (1) a two-way carr ier  with f u l l  system 
capabili ty t o  the CSM, (2) a backup three-way s i t e  t o  the 
CSM with the same capability, (3) a two-way s i t e  with 
car r ie r  only t o  the SIVB, and (4) a separate site for  
ALSEP receive and re:ord, since ALSEP and thecSM/sIVB were 
not within the beamwidth of a single antenna. 
Since the HSK camnand computer was red, CMD capability 
was los t  from both 85 f t  dishes a t  HSK and IISK-X. The 
only other s i t e s  i n  view af te r  HAW LOS a t  u:50 GFP, were 
CRO'which was assigned t o  CSM two way and G W  which wus 
previously assigned t o  ALSEP and had t o  be used as backup t o  
CSM. HSK had early M S  due t o  masking which l e f t  a 
gay i n  ALSEP support u n t i l  CYI AOS nt 21:11 GET. HSK-x 
could have covered the ALSEP support without any 
masking problems u n t i l  CYI AOS, but was not 
modified f o r  ALSEP support. 
Time: 13/10592 
Problem: MAD range system 1 Red cannot support. 
Bnpact/~esolution: mere was no impact since 
System 2 was used a t  handover.. MAD replaced two open 
R. F. cables t o  support R. F. doppler updates. 
B c h l c m :  GDS-X was red fo r  servo amplifier. 
~mpact/~esolution: GDS-X los t  valid auto track data 
for 10 minutes while changing servo amplifier units. 
!Be CSM was handed over t o  GDS-Frime putting b o a  vehicles 
on prirce antenna with dual !TIP operations. After the 
servo amplifiers were changed, the C.SM was handed back 
t o  GDS-X. 
Time: 13/23022 
Prdblen: Si te  doppler biases were observed. 
Impact/~esolution: Select support while looking 
a t  doppler residuals noted that  while GDS was i n  a-1 
TIE on separate vehicles (see above problem) tbe 
N doppler residuals we= about .5E. When any site, 
85 or 30 ft ,  was tracking i n  a single a]$ mode the IV 
doppler residuals were 4HZ. There is no explanations f o r  
t h i s  condition. 
D. April 14, 1970 ( ~ + 3  days) 
Problem: HSK-X reported PA #4 red fo r  fan motor i n  
%at exchanger. 
Impact/~esolution: No iutpact, problem was corrected prior  
t o  AOS. The fan motor was changed and the s i t e  went 
green a t  04152. 
Problem: Not saving GDS-X low speed data. 
l inpact/~solution: Two way s i t e  data was not available 
f o r  trajectory processiagc. PIR had the IU frequency 
pulled of'f and had fai led t o  lock the synthesizer t o  
VCO. P r o b l e m  was resolved by locking the synthesizer 
t o  the VCO. 
Time: 14/065lZ 
Problem: G W  USB was Red f o r  Y - a x i s  failure.  
~ a c t / ~ e s o l u t i o n :  G W  was the backup site t o  the IN and site 
a s s i g m n t s  had t o  be changed from GIM t o  HAW. G N  went 
m e n  a t  07202, after replacing a servo amplifier. 
E. April 15, 1970 ( ~ + 4  days) 
Time: 15/0034~ 
Problem: No IU acquisition data was available f o r  
HAW, and ACN from G9"C computers. 
~ a c t / ~ e s o ~ u t i o n :  Sites were currently tracKng but 
if an LCH had occumed, there would have bee, no 
acquisition data available t o  aid i n  reacquiring. 
The problem was i n  a program limitation a t  GRPS. They 
could not output acquisition data within+ - one hclur 
of impact. 
Problem: MP9 doppler contained sporadic noise. 
~ c t / ~ e s o l u t i o u :  No impact; 3he points were several 
minutes apart and cmld be edited. Two way carr ier  
was handed over from system 1 t o  system 2, t o  isolate  
the problem. Sporadic noise was s t i l l  present on system two. 
No resolution. 
Problem: ACN 1218 computer was red. 
~ a c t / ~ s o l u t i o n :  NO impact, me 1218 was green 
a t  18372 after  reloading the computer. 
F. stpril 16, 1970 ( ~ + 5  days) 
TW: 16/0907z 
Problem: GDS Apollo Timing Equipment was red. 
rplpact/~esolution: No impact. The problem 
affected !lDP high speed data only. 
Time : 17/0U52 
Problem: Lost HAW Low Speed data and received an 
S-Band unidentified TTY indicator on the !Crack Console. 
OS-X low speed data was also los t  a t  about the same 
time. This apparently caused a C-band unidentified 
L/s indicator t o  l ight.  HAW and GDS-X data was 
reestablished and the console indicators returned t o  
normal with exception of Urn-ID being lit along w i t h  
8 sources. 
&act/Fksolutlon: No major impact ( los t  a few frames 
of data.) A check with GCC and with Track support 
on the 6 L/s hadling resulted i n  no reason identified 
for the problem. 
G. stpril 17, 1970 ( ~ + 6  days) 
No tracking problems. 
3.6.1 Communications support f ran the Communication Managers 
and Voice Controllers a t  GSFC and the  MSFN personnel 
was considered excellent.  All positions were quick t o  
respond i n  resolving communications problems with the 
W N  and adherence t o  the established Communications 
Interface Procedures was excellent.  As indicated i n  
the da i l y  chronologies the communication l inks t o  
Madrid were plagued with problems. Communications t o  the 
r e s t  of the Network were excellent.  
3.6.2 The following i s  a chronological resume of those 
communications problems which had mission impact. 
A. April  11, 1970 (F-0 day) 
Time : 11/22152 
Problem: Non-receipt of BIOMED upon GDS handover. 
Irnpact/~esolution : PTormally, no signif icarit impact 
would be f e l t  because of immediate ava i l ab i l i ty  
of BIOMED from an. a l ternate  source. In t h i s  
instance, BIOMED via  HAW was attempted without success. 
A t  22172, GSFC Voice Control received GDS BIOMED and 
transferred it .i;o MCC. It is believed t ha t  the  
problem was due t o  a misinterpretation of 
procedures which s t ipu la te  remoting on Net 5 a t  TLI plus 
3 hours v ice  3 hours Ground Elapsed Tiroe. This w i l l  be 
reviewed and c l a r i f i c a t i on  w i l l b s  provided. 
B. April 12, 1970 ( ~ + 1  day) 
-re were no s ignif icant  anomalies v i t h  mission impact 
during the  course of t h i s  GMT day. 
C. April 13, 1970 (F+2 days) 
Prdblem: Non-sequential segments on a l l  Telemetry Data 
were received a t  MCC. 
Irnpact/~esolution: The impact was loss  of useable telemetry 
data f o r  a period of 12 seconds. The p rd lem was an 
occurence of momentary l i ne  h i t s  on the Primary Widaband 
c i r cu i t  (G-8526), and was of such short duration t h a t  
t racing a cause within the commercial c a r r i e r  system 
was impossible. Comnlunications Control placed e r ro r  
counters under surveillance t o  detect  any possible 
recwrence, however, no fur ther  e r ro rs  appeared. 
Time: 12422 
Problzm: Momentary loss  of Net '4 (High Speed command) 
capabil i ty t o  MAD. 
~mpact/~esolution: MATI'S Net 4 was =stored on a make-good 
f a c i l i t y  (the s a t e l l i t e  wideband system) a t  12442. The 
prc5lem with the basic Net 4 f a c i l i t y  was determined t o  be 
a noisy car r ie r  between Paris and Madrid, which was 
repaired and returned a s  operational a t  13152. 
Time: 12582 
Problem : GSE'C "A-System" Communications Processor Fault. 
Impact/~esolution : The Telemetry Instrumentation 
Controller reported a 2-second dropout of a l l  data 
sources. Further, four low speed teletype sources were 
l o s t  by Track and required "re-starts; these stations 
were MAD, MAD-X, CRO, and GWM. The cause of the f au l t  
was a buffer control regis ter  pari+y on a low speed ESI 
(~ommunications Line ~ermina l )  . The CLT was roplaced 
and the fau l ty  CLT was not ut i l ized again pending post-mission 
repair. The effect  of the was minimal since GSFC 
was able t o  effect  an immedic.te swap t o  the "B-System" 
(standby system). The Telemetry  str run en tat ion Contrcller 
reported a good interface a t  12592. 
Time: 14551. 
R6blem: Loss of a l l  GSFC-MAD Nets (except Net 1) 
Iinpact/~esolution: Command, telemetry, biomed and voice 
coordinated was l o s t  t o  MAD. A t  15022, G S C  completed 
a res tora l  of Net 2 ( ~ e t m ~ * k  Voice ~oordination) via 
London. Nets 2 and 4 were declared good a t  15022. The 
trouble was attributed t o  a fa i lure  of a radiation hazard 
protection switch a t  the Ruitrago (spain) Earth Station. 
Nets 2,  3, 5 and 6 were placed back on the i r  nomal routes 
a t  15092. 
Problem: Loss of GSFC-MCC GOSS Conference Circuit. 
Impact/~esolution: Air-to-ground capabil i ty was l o s t  
b r ie f ly  un t i l  t h i s  function was shifted t o  a backup 
circui t .  The normal COSS Conference c i rcu i t  was returned 
t o  service a t  l5lCZ; the trouble was due to  a fau l ty  
jaek a t  AT&T \.?aohi~ton, D.C. 
Time: 15122 
Problem: Loss of' L w  Speed Tracking Data. 
~nrpact/~esolation: Approximately 1 minutes & tracking 
data was los t  at MCC. A t  15122 the GSFC CP (on-The 
System B) experienced a drum parity error. A check indicated 
that CSFC did not lose output; however, tk interruption 
lleeessitated "re-starts" on the tracking data. 
Time: 1plZ 
~rapact/~esolution: Appmxinately 15 to  20 seconds of 
telemetry data was l o s t  and a jwitch vas made t o  the backup 
fomat. By 15242, llet 6 vzs  restored t o  nonzal and the 
!klemetry Instrumentation Controller reporfed good Cats. 
'Ihg reason f o r  the pmblen was a aispatch a t  MAD which had 
been effected duri g the process of set t ing up a backup 
route via CYIt 
I@act/Iksolution: Tbere was no data impact a t  M E ,  since 
llAD data was being processed. The c i rcu i t  was restor& 
t o  operation a t  16202; the trouble was reported as a 
faul ty message unit (MUR) between Faulkner, &mylaad and 
City, Oklahoma. 
Pnblem: MAD Net (High Speed ~ommacds) impaired. 
~ c t / ~ e s o l u t i o n :  The impact was loss of high speed 
camnards to XAD. Since GSFC Communications Manager was 
dualing Nets 4 and 6 t o  $!AD, MAD was advised t o  switch t o  the 
receive side of Net  6 as  a restoration action. The problem 
with the basic Ikt 4 circui t  was reported as  low levels. 
Problem: Uss of MAD Net 2 (~etwork Voice Coordimtion) 
?kt 3 (BI-), and l&t 5 (High Speed lkack) 
~ a c t , ' ~ e s o l u t i o n :  lhese tkiree bets uere on the HAD wide- 
brud system (sa te l l i te )  which had been experiencing 
dropouts caused by the antenna elevatior switch 
(*Radiation Hazard Protection Switch") cutting out a t  
low elevation. N e t  2 (Network Voice Coordiation circuit) 
was shifted t o  cable f a c i l i t i e s  via London. Attempts 
uere made t o  shift Net 3 via ACN (backup s i te ) ;  however, 
AClJ could not provide BIOME3) (30 f t  antenna). By 17422, the 
MAD wideband was restoreti and BIOMED was being received via 
NAD Net 5. The t o t a l  impact was loss of BIQHED f o r  
apprdximately 2 minutes. Because of recurring problems 
erperienced with the buitrago (spain) Earth Station auto 
track a t  low elevation, GS'C decided t o  retain a l l  circuits 
(except met 5 BIO~~ED) i n  the i r  present configuration. A t  
205x the t rackiw stat ion at- Buitrago lost  auto track 
capability and had t o  track manually. Since a l l  MSr'N s u ~ ~ o r t  
nets except BICMED, uere on other f ac i l i t i e s ,  the only 
service i n  jeopardy was BIOMED, which was quickly shifted 
t o  a malts-good f a c i l i t y  via CYI. 
Iiupac-i;/Resolution: BIdME3.I vas l o s t  for  app-oximately 3 
minutes dm t o  a dspatch a t  GSFC. 
Problem: Kanentary loss of a l l  MSFii data sources via 
GSFC. 
Xmpact/~esolutian: A l l  data and teletype incoming t o  tbe 
MCC were regcrted as hsving errors. The error  counters 
on the Ccmnunication Controller's console indicated no 
errors. The problem was of surh short duration that 
GSFC checks revealed no valid reemn f o r  the in tempt ion .  
Time: 13512 
Froblem: Temprary loss  of HSK Itets 2 and 6. 
Dnpact/~esolution: The impact was temporary loss of the 
Network Coordination voice c i rcu i t  with IESK and Net 6 
telemetry frm ftM. The problem on Net 2 was an outage 
between Canberra Switch and H.; Ik t  2 was restored 
on Net 3 a t  13522. The manentary loss of Net 6 was attr ibuted 
t o  trouble with the microwave system between Canberra 
and SJrdney. A t  lbI.2, the original Net  2 c i rcu i t  vas 
returned t o  normal s e ~ c e .  
E. April 15, 197C ( ~ + b  days) 
There were no ~ i g n i f i c a n t  problems this day. 
Time: 14132 
Prdblem: Mmntary loss  of MAD IJets 4. 
Impact/~esolution: lklemetry on t h i s  net was momentarily 
impaired u n t i l  GSFC took hnedia te  res tora l  action 
on a back ap circui t ,  
Problem: Suspected loss  of ACN Nets 4 and 6. 
lmpact/~esolution: The hleme try Instrumentation Controller 
was unable t o  turn on Am1 Telemetry. GSFC, on t.hecking with 
ACN, indicated tha t  commands were gett ing in to  the Data 
Transfer Unit on s i te ,  therefore the problem was believed 
t o  be an on-site . After several attempts B t  PEN t o  change 
the telemetry configuraticn, the problem was isolated a t  15152 
t o  an incorrect DTU configuration a t  ACN. 
Time: 15592 
Problem: Loss of ACN Net 2 Voice Coordination Circuit and 
ACN Wlemetry. 
~mpact/~esolution: The SATCObi t o  ACE drogped i n  and out 3 times 
for  short periods (the Andov 2. Earth Station reported t~ GGSFC 
that  they i:ad l o s t  carr ier  f rm ACN). A t  16012, a receive- 
orly loss of the Am SATC(Y-4 was experienced. This problem was 
traced t o  E transmittcr problem at the ACN Earth Station. Tht. 
ACH SATCOB1 was plnccd on the standby transmitter and a n  nets 
were "mailc good" by 1 C b 2 ~ .  
G. April 17, 1970 ( ~ + 6  days) 
Xo significant problems t h i s  date. 
3.7 Air/~mluld Communications 
Alr/~round voice communications were considered excellent, 
even tho@ a considerable portion of the mission vas 
f lown with the power amplifier off i n  the spacecraft. 
The MSFN support of the Mbackup voice mode on low p m r  
was considered :xcellent . The quality provided made it 
possible f o r  the hICC f l i g h t  controllers t o  operate i n  the low 
powr  mode and thus conserve c r i t i c a l  electrica1;;ower on the 
IM spacecraft. 
3.7.2 The following i s  a chronological summary of those air/ground 
problems which had mission impact or  significantly delayed 
ab/ground voice operations: 
A. April 11, 1970 (F-0 day) 
Air ground communications were satisfactory on this date. 
B. April 12, 1970 (~+1 day) 
Air g r d  ccmmunications =re satisfactory on t h i s  date. 
A i r  ground cmvminications wen? satisfactory on t h i s  date. 
D. April 14, 1970 (F+3 days) 
Time: l 4 / 0 6 5 ~  t o  lk/07352 
Problem: Interni t tent  AOS and IDS via GDS. 
linpact/~esolution: MCC encountered intermittent loss of 
a i r /groud conrmunic ations when O S  and HSK *re attempting 
t o  maintain separate track on the CCS and IM transponder. 
Air t o  ground voice communications were logged a s  
satisfactory a t  07352. 
Problem: CAPCQ4 did not uplink via  m. 
Iinpact/~esolution: The impact was momentary loss  of a i r  
ground communications uplink. HSK missed one Quindar 
key; a t  10272, tFe IISK Quindar sens i t iv i ty  was adjusted 
and no fur ther  problems were encountered. 
Time : llc/1034~ 
Problem: Spacecraft was not copying a l l  of CAPCOM 
uplink v i a  HSK. 
Iinpact/~esolution: Part  of the uplid. conversation was 
missed by the spacecraft. HSK reported solid uplink via 
HSK s t a t i s r  f ac i l i t i e s .  The spacecraft was i n  the 
Pn: mode a t  t h i s  t h e .  
E. April 15, 1970 ( ~ + 4  days) 
Time: 15 /09j2~  
Rdblem: Momentary appearance of t o m  on GCSS Conference. 
Impact/~enolution: No loss  of air/grosmd voice communications 
was realized. The tone appeared a t  the time of handover 
fran GDS t o  HSK. While i ts duration was extremely s h ~ r t ,  GSFC 
Voice Control advised tha t  the tone was coming i n  on the 
BSK line. There uas no recurrence of the tone t o  allow 
fur ther  trouble-shooting for  a positive source and cause 
identification. 
F. April 16, 1970 (F+5 days) 
problem: Loss of an i n i t i a l  voice uplink t o  spacecraft. 
~ m p a c t / ~ e s o l ~ t i o n :  The CAPCOM did not uplink on h i s  
first transmission via GDS. A t  the time of the incident, 
someone plugged h i s  headset in to  the CCS jack associated 
with the CAPCOM keyset. When t h i s  occurs, with air/ground 
accessed, t h i s  generally resu l t s  i n  the Quindar trensmitter 
droppiw the f i r s t  key. The problem was overcane by the 
CAPCOM "re-keying" the air/ground circuit .  
G. April 17, 1970 ( ~ + 6  days) 
h.dblem: Loss of the Quindar "SPACE" tone (off 
condition) a t  GDS. 
~ a c t / ~ s o l u t i o n :  GDS missed 3 or 4 Quindar space tones 
during the  process of a CAPCCkV transmission t o  the 
spacecraft. No injury was done t o  the transmission i t s e l f ,  
since it i s  the "MARK" tone which activates the s i t e  
uplink. A check with GSFC indicated tha t  both tones 
were passing throwh G S C  satisfactorily.  GDS used manual 
key procedures a t  BICC direction f o r  a short period of 
time a f t e r  which the space tone reappeared. No 
Qhdar adjustnent was made a t  GDS, according t o  reports 
from the GDS Coarm Tech. 
3.8.1 Apollo 13 carPied 525 line sequential color cameras on 
both CSM and IM. In addition a "backup" slow scan camera 
was aboard the  Uf. Due tc the ancmaly a l l  TV transmissions 
after a GET of 59 hours were cawelled. However, u n t i l  
tha t  the, the  CSM color camera, and growxi system provided 
excellent color television. 
3.8.2 !5e following i s  a chronological summary of onboard television 
activity f o r  Apollo 13. 
A. April ll, 1970 (F-O day) 
Configuration: MILA was configured t o  receive, record, 
and re lay  sequential color television t o  KSC and MCC. 
MCC and Building 8 were t o  convert sequential video 
t o  color and release t o  TV networks. 
EM Signal Strength: -90 DaM 
Picture Quality: Very good, with minor breakups i n  
video. These breakups were accompanied by similar 
f luctuations i n  the M signal strength ma were 
a t t r i t u t ed  t o  tne omni antennas. 
Configuration: Goldstone was configured t o  neceive, 
record, and relay sequential color television t o  MCC. 
MCC and building 8 were t o  convert sequential video 
t o  color and release t o  TV networks. 
Picture mali ty:  Excellent. Occasionally some micro- 
phone noise appeared i n  the video. This noise was 
believed t o  be caused by a crewman holding the camera 
by i ts lens. 
Time: 13/01262 - 13/02152 
Configuration: Goldstone uas configured t o  =eceive, 
record, and relay sequential color television t o  MCC. 
Madrid was configured t o  receive, recard and release 
sequential color television t o  Europe. MCC and 
Building 8 were t o  convert sequential video t o  color 
and -release t o  TV networks. 
FM Signal St;rength: -82 DBM a t  a GDS 210' s i t e  
-93 DBM a t  Madrid 
Picture Qlnlity: Excellent. 
c- April 14, 1970 (F+3 days) 
Configuration: Goldstone was configured t o  receive, record 
mil relay sequential color television to  MSC. MCC 
and building 8 were t o  convert sequential video to  
color and release t o  TV networks.. 
Signal Strength: -83 IlBM a t  GDs 210' S i t e  
Picture Quality: Ekcellent 
3.9 E i  Operations 
3.9.1 EPSQ provided ex2ellent support during the ApoUo 13 mission. 
The problems experienced by 1W were generally of a minor 
nature and the t o t a l  number of problems encountered was 
extremely low. The following is a summary of the more 
significant problems : 
A. April 11, 1970 (F-O day) 
Problem: D/TV Channel #5 had bright spots on the "Charactrod1 
face indicating a bad " charactron." 
~mpact/Resolution: Channel #5 was offline for  0r.e hour 
and 38 minutes. The charactron tube was replaced. 
Time: 17052 
Problem: 8 " 6' not receiving CWC through the SCU. 
~mpact/~esolution: The problem prohibited the " C' machine 
from being brought up fo r  support. The problem was cleared 
by selecting a new cross-point in the SCU. 
B. April 12, 1970 (~+1 day) 
Time: 01322 
Problem: "B" system hardcopy disabled. 
Impact/~esolution: A l l  consoles on the "B" system were 
unable t o  make hardcopies f o r  one hour and fourteen 
minutes. A relay on the second floor,  which enables 
second floor hardcopy machines, was stuck. The relay 
was bypassed i n  the circuit .  
Time: 17352 
Problem: L-1 Eidophor l . ~ s t  video presentation. 
~mpact/~esolutic?n: Eidophor presentation los t  tb M3CR fo r  
12 minutes. The VSM output card was replaced to restore 
video. 
C. April 13, 1970 ( ~ + 2  days) 
No problems t h i s  G?+E day. 
D. April 14, 1970 ( ~ + 3  days) 
Time: 09342 
Problem: Unable to load "C' system configuration into 
the SCU. 
Impact/~esolution: We?e unable to use the "C?' CP for 
support for five hours and 54 minutes. The "C' system 
was configured for support by manually doing crosspoints. 
However, the SCU operator was not able to close all of 
the nonnal crosspoints. Those left open were Alt P ~ / G S ,  
DSC and Alt MSFN.. .It was decided not to do fVfther work 
on the problem until after the mission. 
Time: 1430~ 
Problem: The Biomed Analog Recorder P'ELS not recording. 
lmpact/~esolution: No real time impact. The recordings 
are used for data reductions in Building 12. A ground 
strap was installed to solve the problem. 
E. April 15, 1970 ( ~ + 4  days) 
Time: 093= 
Problem: Recovery 6x12 lost drive in the X-axis. 
Impact/~esolution: The plo-cter was down for 49 minutes 
while a belt was changed on the servo motor. 
F. April 16, 1970 ( ~ + 5  days) 
Time: 03582 
Problem: R-1 Eidophor lost video presentation. 
lmpact/~esolut ion : Colored Eidophor presentation was lost 
for two minutes. A new cathode was rotated into position 
to correct the problem. 
G. April 17, 1970 (~+6 days) 
No problems this GMP day. 
4.0 Scheduling 
4.1 Premission Activities and Utilization Summaries 
4.1.1 U j o r  Milestones 
The MCC resources were placed in an Apollo 13 configuration 
on November 29, 1969. Apollo -13 delivery dates were as 
follows : 
December 9, 1969 CCATS Software Program 
December 24, 1969 ALDS Software Program 
December 31, 1969 GSSC Software Program 
January 2, 1970 R9)P Software Progrun 
January 2, 1970 APCU Software Program 
January 5 ,  1970 RTCC Software Program 
February 1, 1970 ALSEP Software Program 
!Zhe following zhronological history depicts a l l  Ago110 13 
premission test ing supported by the MCC. This tes t ing 
includes a l l  simulations, pad t e ~ t s ,  and validation tes t s  
conducted by Flight Control and Operations S.~.pport. 
November 20, 1969 
December 4, 1969 
5 
31 
31 
January 6, 1970 
6 
7 
8 
29 
February 3, 1970 
3 
4 
4 
TM Checkout 
Acquisition Message Generation 
Tape Build 
Val 501 
V a l  602 
Val 501 
Math Model M I  Sirn 
Math Model LM ~ c t / ~ e s  Sirn
MCC/MSFN V~ls 1040.1, 1040.2 - mc, ALDc 
2041, 2043 - GSFC, MIL 
CNS M I  Slm 
W/LMS LM ~ c t / ~ e s  Sim 
Val t e s t  Format 30 - GSFC, MIL 
MCC/MSFN V a l s  1041.1, 1041.2 - GSFC, MIL 
McC/MSFN Vals 3040, 1040.3 .- KSC, ALT)C 
1041.3 - GSFC, MIL 
C3B TLI Sirn 
Math Model Ascent Sirn 
MCC/MSFN V a l s  1051, 2051, -GSFC, MIL 
LMS Descent Aborts Sim 
W/LMS Ascent Sim 
CXS Launch Aborts Sirn 
CMS Reentry Sirn 
CMS/LMS LM A c t / ~ e s  Sirn 
LMS c/o 
QG TLI Sirn 
ALSEP C/O 
ALSEP C/O 
L W  Descent Sirn 
McC/MSFN ValS 1051, 2051 - GSFC, TM 
Math Model Lunrr Surface Sim 
CSS DO1 Sim 
CMS EVA No. 1 (KSC) 
LM Color TV C/O 
13 
16 
17 
17 
18 
19 
19 
25 
March 2, 19'10 
2, 
3 
4 
5 
5 
6 
6 
MCC/- Vals 1041.1, 1041.2, 2044, 1043 - 
GSFC, MIL 
Track Acquisition Message and JFL Vectors 
Cos 4/~edable  Decom C/O - GSFC, MIL 
Track and TLM Loading C/O - GSFC, MIL, 
BDA, QIS, NT&TF, !EX 
MCC/MSFN Val 1040.3 - A D C ,  KSC 
Math Model ALSEP 3 Sim 
CMS TEI Sim 
Special Launch Sim fo r  NBC Movie 
CMS Launch Sim 
SESL Tape Playback 
LV Redundancy Test 
Fl ight  Readiness Test 
N h  No. 2  lagst staff, ~ r i z )  
CMS Lunar Photo - Sequence 2 - Sim 
U@/LMS LM Ascent l~escent  Sim 
Math Model ALSEP 3 Sim 
LMS Descent Sim 
A/G Remoting Test - CISFC, QIS, GYM, HAW 
A/G Remoting Test - GSFC, GWM, CRL), HSK 
A/G Remaking Test - GSFC, Am, BDA, CYI ,  
m, MIL, TEx 
Medable Decom C/O 
MCC/MSFN Val 1041.2 - GSFC, MIL 
Ma tk. Model FDO ,/BSE Sim 
LMS Descent Sin 
Math Model ALSEP 3 Sin 
W/LhE Ascent 9im 
JJ Tracking Data Flow Test - GSFC, CRO, CXI, 
GWM, IIAW, HSK, MAD 
Math Model Lunar Impact rim 
A/G Remoting Test - GSFC, VAN 
LV SIT (CMD History ~ e s t )  - ~ F u ,  KSC, m, 
m c h  16 
17 
18 - 20 
EVA 110. 2 (~ lagstaf f ,  ~ r i z )  - Voice Only 
'1ZI Sim 
HCC/MSFN Val; 1040.1, 2044 - GSFC, (394, 
HAW, HSK, CRO, Amy CYI, May MAD, 
BDAI VAN, TW(, GYMy GDS 
Format 30 C/O, 1041.3 - GDS, GSFC, BDA 
3044, 3047 - VAN, GSFC 
3046, 3047 - HAWy my GSFC, GDi, MI), MAD-X 
GWy Q)Sy QIS-Xy Ma, Aa?, B A S  
HSK, HSK-X 
CM/m LO1 Sin 
Astro Corn C '0 - KSC 
Math Yadel ALSEP 3 Sim 
Medable Decom CB 
LV SIT - TTY C3.D Eistory 
C3lS Reentry and LEIS Ascent Sirn 
Ed-to-End Corm V a l  4041 - KSC 
Math Model IX)I/DES Sim 
Wet UIDT 
Dry QIEl! 
Math W e 1  F~Do/BSE 3im 
Llath Mode: ALSEP 3 Sim 
LHS Descent Sim 
Network Sim 
M/LW Ascent Sim 
(rCj LOI/DCI Sirn 
A/G Remoting Test 
Spacecraft Tine Conversion C/O 
C S  Launch Sim 
Ponnat 30 Checkout - GSFC, MIL, HSK 
W L M S  Act/Des Sim 
A/G Remoting Test - GSFC, AQJ, BDA, CRO, 
CIIy.cPSy CWM, my HAW, HSK, MAD, 'IM 
T-53 Hour Checkout 
1.2 HF Checkout - GSF'C, VAN 
April 9, 1970 
9 - 11 
11 - 17 
TLM and Color TV Val - GSFC, Q)S 
Terminal Count 
Mission 
4.1.2 bISF13 S i te  Utilization 
Table VIII represents the tota l  hours that the MCC interfaced with each 
MSRi site for all Apollo 13 premission support. This includes a U  
simulations, validations, and pad tests. Table I1 shows the number 
of hours devoted to TUI, 0, or TRK data validation by the MCC 
with the various sites. 
MSEN SIm UTILIZATION ANAL?:;SIS 
Pre-Mission Prime Tin.e fiemiurn Time Table 11 
Site  ~ / ~ H o . u r s  YSC SITE b S C  SITE TLM CMIi TKG 
Am 
AISC 
BD A 
CRO 
cn 
GDS 
GiK 
GYN 
HAW 
HSK 
K m  
MIL 
TM 
v .  
4.1.3 Mission Progran Build and Testing 
The build and testing of the Apollo 13 RTCC program utilized 7% hours 
of IBM 360/75 time. The build begen i n  August 1969 and updates were 
added af ter  the program vas delivered i n  January 1970. 
The CCATS pmgram was delivered i n  December lsg. A total of 364 
hours were ut i l ized on the UlII:VbC 494 computers for the building 
and testing of the program. 
The development afid testing of the kLSEP program f o r  hpollo 13 
required 160 hours of 360/75 time. Development began in September 
1969 ancl continued with sore system test ing a f t e r  the program was 
delivered i n  F e b m r y  1970. 
4.2 Network Stat.= recording fo r  Apollo 13 began v i t h  IS1 #l. Upon be:% 
placed i n  Mission Status, the s i t e  status was maintained and displayed 
via TV to the Kission Operations Control Room. This status -as abtained 
from daily s i t e  status messages from Station M8D a;ld from coordination 
vith the Network Suppr t  Team a t  GSFC. Status messages were received 
a t  specific intervals during the suppcrt count, with the l a s t  being 
a voice check a t  T-2:30 minutes. After launch, status was reported 
verbally to  the Netvork Controller and by Trm +A the status monitor. 
During Apollo 13 (ISI #1 to splash) the stat= monitor received 715 
s ta t=  messages. 
I 
The LOS, AOS and maximum elevation were extracted from the FsATtables 
and used with the mission tracking requirements to  determine remte  
s i t e  release cr i ter ia .  A s i t e  was released to ta l ly  or  part ial ly 
de-wndent upon the following: 
A. USB lllaximum elevation of less than 6 depees  
B. Si te  not required for  6 hours. 
c. MCC tracking requirements 
4.2.1 Network Status a t  launch is l i s t ed  below. The red can support items 
indicate that some piece of equipment i n  the system was down, but 
that  backup units were available o r  the outage would not cause a 
major effect  on the systems support. Red cannot support items 
indicate that a system (or systems) was unable to  provide required 
support. 
S i te  
-
Am 
Am 
BDA 
HAW 
HSK 
VAN 
ARIA 
Status 
-
Green 
Green 
Green 
Green 
Red can s u ~ p r t  
Green 
Green 
Green 
Green 
Green 
Red can support 
Red can support 
Green 
Green 
Green 
Red can support 
Green 
Ihe "Red Can ~lrpport" system problems were as follows: 
a) Carnammn - the SPAN radio telescope c o n t ~ o l  oven temperature 
was out of limits. (E!JD 13/00302. 
b) EGcsy.o*~~zckle - the RglP 642~ NR 1/CMD was faulting intermrittently. 
BTO UnknQVZl. 
c)  Madrid - timing prdblem wLth the Loran C receiver Model WC 504. 
m 12/16302. 
d) USNS Vanguard - the CDP 1230/EiN H.S. da ta  output was erratic.  ETO 
post-mission. Also, the C-band receivers were drifting. No EX). 
4.2.2 Network Support of Apollo 13 is l i s t ed  below, the hguys shown 
indicate the interface time between the s i t e  and MCC. The times 
indicated are to t a l  support times from T-3 h ~ u r s  i n  the terminal 
count u n t i l  the s i t e  was released fromMission support. The t o t a l  
s i t e  release messages sent were 108. 
Site 
-
K S C  
m 
ALDS/DATA OORE 
AOCC 
A R I A 1  
ARIA 2 
ARIA 3 
ARIA 4 
GWM 
Am 
VAN 
GYM 
HSK 
HSK-X 
MAD 
MAD-x 
c!iI 
CRQ 
BDA 
MLA 
MIL 
TM 
a s  
me-x 
HAW 
PARKES 
MARS 
Hours 
3:12 
3:12 
7: 53 
7:49 
7: 19 
7: 19 
7: 19 
7:49 
64: 30 
65:11 
5: 57 
81: 56 
62:05 
66: 13 
81~19 
8099 
60:15 
68 : 14 
82: 10 
14: 27 
83:25 
69:47 
86: 56 
86: 56 
86: 41 
3395 
41: 54 
4.2.3 Util ization of the RTCC and CCATS computers i n  direct support of 
the Apollo 13 mission constituted a to t a l  of 354.5 hours in the 
RTCC and 340.5 hours on the CCATS computers. A breakdown of these 
hours is as  follows: 
RWC Hours CCATS Hours 
Flight Control 287.5 241.0 
Operations Support 67.0 99.5 
354.5 340.5 
During the Apollo 13 mission, no major premission test ing was conducted 
f i r  the next mission. 
